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

THE ART OF SPEECH.

VOL. II.

STUDIES IN ELOQUENCE AND LOGIC.

BY

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TO

HON. LEWIS MILLER,
OF AKRON, OHIO,

WHOSE SUGGESTION MADE CHAUTAUQUA LAKE

THE SITE OF THE FIRST SUNDAY-SCHOOL ASSEMBLY,

AND WHOSE WISE COUNSELS AND NOBLE PATRONAGE HAVE,

IN A LARGE DEGREE,

CONTRIBUTED TO THE SUCCESS OF

THE WHOLE CHAUTAUQUA MOVEMENT,

THIS TREATISE IS RESPECTFULLY

Dedicated.

PREFACE.

THE author desires to express gratitude for the commendations bestowed by the public upon Volume I. Nor is he less thankful for adverse criticisms; the most of which, doubtless, are just. If errors are discovered in this book, he would regard it a favor to have them pointed out, that corrections may be made.

The author has felt that clergymen more than those of other professions will study this treatise, hence the same method as in Volume I. has been adopted, that of drawing the illustrations largely from the Bible and sermonic literature.

The field remaining to be discussed under "THE ART OF SPEECH," includes *Studies in Elocution and Psychology.*

A volume, covering these subjects, uniform with I. and II., will in due time be prepared for the Chautauqua Course by some writer not yet determined upon.

CONTENTS.

PART I.—STUDIES IN ELOQUENCE.

CHAPTER		PAGE
	INTRODUCTORY	11
I.	HISTORY OF ELOQUENCE	15
II.	LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DEMOSTHENES	20
III.	ORATION ON THE CROWN	32
IV.	INFERENCES	58
V.	INFERENCES (*Continued*)	96
VI.	INFERENCES (*Continued*)	115
VII.	INFERENCES (*Concluded*)	174

PART II.—STUDIES IN LOGIC.

	INTRODUCTORY	183
I.	ARGUMENTATION	184
II.	CLASSIFICATION	191
III.	PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS	220

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES 235

ART OF SPEECH.

PART FIRST. — STUDIES IN ELOQUENCE.

PART I.

STUDIES IN ELOQUENCE.

INTRODUCTORY.

ARISTOTLE, who was one of the first to reduce the chaos of ancient knowledge to something like order, defines oratory as "the power of saying on every subject whatever can be found to persuade."

Theodorus describes oratory as "the power of discerning, and expressing with elegance, whatever is creditable on any namable subject." The Peripatetics viewed oratory as a science; the Stoics, as a virtue. "An orator," says Cicero, in his *De Oratore*, "is one who can use words agreeable to hear and thoughts adapted to prove."

Cicero, in the same treatise, bases eloquence upon three processes: (1) The conciliating of hearers. (2) The instructing of hearers. (3) The moving of hearers. He further states that these ends are accomplished, (1) By mildness. (2) By penetration. (3) By energy.

Quintilian, in his treatise upon rhetoric, divides oratory into invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery or action. Most ancient writers add to these the power of correct judgment.

Quintilian defines oratory as "the power of persuading," and "the science of speaking well." Gorgias defined it as "the power of persuading by speaking."

Says Lord Macaulay, in his essay on Athenian orators: "The object of oratory alone is not truth, but persuasion. The admiration of the multitude does not make Moore a greater poet than Coleridge, or Beattie a greater philosopher than Berkeley. But the criterion of eloquence is different. A speaker who exhausts the whole philosophy of a question, who displays every grace of style, yet produces no effect on his audience, may be a great essayist, a great statesman, a great master of composition, but he is not an orator. If he miss the mark, it makes no difference whether he have taken aim too high or too low."

Says Lord Russell, in his Life of Fox: "Of eloquence it has been eloquently said, 'Eloquentia sicut flamma, materie alitur, motu excitatur, urendo clarescit.' Mr. Pitt renders the passage thus: 'It is of eloquence as of a flame; it requires matter to feed it, motion to excite it, and it brightens as it burns.'"

"Eloquence," says Bautain, "would miss its aim, if it failed to lead the hearer to some act." Says Fénelon: "I think the whole art of *oratory* may be reduced to proving, painting, and raising the passions. Now all those pretty, sparkling, quaint thoughts that do not tend to one of these ends, are only witty conceits. . . . The whole art of eloquence consists in enforcing the clearest proofs of any truth,

with such powerful motives as may affect the hearers, and employ their passions to just and worthy ends; to raise their indignation at ingratitude, their horror against cruelty, their compassion for the miserable, their love of virtue, and to direct every other passion to its proper objects."

Says Emerson: "The end of eloquence is — is it not? — to alter in a pair of hours, perhaps in a half hour's discourse, the convictions and habits of years." Noah Webster, who may be allowed to represent modern lexicographers, defines eloquence as "the expression or utterance of a strong emotion, in a manner adapted to excite corresponding emotions in others. It ordinarily implies elevated and forcible thought, well chosen language, an easy and effective utterance, and an impassioned manner." Webster defines oratory as "the art of an orator; the art of public speaking in an eloquent or effective manner; the exercise of rhetorical skill in oral discourse."

From these views and definitions we may conclude that eloquence as an *art* is such a representation of thought in vocal, written, or gesture language, as is adapted to persuade. The aim in eloquence is to persuade the will and the moral faculties, rather than merely to convince the judgment. Hence anything that persuades, whether oral or written composition, a look or a gesture, is eloquent.

As a *science*, eloquence is the theory of the processes of so expressing thought as to persuade. Eloquence is, therefore, the art and science of per-

suasion. Its highest form combines right intentions and correct expression. The Christian sermon ought, therefore, to be the highest type of this highest form of eloquence.

Oratory as an *art* is such an exercise of rhetorical skill in oral discourse as is imposing and impressive. A classification and systematic arrangement of the rules of oratorical art constitute the *science* of oratory. Oratory is, therefore, the art and science of producing strong impressions by means of oral speech. Eloquence, strictly speaking, generates volition; oratory generates conviction.

To these definitions may be added that of sacred or pulpit eloquence: it is the art and science of persuading men, by means of a sermon, to become Christians in heart and work. Sacred, or pulpit, oratory is, therefore, the art and science of employing sacred, or pulpit, eloquence orally, skilfully, and impressively. In this treatise it is not necessary constantly to keep up these distinctions between secular and sacred eloquence and oratory: we shall, therefore, treat the general subject under the head of Eloquence.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF ELOQUENCE.

> "To the famous orators repair,
> Those ancients, whose resistless eloquence
> Wielded at will that fierce democratie,
> Shook the arsenal, and fulmined over Greece
> To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne."—MILTON.

FOR one thoroughly to master the art and science of Eloquence, he evidently must master the history of public speaking. The student will, therefore, best begin with the life of Demosthenes, making a careful study and analysis of his masterpiece, the *Oration on the Crown*, which Macaulay says is "the most splendid contest of eloquence the world has ever known." Next, the student ought to take up the life of Cicero, mastering, for instance, his *Defence of Milo*. Tully and his *Oration Against Antony* should not be overlooked. The British secular orators should next be thoroughly reviewed. The following deserve special attention:—Lord Chatham, *Speech*, April 2, 1778; William Pitt, *Speech*, February 26, 1781; Charles James Fox, *Speech on the Rejection of Napoleon's Overtures;* Sheridan, *Speech at the Trial of Warren Hastings;* Curran, *Defence of Rowan;* Burke, *Speech*

at the Trial of Warren Hastings, and *The Arcot Debts;* Brougham, *Speech on Law Reform*, and *Defence of Queen Caroline;* Grattan, *Speech on Irish Rights* (1780), and *Debate on Pensions* (1786); O'Connell, *The Irish Coercion Bill;* Thomas Erskine, *Plea in Case of Lord Sandwich* versus *Captain Baillie*, and *Defence of Lord George Gordon* (1781); Canning, *Speech on King's Message respecting Portugal* (1826).

From British to American secular orators is the next step. James Otis, Patrick Henry, the two Adamses, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, Robert Y. Hayne, Fisher Ames, Rufus Choate, William Pinkney, Edward Everett, Abraham Lincoln, Charles Sumner, Wendell Phillips, and John B. Gough, are men with whom the student of oratory should be thoroughly familiar. The following speeches of these men should receive critical study: — *British Writers of Assistance*, Otis: *In Behalf of American Independence;* also, *In Behalf of British Refugees*, Henry: *Oration on American Independence*, Samuel Adams: *The United States ought to be Free and Independent* (July 2, 1776), and *Inaugural* (1797), John Adams: *South American Independence*, also *Speech at Lexington, Ky.* (1843), Clay: *Plymouth Address; Reply to Hayne;* also, *Plea at the Trial of the Knapps*, Webster: *Speech on the Force Bill*, Calhoun: *Speech on Foot's Resolution*, Hayne: *Speech on Madison's Resolution*, Fisher Ames: *Eulogy on Daniel Webster*, Choate: *Case*

of the Nereide, Pinkney: *Phi-Beta-Kappa Oration* (1824), also *Dudley Observatory Oration*, Everett: *Gettysburg Speech*, Lincoln: *Crime against Kansas* (1856); *Barbarism of Slavery* (1860); and *True Grandeur of Nations*, Charles Sumner: *Sims' Anniversary* (1852); *Removal of Judge Loring*; also *Toussaint L'Ouverture*, Phillips.

The field of sacred eloquence and oratory must also pass under the student's patient and careful review. Judah's *Plea before Joseph* (Genesis xliv. 18–54); Joshua's *Exhortation to Israel* (Joshua xxiii.); *Nathan before David* (2 Sam. xii. 1–12); *Ezra's Sermon* (Nehemiah viii. 1–12); *Elijah's Speech on Carmel* (1 Kings xviii.), and the prophetic announcements of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, and the Minor Prophets, will furnish the student with valuable lessons in eloquence and oratory.

In the New Testament, the various discourses of our Lord should be examined. So, likewise, should the preaching of John the Baptist (Matt. iii., Mark i., Luke iii.); the speech of Stephen (Acts vii.); the sermons of Peter (Acts ii. iii. x.); and the sermons of Paul (Acts xiii. xvii. xxiii. xxvi.). In these partially reported Bible sermons and speeches will be found or suggested many of the fundamental principles of successful oratory. Among the church fathers, the character and lives of the following, together with their sermons upon the texts specified, should be studied and mastered: Tertullian, *James*

i. 4; Athanasius, *Ps. xlv.* 7, 8; Chrysostom, 1 *Thess. iv.* 13; and Augustine, *Matt. xx.* 30–34.

Approaching the sixteenth century, the list of distinguished preachers rapidly increases. The German pulpit presents the following: Luther, *Gal. iv.* 1–7; Melancthon, *John x.* 28; Theremin, *Matt. xxvii.* 61; Tholuck, *Luke ii.* 34, 35; Stier, 1 *Cor. xv.* 1–10.

From the British pulpit we select the following: Hugh Latimer, *Rom. xv.* 4; John Knox, *Is. xxvi.* 13–16; Chillingworth, 2 *Tim. iii.* 1–5; Tillotson, *Acts xxvi.* 8; Hugh Blair, *John xvii.* 1; Barrow, 1 *Col. i.* 23; Jeremy Taylor, *Matt. xvi.* 26; South, *Gen. i.* 27; John Wesley, *Rom. xiv.* 10; Whitefield, *Rom. xiv.* 17; Richard Watson, *Job vii.* 27; Robert Hall, *Eph. ii.* 12, also *Jer. xv.* 9; Dr. Chalmers, 1 *John ii.* 15; John Foster, *Acts xii.* 1–11; Edward Irving, *John v.* 39; Henry Melville, *Gal. vi.* 7; Spurgeon, *Job xxxv.* 10; Guthrie, *Ez. xxxvi.* 10; John Caird, *Rom. xii.* 11; Robertson, *John xviii.* 38; and Punshon, *Daniel, King of Babylon.*

The French pulpit presents for study the following brilliant names: Bossuet, *Judges vi.* 12–16; also, sermon *On the Death of Madame Henriette Anne d'Angleterre:* Bourdaloue, *Luke xxiii.* 27, 28: Fénelon, 1 *Thess. v.* 17: Massillon, *Luke iv.* 27: Vinet, 1 *Cor. ii.* 9: D'Aubigné, *Is. viii.* 20, *Eph. ii.* 5, *John iii.* 6; and Adolphe Monod, 1 *John iv.* 8.

The American pulpit will be found full of interest to the student of sacred oratory. Read Cotton Mather,

Ps. lxxxix. 35: President Edwards, *Deut. xxvii.* 35: Dr. Griffin, *Col. i.* 20: John M. Mason, *Luke vii.* 22: Stephen Olin, *John xiv.* 1: John Summerfield, 3 *Peter i.* 11: John McClintock, 1 *John iv.* 19: Dr. Channing, *Col. i.* 28: Mark Hopkins, 1 *Tim. vi.* 20, 21: John P. Durbin, 2 *Chron. vi.* 18: Lyman Beecher, *Is. lix.* 14, 15: Dr. Storrs, *Ps. xvii.* 15: Bishop Simpson, 1 *John v.* 4: Professor Park, *Ps. xc.* 2: H. W. Beecher, 2 *Tim. iii.* 16, 17: Dr. Tyng, *Heb. x.* 28, 29: Moody, *John iii.* 14, 15: Phillips Brooks, *James i.* 27.

The designs and limits of this treatise forbid sketches of all the foregoing secular and pulpit orators, therefore we must restrict investigation; and for the purpose of illustrating the correct method of working in this field, we select as a representative, Demosthenes and his *Oration on the Crown.*

CHAPTER II.

LIFE AND CHARACTER OF DEMOSTHENES.

THIS prince of ancient orators was born B. C. 385. Prior to his time there is no name in the field of secular or political oratory that with his is at all worthy of comparison. During his time and since, there is, by his admirers, thought to be nothing in forensic oratory that quite measures up to his high attainments. Hence, what were the circumstances connected with his career, and what were his methods of work in the study, and what his behavior on the bema, are questions deserving the most critical study.

In early life Demosthenes was compelled to battle against much adversity. He was only seven years of age when his father, who was reputed wealthy, died. Shortly after this his guardians defrauded him of his patrimony, which otherwise would have given him ample support. In consequence of this loss he was denied the privileges of systematic schooling and nearly all other opportunities of culture. He was sickly in his youth, and so ill-favored as to receive offensive nicknames. His voice at the outset was weak, and he was a stammerer. His breath was short, his manner repulsive, and to the

popular mind his hopes of becoming a noted orator were without foundation and doomed to disappointment. Still there were a few indications that he possessed at least the head and the heart of an orator. And indeed such he was, notwithstanding his constitutional misfortunes.

There was an indication of this at sixteen years of age. At that time, Callistratus, an orator of considerable reputation, was pleading a civil case in Athens, and Demosthenes, by some means, secured a position where, without being himself noticed, he could hear the orator to the best advantage. Callistratus upon that occasion was brilliant, and won the admiration, praise, and applause of the entire assembly. Demosthenes was thrilled and inspired. A new life opened before him. The grandeur of eloquence stirred his soul to its depths, and he firmly resolved that this power, which he saw could so mightily sway and mould the thoughts and purposes of the masses, should be his.

In this experience, Demosthenes, among the noted orators, does not stand alone. Grattan received his first oratorical impulse while listening to one of Lord Chatham's thrilling speeches in Parliament. Robert Hall felt the first kindling of these fires of oratory in listening to a sermon when a student at the Northampton Academy. And Rufus Choate, while a young man, had the same experience in listening to a brilliant plea of William Pinkney. In these instances the silent chord was struck to which every other chord of the man's being responded. It

is as with Correggio: his face flushed, his eye flashed fire, while looking for the first time upon a painting of Raphael, and he exclaimed, "I, too, am a painter!" Thus, also, Demosthenes, while listening to Callistratus, had the feeling for the first time, no doubt, "I, too, am an orator!"

Subsequent events show that he also probably had in mind the fact that with this oratorical skill and might he could crush the power of his guardians and compel them to refund his stolen patrimony. With characteristic determination, he at once abandoned all other life-plans, and rigorously and continuously applied himself to the art and science of oratory. To be numbered some day among the great orators of Greece was at once his determination and his inspiration.

Two years after this determination was formed, at eighteen years of age, he appeared at the bar with a plea for the recovery of his embezzled inheritance. He was successful, gaining his cause. But his next public appearance was an utter failure. He was confused, then hissed down. He left the assembly and wandered about the streets of Athens, dejected, well-nigh disheartened. Fortunately he was met by Eunomus, an aged, kind-hearted, and keen-sighted man, who said to him, "You have a manner of speaking much like that of Pericles." Eunomus likewise urged Demosthenes not to suffer his body, through severe study, "to wither away in negligence and indolence," but "to prepare it by exercise for the labor of the rostrum."

How much this word of encouragement did for the young orator we cannot easily tell. He had learned a most valuable lesson, however; this — that the background of a successful life is a *task*. His work was to be done not in an easy-chair nor with kid gloves on. He also received a valuable hint from Satyrus, who, as Plutarch tells us, following Demosthenes to his home after one of his early failures, said to him, "Though you are the most laborious of all the orators, and have almost sacrificed your health to application, still you gain no favor with the people: drunken seamen and other unlettered persons are heard and keep the rostrum, while you are entirely disregarded." These hints were well received.

The subsequent efforts of Demosthenes to overcome his defects of person and speech are too familiar to dwell upon. He built a subterranean study, to which he daily repaired to exercise his voice. He excluded himself from the public for months together, devoting himself to physical discipline and study; and lest he should be tempted, during these seasons, to abandon his purpose, he shaved the hair off one half his head, and thus precluded the possibility of relinquishing his purpose. He increased the capacity of his lungs by speaking while rapidly climbing steep hills. He increased the penetrating power of his voice by declaiming on the shores of the Ægean Sea when lashed into fury by a storm, so that he could cope with the tumult of an Athenian audience. He corrected his imper-

fect enunciation by the painful expedient of placing in his mouth, while speaking for practice, a handful of pebbles. He improved his awkward bearing and gesticulation by speaking before critical masters, and also before a mirror in his own house. He acquired the power of giving ready expression to his thoughts by continually talking; whenever left to himself he would seize upon the passing moment to put into a speech what he had heard on the street or at the fireside. He was in his work an enthusiast.* Demosthenes was also a constant student of men in the common walks of life. When persons who had suffered some wrong came to him, he would listen to their complaints, and reply that they had not been much wronged. Then, when they were repelling this charge, he would study their action and words, as an artist studies the form he is to transfer to canvas. So laborious was the great orator in all these matters, that many people, as Plutarch writes, said that Demosthenes is no genius.

But more than this. Demosthenes, in all departments bearing upon eloquence and oratory, applied for instruction to the most noted men of his time. No labor or expense, as he judged, was too great to be offered in sacrifice. He received elocutionary lessons of Satyrus, a noted theatric player, and rehearsed before him the speeches found in Euripides and Sophocles. Isæus, however, in the arts of elo-

* The notes in this volume are indicated by the small Arabic numerals [1], [2], [3], etc., and constitute the Supplement. See page 235.

quence was his principal teacher, and an especial favorite, owing to the vigor and nerve of his style. Demosthenes also received instruction from Callias, and studied the rhetorical systems of Isocrates and Alcidamus. He copied and recopied the entire writings of Thucydides, that his own style might catch the glow and beauty of that polished historian. In a word, Demosthenes, by personal effort and the best schooling of the day, sought to master everything pertaining to his art — general bearing, gesture, vocal expression, the rhetorical framing and delicate balancing of sentences and even parts of sentences, the nice choice of words, — indeed, everything in rhetoric that would contribute to the utmost closeness, richness, and strength of language. "The result of this training," as a recent reviewer has remarked, "any one can guess. His bodily infirmities disappeared, his voice became strong, and his elocution perfect. His appearance before an audience, however excited the people were, was a signal for quiet and order. It is allowed on all hands that no man ever had such control over his listeners. He could move them at a word to laughter or to tears."

During these years when he was gaining popularity, he was extremely careful in his preparations for all public efforts. He so highly prized eloquence that he would not publicly mar its reputation through negligence of its high requirements. He seldom, until near the close of his career, spoke off-hand, yet he never appeared with manuscript or note.[1] He was often called to speak upon some point under

discussion in the assembly, but rigidly refused unless he felt prepared. So manifest was his usual careful preparation that other envious orators ridiculed him, saying that "all his arguments smelled of the lamp." To Pytheas, who especially reproached the great orator for his exact preparations, Demosthenes replied: "This shows me to be a good member of a democratic state; for the coming prepared to the rostrum is a mark of respect for the people. Whereas, to be regardless of what the people might think of a man's address, shows his inclination for oligarchy, and that he would rather gain his point by force than by persuasion."

Different writers, from Quintilian's time to the present, have called attention to certain passages in his orations which have all the finish his genius and accomplishments could possibly confer, and, like some of our most noted modern orators, he was accustomed, with the nicest changes, to use, in his different orations, these elaborated passages.

It should, perhaps, be remarked in passing, that, notwithstanding this drill and rigid application of Demosthenes, which commenced at sixteen years of age, he attracted but little attention, and had gained but small influence, until he was past thirty.[2]

There is one other thought that should be borne in mind: Demosthenes was fortunate in having men for auditors and for antagonists who could evoke the fire of eloquence, and thus compel him carefully to prepare his public efforts, and to do his best when on the bema. The effect of this responsive power

of an audience upon a man of an "objective turn" is far greater than is generally supposed. "There would be no oratory in the world," says Quintilian, "were we to speak with one person only at a time." "A jest's prosperity," as Shakespeare quaintly remarks, "lies in the ear of him who hears it."[5] In his audience, we repeat, Demosthenes was fortunate. The people who crowded those Grecian assemblies were those who could be thrilled with lofty sentiments, and could appreciate the excellences of elocution and eloquence. Demosthenes knew that nothing of his laborious efforts would be lost; that his pearls would not be thrown to swine. Many, even of the common people, are said to have been "masters of the language of Greece, critics often as to its scholarly niceties, and practised judges upon every species of oratory." Before such auditors — auditors who were accustomed to interrupt one if he chanced merely to mispronounce a word — the public speaker needed to be constantly on his guard; and this kind of guard-duty is vitally beneficial — a professional life-preserver.

Among the great men of Demosthenes' time was the statesman and orator Lycurgus, whose orations were always carefully prepared, whose speech, though not ready, was among the most powerful in Athens, and whose character was irreproachable. Demosthenes also often contested the honors of debate with the profligate but facetious orator, Demades, who in humorous sallies was often a match for any Athenian; and with Phocion, a powerful speaker, a

man of the sternest political integrity, of whom Demosthenes used to say, "Here comes the pruner of my periods." In oratorical efforts, Æschines was the chief rival of Demosthenes; and the Debate on the Crown was the occasion of the masterly efforts of each of these two great men. In loudness and clearness of voice, in ease and fluency of speech, Æschines decidedly outranked Demosthenes. After his defeat, Æschines opened a school of oratory in Rhodes, where he gained great reputation for ability in speaking.

Such were the men with whom Demosthenes came in contact; they were of a character, as is easily inferred, to stimulate and inspire to the utmost his oratorical powers.

The themes upon which Demosthenes expended his eloquence, being among the grandest then agitating the popular mind, likewise contributed to his oratorical successes. He appeared upon the side of justice and humanity, always contending for the rights of the people. In his orations against Philip, he "stood before his countrymen representing all which remained of Athenian dignity and glory. If any man could help them, it was he. His advice had always been steady and constant; his warnings should have been earlier attended to. But even yet there might be need of him. He was their consolation for the past, their hope for the future." Of course, therefore, when he spoke the people flocked to hear him, and were electrified.

"Wherever," as Emerson says, "the polarities

meet, wherever the fresh moral sentiment, the instinct of freedom and duty, comes in direct opposition to fossil conservatism and the thirst of gain, the spark will pass."

We are at this point prepared to note some of the strong and salient points in the character of Demosthenes.

First. During the periods of his greatest successes he was free from moral and political stains. He appears to have striven always to be on the best terms with his conscience.[3] As Dr. Anthon correctly remarks, "The mystery of Demosthenes' mighty influence lay in his honesty; and it is this that gave warmth and tone to his feelings, and energy to his language, and an impressiveness to his manner, before which every imputation of insincerity must have immediately vanished."

Demosthenes early adopted the philosophy of Plato, which, in a letter addressed to Heracleodorus, he thus extols: "Since you have espoused the doctrine of Plato, which is so distant from avarice, from artifice, and violence: a doctrine whose object is the perfection of goodness and justice! Immortal gods! when once a man has adopted this doctrine, is it possible he should deviate from truth, or entertain one selfish or ungenerous sentiment?" In harmony with this philosophy it is found that virtue chosen for its own sake, and at any cost, was the principle pervading all his masterpieces. "My friends," he once said, when the people were trying to carry an impeachment case by unfair means,

"my friends, I will be your counsellor whether you will or not; but a false accuser I will not be, however much you may wish it."

Second. Patriotism, especially during the period of his ascendancy, was a marked characteristic of Demosthenes. "The more his country was environed by dangers, the more sturdy was his resolution." He was superior to others because others were selfish, while he was moved by Athenian patriotism, even a passion for the glory of his country.

Third. Moral fearlessness is another noticeable characteristic of this great orator. He was not brave on the field of battle; but on the bema nothing could intimidate him. At a time when Philip was successful, as Plutarch tells us, and all Athens was struck dumb, and no other man could be found who dared mount the rostrum, Demosthenes stood forth alone, a giant in the darkness of those troubled times, and by his powerful and daring attacks upon Philip, he so inflamed the people that they themselves lost all fear, forgot even to be cautious, and were ready to march against the victorious Macedonian invader.

Fourth. All through the centuries Demosthenes has been held up as one of the most illustrious examples of unwearied application and perseverance.

Fifth. The intensity and earnestness of Demosthenes are likewise noticeable characteristics. His intensity, so sober and yet so passionate, seemed to have a touch of *revenge*. It is not surprising, therefore, that he could stimulate, almost intoxicate, the minds of his hearers, that he could touch and wake

thoughts partially forgotten, causing past events to glow as if they had happened but yesterday, and could ennoble common thoughts and subjects so that they seemed worth dying for. Professor Shepard, while reviewing the orations of Demosthenes against Philip, has well put the case: "Upon the arrogant, deceiving, all-grasping Philip, and the uncaring, supine Athenians did the mind of the orator fasten and glow and blaze," until the people thought of but one thing — Philip the enemy of Athens. It is not surprising that when Philip heard the report of one of these speeches, he said, "Had I been there he would have persuaded me to take up arms against myself."

It was probably this earnestness that led to Æschines' comment at Rhodes upon Demosthenes. Æschines had gained such high reputation in speaking and debate that the people expressed surprise that he should have been so completely vanquished by Demosthenes; whereupon Æschines replied: "Had you heard that *wild beast* you would no longer be at a loss in that matter."

CHAPTER III.

ORATION ON THE CROWN.

We have thus far spoken of the early life and certain prominent characteristics of Demosthenes. In the chapter now before us we are to be more specific, fixing attention especially upon his rhetoric and oratoric methods and style as seen in his masterpiece, the *Oration on the Crown*, "the greatest speech of the greatest orator of the world."

The general facts that called forth this oration are the following: Not long after the battle of Chæronea (B. C. 338), Ctesiphon, a friend of Demosthenes, introduced a bill to the Council of Five Hundred, proposing to reward Demosthenes for his gifts of money to the public, and for his strict integrity and patriotic conduct as a statesman. It is not unlikely that the principal object of the measure was to silence the attacks upon Demosthenes, and to give him an opportunity, in case it should be opposed, of justifying the whole course of his political life. Doubtless with that view was inserted the clause eulogizing his character as a statesman. The Macedonian party, properly enough, regarded this clause as a reflection upon themselves, and a virtual condemnation of the policy which they had for so many

years espoused. They therefore felt themselves compelled to oppose the measure. Hence they resolved upon a course, which was open to them according to Athenian law, of indicting Ctesiphon as the author of an illegal measure. Æschines, the rival of Demosthenes, commenced a prosecution against Ctesiphon for making the proposition, basing the indictment upon certain legal technicalities. Demosthenes took up the defence of Ctesiphon. The interest excited as the trial drew near was intense, not only in Athens but throughout Greece. Before a dense and almost breathless audience, made up both of citizens and strangers, the pleadings began. Æschines, with marked ability, opened the case, and upon strict legal grounds seemingly ought to have received the verdict. Demosthenes began his argument with a modest exordium, and for some time afterwards seemed to be working principally for the good feeling of the jurors.

The oration viewed as a whole is, first of all, an illustration of the thorough preparation Demosthenes was wont to give his public efforts. During the eight years intervening between the indictment and trial the orator was steadily collecting, massing, and mastering his materials. His preparations had been such, that, when he rose to reply, he held perfectly and vividly in mind the entire narrative of facts, extending through a period of twenty of the most eventful years of Athenian history.

Mr. Webster, speaking of his own reply to Hayne, says: "All that I had ever read, or thought, or acted

in literature, in history, in law, in politics, seemed to unroll before me in glowing panorama, and then it was easy, if I wanted a thunderbolt, *to reach out and take it as it went smoking by.*"

Thus it appears to have been with Demosthenes in his reply to Æschines. Decree after decree, letter after letter, statute after statute, were perfectly at command, together with the precise dates of a multitude of different transactions; indeed, he had "a torrent of facts," and they were all under perfect control. Not one item could show itself until the orator called for it; but when wanted, then, seemingly, every fact that had ever entered into his consciousness leaped forward to serve him.

The skill, too, with which he made selections from his accumulated materials discloses one of the prime arts of a great orator. In his choice of subject-matter he appears to have been governed by four general principles.

First, to use what was most important. With rare skill he seized upon the strongest points and the weightiest facts of the case, resolutely dismissing everything impertinent and trivial. He gave no time nor heed to the second-rate. In the struggle, he never allowed the weaker to slay the stronger. He admitted into his argument nothing merely technical. His plea is a clear and massive narration of important matters. And these important matters he rendered still more important in two ways: (1) By skilful repetition. (2) By intense earnestness.

Second. Demosthenes selected and shaped his

materials upon the basis of a common interest between himself and his hearers. He therefore chose those thoughts lying nearest the popular heart and within the range of the popular comprehension; they were consequently interesting to the masses; and through such facts he could make his most effective appeals. In all that had been done, he sought to involve his auditors with himself.

He freely acknowledged that his administration had not resulted as he had hoped; but he then showed that all his measures were as the people would have them — opposed to the aggressions of Philip; that no entreaty, no money, no compliments of Philip did or could move him; and therefore, as Philip was the acknowledged enemy of Athens, he (Demosthenes) was her friend and defender.

But more than this: whatever objection had been urged against his administration, he was not alone under condemnation: whoever condemned his administration condemned all true Athenians, for they had heartily approved his measures and policy. He and the people were one. He did nothing without their sanction; therefore if he was a traitor, all were traitors; if he was unwise, all were unwise. His conclusion, therefore, was: The man who charges evil upon me does not charge it upon me, but upon the most devoted and patriotic citizens of Athens.

This working upon the basis of a common interest is found to modify, either instinctively or artistically, the entire construction of the oration before us. It led Demosthenes constantly to be mindful of his

hearers, even deferential to them, as when he says: "Indeed, I find that the speaker's power depends for the most part on the hearers; for according to your reception and favor it is that the wisdom of a speaker is esteemed." It is the same manner as that used by Cicero in his plea for Milo, and by Paul before Agrippa. It led him to breathe the popular breath, and made him keenly alert in regard to all the popular instincts and intuitions. He thus took the side not only of a *common* cause, but also of *common* sense. It has been well remarked that he won his case against Æschines by an appeal to sheer common sense. Learned material, profound philosophical matters, and nice technicalities would not fall within the range of *common* sense, at least they were not suited to the mass of his hearers; hence these things were rigorously ruled out. He had neither trivial nor recondite theories to propound; but matters of common hearsay, such as had been discussed in every household, — these he fully recounted and thundered them from the bema, and they were quickly responded to in the thunders of popular applause.

The style of Demosthenes, including his diction, idiom, sentence-building, and general construction, also shows that, instinctively or intentionally, he welded together, in the language used, his own and the people's hearts. His speech was such as could be easily and perfectly understood by any one who could speak his language.[6] He was certainly a master of Greek diction. In the speech before us

he employs at one moment the most elegant words, then the most forcible, then words commonest to the common ear, but in each instance words perfectly well understood.

In the structure of his sentences there is an almost endless variety, changes constant and captivating, like those of diversified landscapes, — sentences soft as words can make them, and others harsh as the grating of a rusty hinge; phrasing, one moment sweet as music to the ear of the innocent, anon, like the knell of doom. There are sentences as abrupt as a clap of thunder; and others, gradually accumulating, rounding up to a head, then, when his auditors were breathless and paralyzed, bursting upon them with the rush and roar of a cataract. But in each instance a child could follow the sentence and understand it.

It was also this popular instinct that led him to lean in speech to the clear and strong rather than to the refined and beautiful. There were appeals made strong by their abruptness and informality; antitheses that were startling because quickly framed, each member of the sentence flooding the others with a blaze of light.

In this oration there can be discovered no overwrought ornamentation, no extended figures of rhetoric, and nothing for display. We pass page after page before even a metaphor or simile appears; and when at length oratorical warmth demands something of the kind, he wraps up figures and paints pictures in single words. Indeed his oration

is entirely free from the fine, the flighty, and the grandiloquent. He even descended a little at times in order to use words that were familiar on the street and in the market-place. For he well knew, as Professor Shepard says, "that the words which are oftenest in the people's mouths go quickest and deepest into the people's ears and hearts." But these descents were always found in good rhetorical and oratorical company, and are employed to make the good company appear all the better. He descended and then quickly arose to a luminous grandeur and magnificence of style.

Third, he sought to appear unselfish and modest. Though his entire oration was a personal and self-defensive one, still, matters were so presented that he seemed all the while to plead not for himself but for others. With masterly skill he so identified himself with the safety and glory of Athens, and so lifted Athenian history into view, that all personal interests and ambitions disappeared from sight. As one of his reviewers has remarked: "Where he lauded his own acts most strongly, he identified them with the glories of his country. Whatever good results might have accrued from his measures, he ascribed the merit less to himself than to the fortune of Athens, or to the gods, of whom he was but the humble instrument in a righteous cause."

Unselfishness and modesty in bearing and expression, whether natural or the result of art, have never shown to better advantage. Apparently Demosthenes would not let the world know that he had

ever lived, nor let his right hand know what his left had been doing; and if this is art, then art in this oration is carried to the pitch of perfection.

He began his speech by regretting that he was compelled to submit to the unpleasant task of speaking of himself and his actions. He timidly shrank from the charge of egotism, to which his defence of his public measures exposed him. But with the next breath he turned this embarrassment to the discomfiture of his antagonist. Indeed, he cast the full blame of being compelled to speak of himself upon the man who, by the terms of the impeachment, had forced him to adopt this exceedingly unpleasant course.

The *fourth* and last point in our enumeration of the principles underlying the construction of this oration, is this: Demosthenes sought so to manage all the facts involved that they would place in the worst possible light his antagonist. There were certain facts involved in this case which, unless presented in a favorable light, would greatly damage the reputation of Demosthenes. Æschines had forcibly employed them in support of the prosecution. Against these facts Demosthenes presented no objections. He acknowledged them, restated and emphasized them.

For instance, he acknowledged, and even strongly impressed upon his hearers, the ill-luck of Athens; but subsequently showed that misfortunes often come to the best of people. He argued that men are finite; that the gods are infinite, that they have

ordered events, and that he (Demosthenes), as a man, should not, for what the gods have determined, be held responsible.

He then showed that no Athenian, at the time of those misfortunes, proposed any other course; and, further, that since that time no one had been able to propose any other course, except submission to Philip, and that would be treason. He then reached his conclusion: since nobody did propose any other course, and since nobody can now propose any other course, the man who in the present hour comes forward to find fault is "a miserable croaker." This point, and others like it, were so well made, the representations were so cogent, palpable, and self-evident, that the common sense of the auditors responded and fully exonerated Demosthenes in all he had done.

For the purpose of illustrating more fully the method and style of this oration, we invite the student's attention to several quotations. The following instances are illustrations of rhythm and music in sentence-building:

"While the statesmen of Greece were all corrupted by Philip, over me, neither opportunity, nor fair speeches, nor lavish promises, nor hopes, nor fears, nor fame, nor any other earthly consideration, ever prevailed, seducing or driving me to betray, in any one particular, what I deemed the rights and interests of my country." [7]

Here is a similar instance:

"This and more to the like effect I spoke, and left the platform. It was approved by all; not a word was said

against me. Nor did I make the speech without moving, nor make the motion without undertaking the embassy, nor undertake the embassy without prevailing on the Thebans." [8]

The following quotation belongs also to this class:

"When my person was demanded — when they brought Amphictyonic suits against me — when they menaced — when they promised — when they set these miscreants like wild beasts upon me — never in any way have I abandoned my affection for you. From the very beginning I chose an honest and straightforward course in politics, to support the honor, the power, the glory of my fatherland, these to exalt, in these to have my being."

Again he says:

"And I would gladly ask Æschines — while these things were going on, and the city was full of enthusiasm, and joy, and praise, whether he joined with the multitude in sacrifice and festivity, or sat at home sorrowing and moaning and repining at the public success. For if he was present and appeared with the rest, is not his conduct monstrous, or rather impious, when measures, which he himself called the gods to witness were excellent, he now requires you to condemn — you that have sworn by the gods? If he was not present, does he not deserve a thousand deaths for grieving to behold what others rejoiced at?" [9]

The clearness with which Demosthenes, in a few brief sentences, could present his pictures to the auditors is another noteworthy characteristic. Thus when, in a time of peril, he represents himself as coming forward to give counsel, he says:

"What commotion there was in the city you all know; but let me just mention the most striking circumstances.

"It was evening. A person came with a message to the

presidents, that Elatea was taken. They rose from supper immediately, drove off the people from their market-stalls, and set fire to the wicker-frames; others sent for the generals and called the trumpeter; and the city was full of commotion. The next morning at daybreak the presidents summoned the council to their hall, and you went to the assembly, and before they could introduce or prepare the question, the whole people were up in their seats. When the council had entered, and the presidents had reported their intelligence and presented the courier, and he had made his statement, the crier asked—'Who wishes to speak?'—and no one came forward. The crier put the question repeatedly—still no man rose, though all the generals were present and all the orators, and our country with her common voice called for some one to speak and save her—for when the crier raises his voice according to law, it may justly be deemed the common voice of our country. . . . Well, then—I was the man called for upon that day. I came forward and addressed you."

As already noticed, Demosthenes despatched his *comparisons*, *similes*, and *metaphors* in few words. Thus:

"That decree caused the peril which then surrounded us to pass away like a cloud."

. . . . .

"At such a crisis, he springs up an orator, rising from his retreat like a wind."

. . . . .

"In the Grecian state there sprang up a crop of traitors, mercenary and abandoned, such as no one remembers at any former time."

. . . . .

"And Æschines has disgorged upon me the foul contents of his own villainy and injustice."

. . . . .

"Made a fool by a thunderbolt" (ἐμβροντητε.)

In *antithesis*, Demosthenes was a master. It has been remarked that the entire oration "is one grand antithesis — the patriotic and incorruptible Demosthenes set off against the traitorous and corrupt Æschines." The following is an illustration:

"Contrast now the circumstances of your life and mine, gently and with temper, Æschines; and then ask these people whose fortune they would each of them prefer. You taught reading, I went to school: you performed initiations, I received them: you danced in the chorus, I furnished it: you were assembly-clerk, I was a speaker: you acted third parts, I heard you: you broke down, and I hissed: you have worked as a statesman for the enemy, I for my country. I pass by the rest; but this very day I am on my probation for a crown, and am acknowledged to be innocent of all offence; while you are already judged to be a pettifogger, and the question is, whether you shall continue that trade, or at once be silenced by not getting a fifth part of the votes. A happy fortune, do you see, you have enjoyed, that you should denounce mine as miserable!"

The *dilemma* is likewise often employed in the oration before us. Demosthenes pointed out with merciless exactness "the terrible horns" of a dilemma, gave his opponent the choice, but after holding him for a time over, first one then the other, was sure at length to transfix him upon one of the horns. He says:

"If the crimes which he saw me committing against the state were as heinous as he so tragically gave out, he ought to have enforced the penalties of the law against them at the time; if he saw me guilty of an impeachable offence, by impeaching and so bringing me to trial before you; if

moving illegal decrees, by indicting me for them. For surely, if he can prosecute Ctesiphon on my account, he would not have forborne to indict me myself, had he thought he could convict me. In short, whatever else he saw me doing to your prejudice, whether mentioned or not mentioned in his catalogue of slander, there are laws for such things, and punishments, and trials, and judgments, with sharp and severe penalties; all of which he might have enforced against me: and had he done so, had he thus pursued the proper method with me, his charges would have been consistent with his conduct. But now he has declined the straightforward and just course, avoided all proofs of guilt at the time, and after this long interval gets up, to play his part withal, a heap of accusation, ribaldry, and scandal."

Again:

"Why, you—I know not what name you deserve!—when you saw me robbing the state of an advantage and connection so important as you described just now, did you ever express indignation? did you come forward to publish and proclaim what you now charge me with? If indeed I had been bribed by Philip to prevent the conjunction of the Greeks, it was your business not to be silent, but to cry out, to protest, and inform the people. But you never did so—your voice was never once heard to such a purpose. . . .

"He is reduced to an alternative: either he had no fault to find with my measures, and therefore moved none against them; or he sought the good of the enemy, and therefore would not propose any better."

Oratorical *interrogation* is likewise frequently met in this oration. For example:

"Do you hear, Æschines, the law distinctly saying, 'unless where any are voted by the people or the council; such may be proclaimed?' Why, then, wretched man, do

you play the pettifogger? Why manufacture arguments? Why don't you take hellebore for your malady? Are you not ashamed to bring on a cause for spite, and not for any offence? to alter some laws, and to garble others, the whole of which should in justice be read to persons sworn to decide according to the laws?"

. . . . . .

"Accursed one! what have you or yours to do with virtue? How should you discern what is honorable or otherwise? How were you ever qualified? What right have you to talk about education?"

. . . . . .

"All such things were looked for in former times; and many opportunities did the past afford for a good man and true to show himself; during which time you are nowhere to be found, neither first, second, third, fourth, fifth, nor sixth — not in any rank at all — certainly on no service by which your country was exalted. For what alliance has come to the state by your procurement? What succors, what acquisition of good-will or credit? What embassy or agency is there of yours, by which the reputation of the country has been increased? What concern, domestic, Hellenic, or foreign, of which you have had the management, has improved under it? What galleys? what ammunition? what arsenals? what repair of walls? what cavalry? What in the world are you good for? What assistance in money have you ever given, either to the rich or the poor, out of public spirit or liberality? None. But, good sir, if there is nothing of this, there is at all events zeal and loyalty. Where? when, you infamous fellow?"

Oratorical *appeal* and *assault* abound in this oration, indeed the oration is almost a continuous succession of appeals and assaults, often thrilling, cogent, and convincing. Sentences and paragraphs beginning as formal arguments often end in the

outpouring of his soul, involving either condemnation of his opponent, or self-defence, or love for Athens. The following are illustrations:

"To all his scandalous abuse of my private life, observe my plain and honest answer. If you know me to be such as he alleged — for I have lived nowhere else but among you — let not my voice be heard, however transcendant my statesmanship. Rise up this instant and condemn me!"

. . . . . .

"For it is not right to debar another of access to the people and privilege of speech; moreover, to do so by way of malice and insult — by heaven! is neither honest, nor constitutional, nor just."

. . . . . .

"Men whom in their lifetime — you reptile! — you pestered with flattery, yet see not that you are accusing them in their graves."

. . . . . .

"But why do I censure him for this, when with calumny far more shocking he has assailed me? He that charges me with Philippizing — O heaven and earth! — what would he not say? By Hercules and the gods! if one had honestly to inquire, discarding all expression of spite and falsehood, who the persons really are on whom the blame of what has happened may by common consent fairly and justly be thrown, it would be found, they are persons in the various states like Æschines, not like me."

. . . . . .

"If from malice or personal rivalry I bring a false charge against my opponent, may they (the gods) cut me off from every blessing!"

. . . . . .

"You cannot deny it, though you lie till you split open."

. . . . . .

"May the gods, or at least the Athenians, confound thee for a vile citizen and a vile third-rate actor!"

. . . . .

"Wherefore, then, execrable man, do you reproach me with these things? Wherefore utter such language? I pray that it may fall upon the heads of you and yours."

. . . . .

"These were my donations; none of which have you indicted: the rewards which the council says I deserve for them are what you arraign. To receive the gifts, then, you confess to be legal; the requital of them you indict for illegality. In the name of heaven! what sort of person can a monster of wickedness and malignity be, if not such a person as this?"

. . . . .

"O Athenians, is a calumniator always, every way spiteful and fault-finding? But this creature is a reptile by nature, that from the beginning never did anything honest or liberal; a very ape of a tragedian, village Œnomaus, counterfeit orator!"

. . . . .

"Never, O ye gods, may those wishes be confirmed by you. If possible, inspire even in these men a better sense and feeling! But if they are indeed incurable, destroy them by themselves; exterminate them on land and sea; and for the rest of us, grant that we may speedily be released from our present fears, and enjoy a lasting deliverance!"

As would be expected, Demosthenes is likewise free in his use of offensive *epithets*. The following are examples:

"You slanderer," "you accursed one," "a hireling politician," "the common pest of all who have since been ruined, men, places, cities," "you reptile—you pestered with flattery," "you accursed scribbler," "a splendid howler," "you infamous fellow," "this despicable wretch," "this

spit-upon" (spittoon), "monster of wickedness," "idiot," and "ape of a tragedian." [10]

The last group of quotations is made to illustrate a feature in rhetorical art much used by Demosthenes, but by modern speakers not often brought into requisition, namely, *rhetorical repetition*. For illustration, Demosthenes wished the dullest hearer in the assembly to feel that all unpleasant things spoken by him, such as comparisons between himself and Æschines, and other personalities, were extremely distasteful, but were made necessary by the terms of the indictment. To make this thought appear with the greatest possible clearness, Demosthenes resorted to rhetorical repetition.

In his introduction he says:

"If to escape from this (the prosecution) I make no mention of what I have done, I shall appear to be without defence against his charges, without proof of my claims to honor: whereas, if I proceed to give an account of my conduct and measures, I shall be forced to speak frequently of myself. I will endeavor then to do so with all becoming modesty: what I am driven to by the necessity of the case, will be fairly chargeable to my opponent, who has instituted such a prosecution."

A little further on he repeats the thought, though in different phraseology, thus:

"I conjure and beseech you, men of Athens, throughout the trial to remember this; that, if Æschines in his charge had not travelled out of the indictment, neither would I have spoken a word irrelevant; but since he has resorted to every species both of accusation and calumny, it is necessary for me to reply briefly to each of his charges."

A few minutes later he repeats himself thus:

"Much more could I say about those transactions, yet methinks too much has been said already. The fault is my adversary's, for having spirted over me the dregs, I may say, of his own wickedness and iniquities, of which I was obliged to clear myself to those who are younger than the events."

Lest the impression had not been sufficiently deepened, he once more reverts to the unpleasantness of the position forced upon him by Æschines:

"And I believe our ancestors built these courts, not that we should assemble you here and bring forth the secrets of private life for mutual reproach, but to give us the means of convicting persons guilty of crimes against the state. . . . But, as you see, though not naturally fond of railing, yet, on account of the calumnies uttered by my opponent, in reply to falsehood I must just mention some leading particulars concerning him, and show who he is, and from whom descended, that so readily begins using hard words; and what language he carps at, after uttering such as any decent man would have shuddered to pronounce."

But before closing, Demosthenes again seeks, by another repetition, lastingly to fix this impression upon his hearers:

"However, if you are determined, Æschines, to scrutinize my fortune, compare it with your own, and, if you find my fortune better than yours, cease to revile it. Look then from the very beginning. And I pray and entreat that I may not be condemned for bad taste. I do not think any person wise who insults poverty, or who prides himself on having been bred in affluence: but by the slander and malice of this cruel man I am forced into such a discussion,

which I will conduct with all the moderation which circumstances allow."

Now it is evident that every person in that assembly must have had the idea ineffaceably stamped upon the mind that not only was Demosthenes entirely free from the charge of egotism, but that Æschines was extremely culpable in forming an indictment such as would compel Demosthenes publicly to recount his deeds of heroism and patriotism.

Another important thought that Demosthenes desired by frequent repetition to impress upon his auditors was the fault, almost treason, of Æschines in not bringing his charges of mismanagement during the administration of Demosthenes, instead of "trumping them up at so late a day."

Soon after beginning the defence, Demosthenes speaks thus:

"But Æschines declined the straightforward and just course, avoided all proofs of guilt at the time, and after this long interval gets up, to play his part withal, a heap of accusation, ribaldry, and scandal."

A little later in the oration this thought is again presented thus:

"It was the duty of a good citizen, if he had any better plan, to disclose it at the time, not to find fault now. A statesman and a pettifogger, while in no other respect are they alike, in this most widely differ: the one declares his opinion before the proceedings, and makes himself responsible to his followers, to fortune, to the times, to all men; the other is silent when he ought to speak; at any untoward event he grumbles. Now, as I said before, the time

for a man who regarded the commonwealth, and for honest counsel, was then."

Further on, he alludes again to the same thought:

"Besides, it is but a poor favor you do your countrymen by calumniating me. For what is the use of telling us now what we should have done? Why, being in the city and present, did you not make your proposals then, if indeed they were practicable at a crisis when we had to accept, not what we liked, but what the circumstances allowed?"

Then, before the oration closes, he exclaims:

"What advantage has your eloquence been to your country? Now do you speak to us about the past? As if a physician should visit his patients, and not order or prescribe anything to cure the disease, but on the death of any one, when the last ceremonies were performing, should follow him to the grave, and expound how, if the poor fellow had done this and that, he never would have died! Idiot! do you speak now?"

Demosthenes thus "swings this thought around like a great sledge-hammer upon the head of his antagonist." In the meantime the most obtuse hearer in that assembly felt that Æschines was a consummate grumbler, croaker, and slanderer.

Again, it was vitally important that Demosthenes should impress upon his auditors the fact that no different course could have been adopted than the one he had recommended. Already having once hinted at this thought, he subsequently thus uses the oratorical interrogation:

"But I return to the question, What should the commonwealth, Æschines, have done, when she saw Philip establishing an empire and dominion over Greece? Or what was your statesman to advise or move?"

Then quickly follow these statements and questions:

"The only course, then, that remained, Athenians, was a just resistance to all his attacks upon you. Such course you took from the beginning, properly and becomingly, and by motions and counsels I assisted during the period of my political life. I acknowledge it. But what should I have done? I put this question to you, dismissing all else."

After introducing certain historical references, he again repeats the thought:

"Philip was subjugating the Hellespont, and besieging Byzantium, and destroying some of the Greek cities, restoring exiles to others — was he by all these proceedings committing injustice, breaking the truce, violating the peace, or not? Was it meet that any of the Greeks should rise up to prevent these proceedings, or not? If not — if Greece was to present the spectacle (as it is called) of a Mysian prey, while Athenians had life and being, then I have exceeded my duty in speaking on the subject; the commonwealth has exceeded her duty, which followed my counsels. I admit that every measure has been a misdeed, a blunder of mine. But if some one ought to have arisen to prevent these things, who but the Athenian people should it have been? Such, then, was the policy which I espoused. I saw him reducing all men to subjection, and I opposed him: I continued warning and exhorting you not to make these sacrifices to Philip. Could I have done otherwise?"

Later in the oration this thought is reiterated thus:

"If any one now can point out a better course, or indeed if any other was practicable but the one which I adopted, I

confess that I was wrong. For if there be any measure now discovered, which (executed then) would have been to our advantage, I say it ought not to have escaped me. But if there is none, if there was none, if none can be suggested even at this day, what was a statesman to do? Was he not to choose the best measures within his reach and view? That did I, Æschines, when the crier asked, 'Who wishes to speak?' not, 'Who wishes to complain about the past, or to guarantee the future?' While you on those occasions sat mute in the assembly, I came forward and spake. However, as you omitted then, tell us now. Say what scheme that I ought to have devised, what favorable opportunity was lost to the state by my neglect? what alliance was there, what better plan, to which I should have directed the people? But no! The past is with all the world given up; no one even proposes to deliberate about it: the future it is, or the present, which demands the action of a counsellor."

Just before closing, Demosthenes again enforces the thought, thus:

"You, disregarding all this, accuse me whose ministry has been among my countrymen, knowing all the while that a part (if not the whole) of your calumny falls upon the people, and yourself in particular. For if I assumed the sole and absolute direction of our counsels, it was open to you and other speakers to accuse me. But if you were constantly present in all the assemblies, if the state invited public discussion of what was expedient, and if these measures were then believed by all to be the best, and especially by you (for certainly from no good-will did you leave me in possession of hopes and admiration and honors, all of which attended on my policy, but doubtless because you were compelled by the truth and had nothing better to advise); is it not iniquitous and monstrous to complain now of measures, than which you could suggest none better at the time?

No doubt, at this point the orator felt that the people were convinced that nothing could have been devised wiser, at least more patriotic, than the entire administration of Demosthenes.

It was likewise important for his cause that Demosthenes should impress upon his auditors the fact that, while they ought always to strive for the best possible, still they should be mindful that all affairs are at the disposal of the gods, who of late years had manifestly decreed adversity to the glory of Athens.

Soon after beginning his oration, he therefore says:

"At the time, as it appeared, there were dangers impending, and dangers at hand. Mark the line of my policy at that crisis; don't rail at the event. The end of all things is what the Deity pleases: his line of policy it is that shows the judgment of the statesman. Do not then impute it as a crime to me that Philip chanced to conquer in battle: that issue depended not on me, but on God. Prove that I adopted not all measures that according to human calculation were feasible — that I did not honestly and diligently and with exertions beyond my strength carry them out — or that my enterprises were not honorable and worthy of the state and necessary. Show me this, and accuse me as soon as you like. But if the hurricane that visited us hath been too powerful, not for us only, but for all Greece besides, what is the fair course? As if a merchant, after taking every precaution, and furnishing his vessel with everything that he thought would insure her safety, because afterward he met with a storm and his tackle was strained or broken to pieces, should be charged with the shipwreck. 'Well, but I was not the pilot,' he might say — just as I was not the general. *Fortune* was not under my control; all was under hers."

A few minutes later he reiterates:

"As it is, she (the republic) appears to have failed in her enterprise, a thing to which all mankind are liable, if the Deity so wills it: but then . . . had we resigned without a struggle that which our ancestors encountered every danger to win, who would not have spit upon you?"

Again he quietly introduces the thought thus:

"For my part, I regard any one who reproaches his fellow-man with ill-fortune as devoid of sense. He that is best satisfied with his condition, he that deems his fortune excellent, cannot be sure that it will remain so until the evening: how then can it be right to bring it forward, or upbraid another man with it?"

. . . . .

"How much juster and fairer is it to consider that to the common fortune apparently of all men, to a tide of events overwhelming and lamentable, these disasters are to be attributed."

Once more, further on in the speech, he says:

"But never, never can you have done wrong, O Athenians, in undertaking the battle for the freedom and safety of all! I swear it by your forefathers — those that met the peril at Marathon, those that took the field at Platæa, those in the sea-fight at Salamis, and those at Artemisium, and many other brave men who repose in the public monuments, all of whom alike, as being worthy of the same honor, the country buried, Æschines, not only the successful or victorious! Justly! for the duty of brave men has been done by all; their fortune has been such as the Deity assigned to each."

Later, he couples this same thought with an assault upon his antagonist:

"Read him this epitaph, which the state chose to inscribe on their monument, that you may see even by this,

Æschines, what a heartless and malignant wretch you are. Read:

> "'These for their country stood in war-array,
> And check'd the fierce invader on his way;
> Into the battle rush'd at glory's call,
> With firm resolve to conquer or to fall;
> That Greeks should ne'er to tyrants bend the knee,
> But live, as they were born, from thraldom free.
> Now in the bosom of their fatherland
> These warriors rest; for such was Jove's command.
> The gods in all succeed and have their will,
> But mortals must their destiny fulfil.'

"Do you hear, Æschines, in this very inscription, that 'the gods never lack success, nor strive in vain?' Not to the statesman does it ascribe the power of giving victory in battle, but to the gods. Wherefore, then, execrable man, do you reproach me with these things? Wherefore utter such language? I pray that it may fall upon the heads of you and yours."

Before closing, he deepens the impression with this language:

"All this has been accomplished by my decrees and measures; and whoever will examine them without prejudice, men of Athens, will find that they were rightly planned and faithfully executed; that none of the proper seasons were lost or missed or thrown away by me, nothing which depended on one man's ability and prudence was neglected. But if the power of some deity or of fortune, or the worthlessness of commanders, or the wickedness of you that betrayed your countries, or all these things together, injured and eventually ruined our cause, of what is Demosthenes guilty?"

Such are some of the rhetorical excellences and oratorical tactics and artifices of this celebrated

speech of Demosthenes. Every candid reader will indorse the commendation of David Hume: "Could this style of Demosthenes be copied, its success would be infallible over any modern assembly."

The elocution of the speech appears to have been no less perfect than the rhetoric. Very neatly was this fact subsequently acknowledged by the powerful opponent of Demosthenes. It was at Rhodes; upon a certain occasion Æschines read his own speech, and followed it by reading the reply of Demosthenes. The auditors loudly applauded his own, but went into transports of admiration during his declamation of the oration of Demosthenes. When order was restored, Æschines quietly remarked, "What would you have said had you heard Demosthenes himself pronounce this oration?"

Demosthenes, as already suggested, had the weakest side of the case. Æschines had the legal aspects all in his favor, and ought to have been victorious. But Demosthenes, against all these odds, crushed his antagonist beyond possible recovery.

Such are the rewards of mastering completely the subject under consideration, and of perfecting one's self, at any cost, in all the arts of speech and eloquence.

CHAPTER IV.

INFERENCES.

We have studied, in the preceding chapter, the life, character, elocutionary and oratorical methods of Demosthenes in order to suggest to the student of oratory the line of procedure to be adopted in becoming familiar with each of the secular and pulpit orators in the list already enumerated (pp. 15–19). Not until these are thoroughly mastered is one fully prepared, at least by the inductive method, to decide upon the rules and laws belonging to the highest type of eloquence.

We leave the student to do at his leisure this work, and in the chapter before us we venture to present some of the leading inferences which will not fail of being acknowledged as authoritative, when the history of eloquence and oratory has been mastered.

1. *The ideal orator should be strong and vigorous in body and health.*

We are not unmindful of the fact that invalids have sometimes thrilled the assemblies addressed. Lord Chatham was masterly and grandly eloquent even when agonized with pain, and unable to stand except with a crutch. Still it must be borne in

mind that he had other oratorical qualities and compensations rarely equalled.

As a rule, however, it must be allowed that a sickly man makes a sickly speech. It is said, with good reason, that "a thousand sermons, constructed by the finest brains the country possesses, and warmed all through with love and zeal, fall dead every Sunday, which, if they were preached by strong men, would work miracles of movement and transformation." Dr. Storrs, while specifying the conditions of pulpit success, mentions first, "Physical vigor kept at its highest attainable point."

So, too, the orator of perfect physique, as well as perfect health, has great advantage. Still it must be confessed that there have been many apparent exceptions. "John Randolph had a short, small body, perched upon high, crane legs, so that when he stood up you did not know when he was to end; yet he commanded the attention of the House of Representatives, in spite of his gaunt figure and his ear-splitting scream; and Wilberforce was a power in Parliament, though he had but a pigmy body and a voice weak and painfully shrill." Boswell, who heard Randolph in 1784 at York, wrote thus to a friend: "I saw what seemed a mere *shrimp* mount upon the table; but as I listened, he grew and grew until the shrimp became a whale." "Richard Lalor Sheil thrilled the Irish people, notwithstanding his dwarfish frame, his ungraceful action, and a voice so harsh and violent as often to rise to a positive shriek. The most

magical of American preachers, Summerfield, the stories of whose oratorical feats read like a page from the *Arabian Nights*, was femininely feeble, and an invalid all his days."

But it will be found that even in these instances there were remarkable compensations. Men of under-stature must have in marked degree either strong passions, glowing imaginations, sparkling wit, solid judgment, cogent reasoning, vehement action, or some other of the prime characteristics of a perfect orator, in order to take high rank as public speakers. But could these qualities be supplemented by sound health, together with strength and vigor in body, the ordinary triumphs of these men would have been correspondingly greater.

Charles James Fox was a man of stalwart frame, so also were Burke and Brougham. "Mirabeau had the neck of a bull, and a prodigious chest out of which issued that voice of thunder before which the French chamber quailed in awe." O'Connell was like a giant, as is also John Bright. Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, Rufus Choate, William Pinkney, Edward Everett, Abraham Lincoln, and Charles Sumner were men commanding in stature, strong and vigorous. So likewise were Robert Hall, Thomas Chalmers, Stephen Olin, Wm. Morley Punshon and E. H. Chapin.

Charles H. Spurgeon, Robert Collyer, John Hall, Henry Ward Beecher, Dr. Taylor, Bishop Simpson, and Phillips Brooks are men of remarkable physical proportions, and these are also "the magnates of the modern Protestant pulpit."

It has been more than once observed, and correctly, that "the pre-eminence of these men does not depend so much on the greatness of their intellect as upon the manner of their using it. Healthful in body, their brains work healthfully, strongly, clearly, legitimately — not brilliantly, but plainly and convincingly."

It is, therefore, from an abundance of facts that the inference is drawn that the ideal orator should be strong and vigorous in body and health. If any one otherwise constituted or conditioned aspires to enter the field of either secular or sacred eloquence, he must compensate for any lack in these respects by the most vigorous application. He must make his health as firm as possible, and by energy, willpower, indomitable perseverance, majesty of thought, and perfection of expression, he should try to make up for everything he lacks as to physical perfection.

II. *The ideal orator should be religious, that is, have essential goodness as to character and intention, and a Godward bearing.*

With this inference nearly all writers, both ancient and modern, who have given attention to this subject, agree.

It is said to be one of the first things asked by an audience, "Is the speaker honest?" "Be honest and in downright earnest," is an oratorical rule of much value. It is this uprightness, this Godwardness, which lies at the basis of those generous sentiments, that lofty regard for the public good, and that high and manly personal sense of honor which

always largely contribute to a speaker's power and influence. It is true that these qualities are sometimes found in men who are not professedly Christian, still, they are rarely, if at all, found except with those whose hearts have in some notable measure the Godward attitude.

That the pulpit orator should be a man of eminent piety there can be no question. The Godward bearing of the preacher ought to be a divine intimacy. "If I should neglect prayer for a single day, I should lose a great deal of the fire of faith," is the confession of Martin Luther. John Livingstone, in speaking of his own preaching, says:

"I never preached a sermon which I would be earnest to see again in print, but two: the one was on Monday after the communion of Shotts, and the other on Monday after the communion at Holywood; and both these times I had spent the whole night before in conference and prayer with some Christians, without any more than ordinary preparation. About five hundred were awakened by the sermon preached at the kirk of Shotts."

"Is not prayer," asks Emerson, "a sally of the soul into the unfound infinite? No man ever prayed heartily without learning something." The historic record is very suggestive. As already noticed, Demosthenes, when wielding his greatest influence, was in possession of a lofty moral and religious character. In his orations he often devoutly appealed to the gods. Pericles, too, stood among the most upright of the Athenians. Both Thucydides and Plutarch claim that Pericles was a man of power

because he was "a man of probity and of an unblemished reputation." According to Plutarch, Pericles "was accustomed, whenever he was to speak in public, previously to entreat the gods that he might not utter, against his own will, any word that should not belong to his subject."

Cicero's character was blameless. Pitt, in the British Parliament, by reason of his superior integrity had immense advantage over Fox, his witty and brilliant antagonist. It has been said of Sheridan, that, "had he but possessed trustworthiness of character, he might have ruled the world."

So, likewise, the great orators of America have, as a rule, possessed sterling qualities.

That a few men in our republic, without marked religiousness, have reached oratorical distinction we cannot deny. But they must have had other oratorical qualities in an eminent degree. Other things equal, the strictly moral and religious man has advantage — immense advantage.

The following opinions in support of our general proposition deserve notice: Mencius, next to Confucius the most celebrated Chinese philosopher, speaks thus: "It has never been the case that he who possessed genuine virtue could not influence others; nor that he who was not sincere could influence others." Similar is this statement of Confucius: "The accomplished man must have sincere thoughts." Plato contended that true oratory cannot be attained by any except pure and good men.

The Latin writers maintained the same opinion.

"The orator cannot exist unless as a good man," are the words of Quintilian. Cato, as reported and indorsed by Cicero, asserted that the arts of oratory can be completely mastered by none except good men. Crassus is reported in *De Oratore* as saying that the complete orator is one from whom every fault is abstracted, and who is adorned by every kind of merit. Says Augustine, "Let our Christian orator who would be understood and heard with pleasure, pray before he speaks. Let him lift up his thirsty soul to God before he pronounces anything."

Among modern writers upon this subject stands noticeably Dr. Theremin, who, in his treatise entitled *Eloquence a Virtue*, reaches the conclusion that "the orator is sure of success only in proportion as he strictly obeys moral laws and puts away all references of a less pure nature." John Milton says that the chief source of eloquence is the rare and dear love of truth. "In short," says Fénelon, "an orator cannot be fit to persuade people, unless he be inflexibly upright; for without this steady virtue his talents and address would, like a mortal poison, infect and destroy the body politic."

These writers, judging from the nature of the case and from what is proved by experience, have reached the conclusion that the energy of a noble life and the fragrance of a pure and pious character will influence and persuade as can nothing else, that they are often irresistible, and in the highest type of oratory, indispensable.

Opinions like the foregoing seem at first thought

extravagant. The reader doubtless has in mind some one who is eloquent and yet notoriously or secretly wicked. Still we repeat, such a man, as none can doubt, must have marked redeeming qualities in order to succeed, and he would be far more successful if he were thoroughly good. The general conclusion remains irrefutable, that in the ideal orator essential goodness or Godwardness is absolutely indispensable.[12]

III. *The ideal orator should have a deep emotional nature and keen sensibilities.*

It makes but little difference how rare the intellectual graces or how abundant the information may be, a speaker without keen sensibilities cannot be a popular orator. A sensitive nature is extremely difficult to acquire artificially. Without a strong natural basis, almost any amount of discipline would be unavailing. The psychological explanation of the early failures of many great orators is found in their extreme constitutional sensitiveness. And it is this same extreme sensitiveness, when brought under control, which is among the most invaluable oratorical allies. Its perfect subjection, upon elocutionary grounds, is, however, resolutely demanded. Sensitiveness uncontrolled explains the inability of many men to speak publicly who are masters in rhetorical composition, and who with the pen can easily hew in pieces their antagonists.

Sensitiveness is the mother, or at least the ally, of humor and wit. But the sensitiveness of the pulpit orator is rarely allowed to take the form of wit.

While wit has often been effective in secular oratory, it violates the law of harmony if much introduced into the pulpit. God does not call jesters to entertain his courts. The good taste displayed by Dr. Guthrie is commendable. He was "a genial and victorious wit," but his rule was, never to excite a smile while in the pulpit. Lord Bacon in his *Essays* (xxxii.) says that "wit should be exempt from religion and all grave subjects." Thoughtful people commend the remarks of Phillips Brooks in his *Yale Lectures:*

"There is a creature who ought to share with the clerical cheat the abhorrence of the people. I mean the clerical jester. He lays his hands upon all sacred things. He is full of Bible jests, and he talks about the Bible with jests that have come down from generation to generation. The principles, which, if they mean anything, mean life and death to the soul, he turns into material for jest."

The wit of the Bible is rarely such as to make the reader smile, and never makes him laugh. This for the clergyman is a fundamental hint.

We would allow, however, that a certain dry humor, such as is found especially in the writings of Solomon, Prov. xix. 13; xxvi. 17; xxviii. 22, under wise and skilful handling, may not be out of place in the pulpit. There is, too, a dry, witty common sense, which under peculiar circumstances may be used as a weapon against false and arrogant reasoning. But the pulpit orator should err upon the side of a rigid exclusion of all this class of materials. The rule is, that only that degree of wit can be introduced by the pulpit orator which is per-

fectly consistent with profound reverence and an intense desire to make men better. Preachers who succeed with wit can better succeed without it.

Even in secular oratory an excess of wit is harmful. The late Senator Morton, who in his early efforts was excessively witty, came to a conclusion that shows much wisdom. At Terre Haute he once delivered a speech so popular and of such irresistible wit that he was invited to repeat it in all parts of the state. He, however, recognized "the danger of becoming a humorist and passing all his life for a 'light-weight' politician, and resolutely refused ever afterwards to assume the rôle of a buffoon."

A vein of sadness, rather than mirthfulness, befits oratory. "The solitude and sadness of genius," as elsewhere, so in the field of eloquence, are impressive and seem demanded, or, in the nature of things, necessary. Plutarch, enumerating the characteristics of Pericles, says that he had not only "an elevation of sentiment and style, but likewise a gravity of countenance which never relaxed into laughter."

Of Demosthenes this same biographer speaks thus: "His temper, without any embellishments of wit and humor, is always grave and serious." "All the chief orators of the world," says Emerson, have been grave men." M. Bautain likens the delivery of an oration "to child-bearing; frivolity and mirthfulness are at such times indecent."

Again, it should be noted that this sadness of genius, united with keen sensibilities and deep emo-

tions, results in what is known as the pathetic element in oratory. It is true that the present age is not a pathetic but a practical one. Literature constantly aims at the brilliant and startling, rather than the tender and pathetic. Pathos is also at discount, and even in disrepute, because often unnaturally forced and unskilfully used. This disreputable type is not true pathos, however, it is a counterfeit, properly called "*bathos.*"

And, further, pathetic emotion is, in many quarters, not commended because of so little permanent benefit. Dr. Pond, extending his observation over a ministry of eighty years, has said: "I have seen many shed tears at funerals, but have never known a conversion." "You will find two men," says Professor Monroe, "who can make you cry, to one who will make you lead a better life." If one is looking for tears, let him go to theatres, not to lecture-halls or churches, is an elocutionary suggestion. Hence the use of the pathetic for its own sake is properly looked upon as an oratorical vice. If in pulpit oratory the preacher merely excites pathetic emotions, even though the eyes of all his auditors are bathed in tears, his sermon is a failure. The excitement of the emotions, when legitimate, will lead not so much to either laughter or grief as to a better life.

Still, it cannot be denied that deep emotion, taking the form of pathetic speech, has its place. Emblems of the pathetic — tears — are far too natural and common to receive elocutionary rebuke. "The

speaker who cherishes or illustrates a cold, unsympathetic nature, or whose ideas of propriety would repress every pathetic emotion that does not freeze in its utterance, is a poor representative of Him who shed tears over Jerusalem and who wept at the grave of Lazarus." The pulpit orator has abundant scriptural warrant for pathetic expression.[13]

In secular oratory a touch of genuine pathos is often very effective in fixing the flagging attention of the people, and also in softening antagonisms existing between the speaker and hearer.

There are certain themes, too, upon which a speaker cannot properly touch unless in the pathetic vein. References to the past, with its clouded hopes, its broken homes, its pleasant dreams and remembrances, belong usually to the realm of the pathetic. Tennyson speaks of the tears that —

> "Rise in the heart, and gather to the eyes,
> In looking on the happy autumn fields
> And thinking of the days that are no more."

"I once asked John Randolph," says John Quincy Adams, "who was the greatest orator he had ever heard. The reply was startling, from its unexpectedness. 'The greatest orator I ever heard,' said Randolph, 'was a woman. She was a slave. She was a mother, and her rostrum was the auction-block.' He then rose and imitated with thrilling pathos the tones with which this woman had appealed to the sympathy and justice of the bystanders. 'There was eloquence!' he said. 'I have heard no

man speak like that. It was overpowering!'" In this and in all similar instances, the realm of the pathetic is of all others the most fitting and effective.

Whitefield was a master in the use of pathos, and so, likewise, at times is Bishop Simpson. Webster's plea in the Dartmouth College Case shows that the great orator, though not much given to tears, was not destitute of the highest type of true oratoric pathos.

But the speaker needs skill in the use of this kind of expression. After crying for a while, an audience will laugh, laugh at grief, even. "Nothing," says Quintilian, quoting from Cicero, "dries sooner than tears. The auditor shortly becomes weary of weeping and relapses into tranquillity. We must not let this work grow cold upon our hands; but, having wrought up the passions, leave them."

It should also be borne in mind that oratoric pathos cannot be put on; if put on, it is soon perceived to be a tricky deceit. Like any other true expression, it must spring from within. It comes, if at all, from a soul alive with emotions of compassion, sympathy, and pity. As Cicero remarks: "The orator requires not a feigned compassion, nor incentives to sorrow, but that which is real, flowing from the sighs of a wounded heart."

IV. *The ideal orator has great earnestness, together with strong and healthy passions.*

The impression is quite general among those who have given attention to these subjects that no one

can be a noted orator who is not of a nature earnest and passionate.

Ancient writers were accustomed to speak of two qualities in successful oratory, namely, clearness in stating a subject, and dignified ardor in waking the passions of the hearer." Quintilian condemns, upon this ground, those elocutionists who advocate the exclusive use of a simple, unimpassioned, and conversational mode of speech: "It was not, assuredly, in a straightforward tone of voice that Demosthenes swore by the defenders of Marathon and Platæa and Salamis, nor was it in the monotonous strain of daily talk that Æschines bewailed the fate of Thebes."

Says Bautain:

"The coarsest, the most ignorant, man may occasionally be eloquent, if he feel vividly and express himself energetically in words and gesture."

In a similar vein Hazlitt says:

"The orator is only concerned to give a tone of masculine firmness to the will, to brace the sinews and muscles of the mind; not to delight our nervous sensibilities, or soften the mind into voluptuous indolence. The flowery and sentimental style is, of all others, the most intolerable in a speaker. He must be confident, inflexible, uncontrollable, overcoming all opposition by his ardor and impetuosity. We do not command others by sympathy with them, but by power, by passion, by will."

Emerson expresses a like opinion when he says that eloquence is "the appropriate organ of the highest personal energy."

The conviction is quite general that modern public speech, especially that of the pulpit, needs a new baptism of earnestness and passion. One reason assigned why the "empty-headed vociferator" on the next corner fills his house, and the man of diplomas and titles preaches to empty pews is, that the vociferator really is, or seems to be, passionately earnest, while the doctor of divinity seems to be dead. Horace speaks of one Novius, an office-holder at Rome, who was elevated to the position of tribune "chiefly by the force of his lungs." "Has he not a voice," demanded his supporters, "loud enough to drown the noise of two hundred wagons and three funerals meeting in the forum? It is this that pleases us, and we have therefore made him tribune." The mass of the people feel as a teacher in elocution, Professor Monroe, was accustomed to say, "Man has no majesty like earnestness." Garrick once was asked by a minister how it is that the stage produces a deeper impression than the pulpit He replied: "You preach truth as if it were fiction. We speak fiction as if it were truth." Betterton the actor, after listening to a dull sermon, said to a friend: "The dullness and coldness that empty the meeting-house would empty the play-house, if players spoke like preachers." He told the Lord Bishop of London, almost in the words of Garrick, that the reason why the clergy, speaking of things real, affect the people so little, while the players, speaking of things unreal, affect them so much, is because "the actors speak of things imag-

inary as though they were real; the preachers too often speak of things real as though they were imaginary."

We are deeply interested in theological schools; but if their training is to disarm the pulpit candidate of that earnest and passionate enthusiasm which he has by nature, and in which are directness, force, vividness, and fearlessness of delivery, then every such school may as well be closed, for, as Charles Dickens says, "There is no substitute in this world for thorough-going, ardent, and sincere earnestness;" at least, nothing that schools of theology teach can be a substitute for oratorical earnestness. "Infidelity," says Professor Phelps, "will outstrip Orthodoxy, if it has lightning and if Orthodoxy has nothing but fog." Authorities upon this point can easily be multiplied.

Says Augustine: "It is more by the Christian fervor of his sermons than by any endowment of his intellect that the minister must hope to inform the understanding, catch the affections, and bend the will of his hearers." "True preaching," says John Calvin, "must not be dead, but living and effective. There is a force, there is an energy, which should be found in those who desire to be good and legal ministers of the Word. No parade of rhetoric, but the Spirit of God must resound in their voice, in order to operate with power." "Let us speak to our people," says Baxter, "as for their lives." "Gather your materials and set fire to them in the pulpit," is a rule of Thomas Binney.

Says Fénelon:

"I would have every minister of the gospel address his audience with the zeal of a friend, with the generous energy of a father, and with the exuberant affection of a mother.

. . . . . .

"A preacher nowadays gets little credit, unless he comes out of the pulpit sweating and breathless, and unable to do anything the rest of the day."

Bishop Simpson, speaking of this subject, says:

"This earnestness is not to be evinced merely in motion, but in each and every step of the preparation and delivery of the sermon: earnestness in reading, earnestness in writing, earnestness in prayer, earnestness in clearness and distinctness and force of enunciation, earnestness in managing the vocal organs, and earnestness in addressing the congregation in view of the immense issues constantly at stake. A mother is in earnest when she pleads in tears with her wayward boy. A father is in earnest when, from a dying bed, he gives his last messages to his weeping children. Mr. Wesley was remarkable for his general quietness of manner, and yet his congregations felt and sympathized with the deep earnestness of his spirit."

If the opinions of these men have any weight,—and who would venture to say they have not?—then the unfortunate tendency, as men become learned, to disparage or ignore forceful and passionate expression should be vigorously guarded against by the speaker; it certainly will be rebuked by the people. Since the mass of men do not like cold victuals, do not pass them, is a dictation that might well be placarded on a multitude of pulpits. The importance of this point justifies the presentation

of certain historic facts. The speeches of Demosthenes, like those of other great orators, ancient and modern, have, almost without exception, been the outgush of an intense soul aroused by contact with vital subjects, and then uttered with vehement expression. Macaulay thus characterizes Demosthenes' oratory: "Reason, penetrated and, if we may venture on the expression, made red-hot by passion."

Æschines compared the energy of Demosthenes to the roarings of a wild beast.[14] Cicero was likewise a man of vehemence, though it was vehemence under masterly control. He puts these words into the lips of Crassus:

"What do you think is wanting to you, Cotta, but a passionate inclination, and a sort of ardor like that of love, without which no man will ever attain anything great in life, and especially such distinction as you desire?"

In modern times Mirabeau is one of the most remarkable examples of oratorical energy. It seemed at times, says a recent reviewer, that his "arguments were fastened to an electric battery, every link of which gave you a shock." "Herculean force," was the description given of Mirabeau by Thomas Jefferson.

Lord Chatham's oratory was likewise the embodiment of force. The intense earnestness of Fox, too, — an earnestness that led him to "forget himself and everything about him," — is thought by Sir James Mackintosh to be the chief seat of his power. Says Macaulay, speaking of Fox, "He was one of

the most effective and overwhelming orators because his reason was penetrated and made red-hot by his passion." Lord Brougham's speeches were spoken of as "law papers on fire." To this list may be added the names of Curran, Grattan, Pitt, Patrick Henry, Webster, and Clay. Rufus Choate deserves special mention, for in earnestness among American orators he stands pre-eminent. Reporters were accustomed to call his speech "chain-lightning." In addressing a jury, his whole frame seemed charged with electricity; clinching his fists, quivering in every limb, dishevelling his hair, whispering, then screaming, he seemed more like a madman or fiend than like the accomplished scholar and perfect gentleman he really was.

Pulpit oratory abounds in examples of marked earnestness or passion. Chrysostom was elegant, but also impressively and passionately energetic. It was the same with Martin Luther. "If I wish to compose, or write, or pray, and preach well," he says, "I must be (zornig) mad." Bourdaloue and Massillon were likewise men of true oratoric passion. Still more so was Robert Hall. He used to say: "If I should speak slow, it would be my ruin." In his zeal he abandoned himself entirely to his subject, and "often seemed," says Hazlitt, "as if in mortal throes and agonies." The intensity and impetuosity of Chalmers were so great as to render manuscript delivery in his case advisable, if not absolutely necessary. John M. Mason, when asked the secret of Dr. Chalmers' power, replied: "*his*

blood earnestness." It is said of him that, had not his force, "his prodigious energy," been intellectualized and sanctified, it would have "made him, who was the greatest of orators, the strongest of ruffians—a mighty murderer upon the earth." It was somewhat the same with Baxter. "When he spoke of weighty soul concerns," says one of his contemporaries, "you might find his very spirit drenched therein."

Whitefield was profoundly in earnest; his impassioned entreaties and appeals often rose to the verge of what may be termed "intensified vehemence." John Wesley, too, certainly appreciated earnestness in delivery. His brother Charles once tried to draw him away from a mob in which some coarse women were scolding each other. He replied: "Stop, Charles, and learn how to preach." "I go to hear Rowland Hill," said Sheridan, "because his ideas *come red-hot from the heart.*" The impetuosity of Phillips Brooks bears along and greatly delights his auditors. In his address before the Episcopal Congress at Philadelphia he argued "that earnest preaching is the great element in preserving spiritual life, and that there would be less declension if ministers had more of the spirit of Heaven and of Christ in their preaching." The following estimate of Mr. Moody, taken from the *New York Tribune*, is suggestive and will be generally indorsed: "Mr. Moody possesses little rhetorical power, less culture, and no learning; yet his *unusual earnestness* and simplicity keep all his hearers enchained."

We shall hardly be allowed to pass this point without alluding to what is termed unction. Three species of unction can be enumerated:

(1) Physical unction, or that earnestness which comes of the brute force in man. It may be secured by rasping oneself into an excitement through vigorous gesticulation and loud enunciation. With ignorant people, at least this so-termed "able-bodiedness" has much credit, and it may in some instances contribute to other and higher types of oratorical energy.[15]

(2) Intellectual unction, or that earnestness which is aroused by lofty and inspiring intellections or by profound sympathy with objects demanding attention or pity. It is artificially attained by stimulating the intellect until the rhetorical and oratorical instincts and intuitions act with unwonted rapidity and accuracy. That degree of physical exercise which, without exhaustion, perfects the blood circulation; also stimulants of various kinds, together with the reading of vigorous literature, and, with some people, earnest conversation, result in intellectual unction. When it can be done, the best way for the orator to secure this quality, and introduce it into his speech, is for him to hold his mind in close contact with the truth he is to utter until white heat is evolved.

(3) The unction of the Holy Ghost, or that earnestness which comes from "a heart filled with love to God and man, and a voice and manner brought into perfect harmony with that mental and spiritual state." It is, of all qualities, that which best adorns

the pulpit, though it is extremely difficult of analysis and definition. It is in such perfect keeping with the popular idea of preaching as to be regarded indispensable. Intellectual superiority always yields to it. "It is better," says St. Bernard, "than erudition or stores of acquired learning." [16]

This unction of the Holy Ghost, the sublimest of all elements in preaching, is secured, as Dr. Tyng suggests, "by the power of prayer, the power of humble, self-renouncing faith, the power of a close, patient, loving walk with Jesus." "The most mighty eloquence and the most devoted diligence," says Bridges, "will be utterly inefficient without the unction that is brought down from heaven by frequent and fervent supplication."

Two or three concluding remarks as to earnestness, in both platform and pulpit oratory, claim attention.

First, oratorical passion cannot be *assumed;* it must be evolved and be spontaneous. If assumed, the result will be rant. In Faust we read:

> "But never a heart will be ignited,
> Comes not the fire from the speaker's heart."

"Nothing is lasting," as Ben Jonson says, "that is feigned." Monod concludes a discussion of this subject in these words:

"Put no more warmth into your manner than you have in your heart. This honesty in speaking — allow me the

expression — will constrain you to introduce a more sincere and profound warmth than you would ever have attained in any other way. It will, besides, have a salutary reaction on your writing, and even on your soul. For, displaying things as they are, it will bring your faults to light, and admonish you to correct them."

Second. Earnestness should be sought through interest in the hearers, and self-abandonment to the subject. No speaker can be truly eloquent who, while speaking, thinks of the movement of his hands, the intonation of his voice, or the fit of his necktie. The attention and the *tension* must be not to the superficial, but to the vital and profound.

Third. Conscience, intellect, and passion constitute the trinity and perfection of man; hence it matters not how strong are the passions, if they are under the firm control of conscience and intellect.

The advantages of this spontaneous, self-forgetful, and morally controlled earnestness are so many that they can hardly be enumerated. A few principal benefits ought not to be passed unnoticed. Enthusiastic earnestness and passion, for instance, often make even stale subjects glisten like December stars. The psychological, rather, the physiological, reason for this seems to be that, the brain of the speaker being stimulated, influences the brains of the auditors. The brain-tissue of one looking upon Niagara is said to be thrown into very rapid movement; it is exhilarating; it is upon the same principle the Niagara style of delivery sets the brain of the hearer into an active and delightful phosphorescent state.

There is champagne in it. Hence, upon this ground, if on no other, the ignorant man, if earnest, will delight even the wise.

Again, earnestness fosters the natural style as distinguished from the artificial. "Out of this earnestness," says the author of *Ad Clerum*, "will come a simplicity which cannot be misunderstood, a candor which is above suspicion, and an independence as superior to flattery as it is scornful of intimidation." [17]

V. *The ideal orator is always self-possessed.*

We mean by self-possession that power felt by the speaker when filled with his subject, when confident that he understands it, when he feels under obligation to communicate it, and hence feels that he is superior to the occasion.[18] The advantages of oratorical self-possession are well set forth by Adolphe Monod:

"The power with which certain men speak, and the excellence of their delivery, arise in a measure from their ability to put themselves perfectly at their ease in a position where others are embarrassed. If confusion paralyses the faculties, self-possession multiplies them. Of two men who encounter any danger, it is not always the ablest who best extricates himself; it is commonly he who keeps himself cool; and the greatest genius is good for nothing when frozen by fear. Of what avail would the best faculties be to you without self-possession? But he who is at his ease says just what he intends, and just as he intends; reflects; checks himself in a moment, if necessary, to seek a word or a thought, and from the very pause borrows some natural and expressive accent or gesture; takes advantage of what he sees and hears, and, in a word, brings into use all his

resources; which is saying a great deal, for "the spirit of man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts."

Bishop Simpson thinks that self-possession and command of language are the "two great requisites for ready and correct extemporaneous speaking."

The orator, as we have already seen, must have a vein of pathos, and may make others weep; but his skill is not perfect unless his self-possession enables him to keep his tears within his eyelids. "Weep with the voice, not with the eyes," is an important rule of elocution. It is said that "art enshrines the great sadness of the world, but is itself not sad." True art is, therefore, self-possessed. Pericles could easily bring tears to the eyes of his auditors, but, as Plutarch tells us, was never known to shed a tear but once — at the death of his last surviving legitimate son.

The sensibility of the orator must likewise be keenly alive to things witty and ridiculous; but he must be master of his laughter. Says a keen observer:

"You have in you a noisy, sensual savage, which you are to keep down, and turn all his strength to beauty. For example, what a seneschal and detective is laughter! It seems to require several generations of education to train a squeaking or a shouting habit out of a man. Sometimes, when in almost all expressions the Choctaw and the slave have been worked out of him, a coarse nature still betrays itself in his contemptible squeals of joy."

Talma, the French actor, declared that he had studied forty years to be energetic without noise.

A self-possessed man never allows himself to be hurried. Warren, in his *Attorneys and Solicitors*, gives this excellent advice to the legal profession:

"No one in a hurry can possibly have his wits about him; and remember that in law there is ever an opponent watching to find you off your guard. You may occasionally be in haste, but you need never be in a hurry; take care — resolve — never to be so. Remember always that others' interests are occupying your attention, and suffer by your inadvertence — by that negligence which generally occasions hurry. A man of first-rate business talents — one who always looks so calm and tranquil that it makes one's self feel cool on a hot summer's day to look at him — once told me that he had never been in a hurry but once, and that was for an entire fortnight at the commencement of his career. It nearly killed him; he spoiled everything he touched; he was always breathless and harassed and miserable. But it did him good for life; he resolved never again to be in a hurry — and never was, no, not once, that he could remember, during twenty-five years' practice! Observe, I speak of being hurried and flustered — not being in haste, for that is often inevitable; but then is always seen the superiority and inferiority of different men. You may indeed almost define hurry as the condition to which an inferior man is reduced by haste. I one day observed, in a committee of the House of Commons sitting on a railway bill, the chief secretary of the company, during several hours, while great interests were in jeopardy, preserve a truly admirable coolness, tranquillity, and temper, conferring on him immense advantages. His suggestions to counsel were masterly, and exquisitely well-timed; and by the close of the day he had triumphed. 'How is it that one never sees you in a hurry?' said I, as we were pacing the long corridor, on our way from the committee-room. 'Because it's so expensive,' he replied, with a significant smile. I shall never forget that observation; and don't you." [19]

Emerson suggests that haste is ill-breeding. Chesterfield remarks that "whoever is in a hurry shows that the thing he is about is too big for him." No being has ever walked this earth who, according to this test, has so clearly shown as has our Lord that he stood above his life-work, grand as it was. He was *superior* to every circumstance and occasion. This cool self-possession, at the bar, on the platform, or in the pulpit, has immense advantage. Such an orator conforms to the rule of good manners which bids us avoid all off-guard exaggeration. "A man this is who cannot be disconcerted, and so can never play his last card, but has a reserve of power when he has hit his mark. With serene face he can subvert a kingdom."

But observe, in oratory, self-control does not prevent what is known as abandonment to the subject. In vehement expression, which includes intense feeling and fervid utterance, the speaker often seems to give himself completely to his subject. Demosthenes seemed at times in transports of rage. Luther was often so completely abandoned to his subject that he was oblivious to himself. It was the same with Robert Hall. But the orations of Demosthenes and the sermons of Luther and Hall, when carefully studied, show that these men were all the while under perfect self-management. The rage of one moment is quickly followed the next moment by a royal deliberateness; the floodgates were opened, but at any moment the flood could be controlled. Mirabeau, too, at times appeared like a madman, but was then

even under such self-mastery that his wrath was superb. It was thus in large degree with Rufus Choate. "He combined," says Whipple, "a conservative intellect with radical sensibilities." He could throw himself, with all his vehement energy, into his speech, and then, in the midst of his oratorical wrath, he would quickly check himself, and paint a picture rich and gorgeous. The biographer of Robertson says that it was because Robertson "was not mastered by his excitement, but, at the very point of being mastered, mastered *himself*, — because he was apparently cool while at a white heat, so that he made his audience glow with the fire, and at the same time respect the self-possessive power of the speaker, — that his eloquence was so conquering." It is, therefore, somewhat against Lord Chatham that he confessed that "he did not dare to speak with a state secret lurking in his mind, for in the Sibylline frenzy of his oratory he knew not what he said." It is this power to thunder, and yet the ability to direct it anywhere, or to "check the thunder in mid-volley," that characterizes the supreme orator. In his transports of oratorical enthusiasm, such a speaker is secure against both extravagance of manner and impropriety of expression. At will he can deliver that most stunning of all replies — a dead silence.[20]

VI. *The ideal orator is morally fearless.*

"The power of Chatham, of Pericles, of Luther," says Emerson, "rested on this strength of character, which, because it did not and could not fear any-

body, made nothing of their antagonists, and became sometimes exquisitely provoking and sometimes terrific to them." "To feel your subject thoroughly, and to speak without fear, are the only rules of eloquence, properly so called, which I can offer," are the words of Goldsmith; they embody a treatise on elocution. Lord Bacon, in his Essay on State Government, says: "Boldness is first in civil dispatch, boldness second, boldness third." This quality of boldness is certainly as important in oratory as in "civil dispatch." "*Rash* preaching," said Rowland Hill, "disgusts; *timid* preaching leaves poor souls fast asleep; *bold* preaching is the only preaching that is owned of God."

Moral courage, however, is often united with what is sometimes called physical timidity, or extreme sensitiveness. This fact explains the apparent contradictions in the character and bearing of many of the world's great orators. Cowardice was charged upon Demosthenes. He was vigorously assailed by Æschines for quailing before Philip and cringing before Alexander; and Plutarch says of Cicero that "he was not only timid in war but had much fear when he spake in public; and in many causes he scarce left trembling, even in the height and vehemence of his eloquence." This extreme sensitiveness before an audience, resulting often in "stage fright," is not moral cowardice, but rather a sense of responsibility, a vivid consciousness of all that is pending, both real and imaginary; this elocutionary trepidation involves, however, qualities

which are essential to successful oratory. "Timid in himself, but bold in his cause," is a suggestive remark of Cicero.[21]

Examples of unquestioned courage in secular oratory are those of Demosthenes in his reply to Python, Cicero against Catiline, Chatham defying Walpole, and fighting overwhelming majorities; Burke contending, in behalf of America, against the heaviest odds. The careers of Fox, Pitt and Brougham abound with instances of unflinching oratorical courage. Not less honored in this respect are the names of Wendell Phillips, Charles Sumner, and William Lloyd Garrison. Conant's portrait of Garrison has this characteristic extract from one of his speeches: "I am in earnest! I will not equivocate — I will not excuse — I will not retreat a single inch — and I will be heard!"[22]

Sacred eloquence likewise abounds in examples of this kind of courage. The Old Testament prophets and the New Testament apostles present a continuous line of oratorical heroes. Moses before Pharaoh, Elijah before Ahab, Isaiah before Ahaz, Nathan before David, John before Herod, Peter before the enraged Jews, Paul before kings and rulers, and "the Greater than All" before the Pharisees, are examples of the highest type of oratorical courage on record. "Be not afraid," are the words repeated throughout the Bible to the servants of God. Compare, John vii. 26: Acts iv. 13, 29, 31; xiii. 46; xiv. 3; xviii. 26; xix. 8: Eph. vi. 20: 2 Cor. vii. 4.

Pulpit oratory is equally crowded with illustrious examples. Luther at the Diet of Worms, Latimer before Henry VIII., Bourdaloue before Louis XIV.; indeed, there is scarcely an end to this list.[23]

Unquestionably there is more courage in the pulpit of to-day than many suppose; yet it must be confessed that many clergymen, for the want of a little more oratorical boldness, live in comparative obscurity and exercise but the smallest influence. The defence of the so-called "obnoxious doctrines," the evils of society and the sins of the people are calling to-day strongly for a display of the old-time prophetic and apostolic heroism.

VII. *The ideal orator is a man of strong convictions and positive opinions.*

One of the first and best-established laws of oratory is, that the speaker must himself be first persuaded, if he would persuade others. Hence, in the long run he will succeed best who resolutely refuses to take what seems to him to be the wrong side of a question. When one is in alliance with his convictions, he is never lonely and never can be weak.

"Thrice blest is he to whom is given the instinct that can tell
That God is in the field when he is most invincible."

Vice-President Wilson, at the National Convention, 1848, held in Philadelphia, repudiated the action of the convention, and, standing almost alone, resisting the complimentary attentions of such a man as

Daniel Webster, and the other great leaders of the Whig party, used these words, which ought to be echoed by every political, legal, and pulpit orator in the land: "No hope of political reward; no fear of ridicule or denunciation, will deter me from acting up to my convictions of duty."

The pulpit orator, especially, should be *under conviction* — a conviction deep and solemn as his being, based upon an unswerving faith in the simple, but mighty, truth of the gospel. It has been well remarked that a preacher "is set to declare to the people the truth as he perceives it, and as he believes it; the truth which to him is real and positive and living truth; which is as his very life, and which he would die for. If a man has no such convictions of truth, he is out of his sphere, as a preacher."

These strong convictions result in that positiveness of opinion and expression without which all oratory is feeble and hardly worthy of the name. Being based upon moral conviction, it is the positiveness of a true prophet or apostle, in which there is a mingling of self-assertion and self-surrender extremely attractive to the majority of men. The doubting and hesitating man who aspires to be a public teacher is in the eyes of the masses despicable. Dr. Storrs thinks that in this characteristic is found the prime element of the attractiveness of the Papacy to many educated Protestant minds.[24]

"Brains are good for a minister," said a woman of shrewd common sense, "but brains and brass mixed are better." A New Haven professor was

accustomed to say, "I feel the need of rubbing my face with a brass candlestick when I go out to beg even for a good cause." Pulpit positiveness, however, is not brass nor arrogance, though in outward appearance it is something like them. If the preacher meditates upon his theme till his whole being responds to it, until, for the time, nothing else seems quite as important, and if he feels that God has touched his lips, then he will speak with authority, and no hearer will think his speech immodest.

Likewise in secular oratory, strong convictions and positiveness of opinion are indispensable, and should depend upon a firm alliance between the mind of the speaker and the cause advocated. Lord Chatham's logic is said to consist of "I affirm," "I am ready to maintain," and "I pledge myself to prove." He was *convicted*, felt what he said, therefore was positive and spoke with authority.

The brilliant Lady Mary, wife of Montague, gave this direction to her husband for his guidance in his parliamentary career:

"The first necessary qualification is impudence, and (as Demosthenes would say), the second is impudence, and the third still impudence. No modest man ever did or ever will make his fortune. Your friend Lord Halifax, R. Walpole, and all other remarkable instances of quick advancement, have been remarkably impudent. Your modest man stands behind in the crowd, and is shoved about by everybody."

But oratorical positiveness, though resembling impudence is not impudence. It is rather a perfect consecration to the theme advocated, and a conviction

admitting of no doubt that the cause is just and should be and must be triumphant. The force and earnestness of solemn convictions are the most irresistible things among men. The power and commanding majesty are at times so great that the auditors are amazed. "The eloquent man," says Emerson, "is the one who is inwardly drunk with a certain belief. . . . This terrible earnestness makes good the ancient superstition of the hunter, that the bullet will hit its mark which is first dipped in the marksman's blood."

VIII. *The ideal orator is a man of untiring perseverance and industry.*

No chapter in the history of oratory is fuller of interest and encouragement to the aspirant for the honors of public speech than the one which records the severe application of distinguished orators. The record is an inspiration. Plutarch, speaking of the diligence of Pericles, says:

"He appeared not in the streets, except when he went to the forum or the senate-house. He declined the invitations of his friends and all social entertainments and recreations; insomuch that in the whole time of his administration, which was a considerable length, he never went to sup with any of his friends but once, which was at the marriage of his nephew, Euryptotemus, and he staid there only until the ceremony of libation was ended."

Of the perseverance of Demosthenes under difficulties we have already spoken. Cicero in consequence of too close attention to his work narrowly escaped death. Cæsar was a master in the art of

speaking, especially in his command of pure and elegant language; but he attained this distinction, says Cicero, "by a studious application to the most intricate and refined branches of literature, and by careful and constant attention to the forms and style of his speech." Richard Burke, shortly after an extraordinary display of powers in the House of Commons by his brother Edmund, was found sitting by himself in meditation; he was questioned by Mr. Malone as to the cause: "I have been wondering," said Richard, "how Ned has contrived to monopolize all the talents of the family. But, then again, I remember, when we were at play he was always at work."

Brougham, during the time of his greatest successes, gave but four hours out of the twenty-four to sleep. Cobbett wrote: "What man ever performed a greater quantity of labor than I have performed? I have not, during my life, spent more than thirty-five minutes at table, including all the meals of the day." Alexander Hamilton once said to an intimate friend: "Men give me some credit for genius. All the genius that I have lies in this: When I have a subject in hand, I study it profoundly. Day and night it is before me. I explore it in all its bearings. My mind becomes pervaded with it. Then the effort which I make is what the people are pleased to call the fruits of genius. It is the fruit of labor and thought."

Webster's lofty and chaste style was the result of twenty years of special study of the dictionary and

of careful literary revision. Says a biographer of Charles Sumner:

"It was one of the good fortunes of his life that, born amidst the happiest of influences, he used to the utmost the advantages of school and college. To many men youth itself is so sweet a siren that in hearing her song they forget all but the pleasure of listening to it. But the sibyl saved no scroll from Sumner; he had the wisdom to seize them all. His classmates, gayly returning late at night, saw the studious light shining in his window. The boy was hard at work, already in those plastic years storing his mind and memory, which seemed indeed an 'inability to forget,' with the literature and historic lore which gave his later discourses such amplitude and splendor of illustration that, like a royal robe, it was stiff and cumbrous and awkward with exaggerated richness of embroidery. He never lost this vast capacity for work, and his life had no idle hours. Long afterward, when he was in Paris, recovering from the blow in the Senate, ordered not to think or read, and daily, as his physician lately tells us, undergoing a torture of treatment, which he refused to mitigate by anæsthetics, simply unable to do nothing, he devoted himself to the study and collection of engravings, in which he became an expert. And I remember in the midsummer of 1871, when he remained, as was his custom, in Washington, after the city was deserted by all but its local population, and when I saw him daily, that he rose at seven in the morning, and with but a slight breakfast at nine, sat at his desk in the library hard at work until five in the afternoon. It was his vacation; the weather was tropical, and he was sixty years old. The renowned senator at his post was still the solitary midnight student of the college."

The field of pulpit oratory is likewise filled with men who have risen to distinction through hard and

incessant labor. Bossuet, who left fifty volumes of his own manuscripts, rose at four, wrapped himself up in a loose dress of bearskin, and wrote until, from sheer fatigue, his hand refused to hold the pen. Then he would return to bed, take the sleep of exhaustion, and on awaking, go through the same process again. John Wesley's motto was, "Never be unemployed."

A young man once called upon Richard Baxter with no particular business, and said to him, "Perhaps I trouble you." "Of course you do," replied Baxter. That reply was blunt; yet it must be remembered that he had no time to waste. It was his diligence that enabled him to write one hundred and sixty-eight treatises. One of his greatest works, the *Methodus Theologiæ Christianæ*, was written, he says, "at Totteridge, in a troublesome, smoky, suffocating room, in the midst of daily pains of sciatica and *many worse*."

Robert Hall kept on writing when too sick to stand or sit. Dr. Emmonds had his study on the lower floor, in order to save the time it would take to climb a flight of stairs. It was acquaintance with facts like these that led Sir Fowell Buxton to say:

"The longer I live, the more I am certain that the great difference between men — between the feeble and the powerful, the great and the insignificant — is *energy, invincible determination*, a purpose once fixed, and then, *death or victory!* That quality will do anything that can be done in this world; and no talents, no circumstances, no opportunities, will make a two-legged creature a man without it."

What, then, is the young man who is aspiring to distinction in secular or pulpit eloquence waiting for? The price is fixed, and must be paid; if not paid, the man is doomed to walk with that large class of men known as the unable and unfortunate. Says a distinguished preacher: "There is no heresy on earth like laziness." The author of *Ad Clerum*, too, is forcible in his warning: "A terrible malediction awaits the indolent minister."

But if the price is cheerfully paid, handsome returns will be received. Carlyle exclaims:

"Sweat of the brow, and up from that to sweat of the brain; sweat of the heart, up to that 'agony of bloody sweat,' which all men have called divine! Oh, brother, if this is not worship, then I say, the more pity for worship! for this is the noblest thing yet discovered under God's sky."

CHAPTER V.

INFERENCES (*Continued*).

IX. *The ideal orator is a master in the arts of poetic representation.*

The orator, therefore, must have the poetic nature. Fénelon affirms that the true orator is a poet, a philosopher, and a man of passion in one. "He is the best orator who can turn men's ears into eyes," is the saying of an Arabian proverb. The proposition that: objects, to be well described, must have been seen by either the optical or the mind's eye, needs no argument. The mind's eye is marvellously available to some men. Humboldt once gave a description of Jerusalem, so minute and accurate that a traveller then recently returned from the East, asked, "When did you last visit Jerusalem?" "I never visited it," replied Humboldt, "but expecting to do so forty years ago, I booked myself." One of the best descriptions of Athens is by Milton (*Paradise Regained*, Book IV.), but Milton was blind. Burke's description of India, as Macaulay assures us, is faultless; yet Burke had never visited India. It was with the mental eye that Humboldt had

seen Jerusalem, that Milton had seen Athens, and that Burke had looked upon India.

This power of visualizing the unseen and distant, united with good judgment in its use, is indispensable to the orator. He sees, and speaks, and his auditors see. By the means of this poetic imagery, fittingly expressed, the distant is brought near and the imaginary is made real. It is not too much to say that the products of a vivid and healthy imagination are, to the mass of people, the most tangible things in the speech of an orator. Hence the Figures of Poetry — *metaphor*, *simile*, *comparison*, *allegory*, *parable*, *and fable*, also the Figures of Poetic-Prose — *metonymy*, *trope*, *personification*, *apostrophe*, *hyperbole*, *oxymoron*, *irony*, *numeration*, *allusion*, *indication*, *supposition*, *parody*, *soliloquy*, and *dialogue*, should be so familiar to the orator that he can readily use them whenever the thought would thus be better expressed than otherwise; while the Figures of Oratory, or, as they are sometimes termed, the "Figures of Emphasis" and "Figures of Argument," must be constantly on his tongue.[25]

Of prose-poetry, Rufus Choate is one of the best examples in secular, while Jeremy Taylor ranks among the first in pulpit, oratory. Few, if any, have excelled Whitefield in the art of dramatizing.

X. *The ideal orator has logical instincts and methods, but is not trammelled by them.*

Cicero, in *De Oratore*, following out a thought expressed by Demosthenes, claimed that "an orator

should be a master of reasoning, and know how to define, and argue, and unravel the most specious sophisms. When the subject treated requires any of the essential characteristics of logic, such as analysis and synthesis, abstraction and generalization, the ideal orator should know instantly which to apply. And, further, it is safe to say that any mental discipline which improves one's perceptions of the essential or logical relation of ideas will not only improve his reasoning powers, but will also add to the strength of his oratory. Hence, the habit of arranging knowledge in systematic order will be found an excellent discipline. Also the study of the masterpieces of oratory, and even frequent references to treatises upon logic until at least one has mastered the general principles, will be of service. Furthermore, as mathematical reasoning is coincident with demonstrations, it follows that the solution of mathematical problems is a safe and efficient means of cultivating the reasoning powers. Geometry is said to be logic applied to mathematics, and logic is said to be geometry applied to rhetoric. It was claimed by Quintilian, and has been echoed by many writers since his day, that no one can be a complete orator without a knowledge of geometry.[26]

While, therefore, attention to these methods of acquiring the art of reasoning, which are based upon an improvement of the mental faculties, cannot be otherwise than beneficial to the orator, and need not in any way trammel him, still it has to be confessed that the mere technicalities of logic, if very rigidly

applied while in the act of speaking, will doubtless mar the effectiveness of his eloquence.

The charge is sometimes made that the modern lawyer has ceased to be eloquent. "All the fire, energy, and enthusiasm of a young man with noble impulses, — all his native genius and acquired abilities, — die within him, overlaid and smothered by the forms and technicalities of a narrow, crabbed, and barbarous legal system." It must be confessed that this charge has in it much truth.

Modern city pulpits, where fashionable society worships, are likewise, with few exceptions, not filled with orators. The young preacher, fresh from the schools, dares not let his logic burst out into flames. He is technical, self-conscious, and therefore destitute of oratorical power.

And the older men seem to have met with an irreparable loss. Their studied exactness and resort to manuscripts have murdered the orator that used to speak from their lips.

Nothing, in this connection, therefore, is more important than the distinction between the reasoning adapted to oratory and that which is appropriately employed by the philosopher and the professional instructor in their studies and teachings. The teacher is exact and didactic; his methods may convince, but do not profoundly impress or move the audience. Hence, he who is a successful teacher may in oratory be an utter failure. It is therefore contended by not a few eminent men that breadth of conception, clearness of perception, and those rhetorical intui-

tions which lead to correct arrangement, are the only necessary logical outfit for an orator. Johnson's advice to Boswell was this: "You must not argue as if you were in the schools: close reasoning will not fix attention." When Sheridan was asked how he had succeeded so well in the House, he replied, "I had not been there very long before I found that three fourths of the members were fools, and I resolved therefore not to shock them by too much severity of argument." Grattan, speaking of Chatham, said that "he did not conduct the understanding through the painful subtleties of argumentation, but rather lightened upon his subject, and reached the point by the flashing of his mind, which, like those of his eye, were felt but could not be followed." [27]

There is much that is tawdry, much that is not pertinent, much that could be overthrown by discriminating logic, in Sheridan's speech at the trial of Hastings; still, it is acknowledged to have been one of the most effective speeches ever delivered. It has the vital merit of oratorical scope, grasp, and arrangement. Fox, when told that a certain speech read well, replied: "Then it must have been a bad speech." It is upon this same ground that Whately, in his *Rhetoric*, expresses the doubt "whether a first-rate man can be a first-rate orator." "No good writer, who is occupied in simply expressing truth," says Dr. Bushnell, "is ever afraid of contradictions or inconsistencies in his language. It is nothing to him that a quirk of logic can bring him into an absurdity." The Duke of Wellington was partly

educated at the military college of Angers in France. He there acquired some knowledge of French, but his pronunciation was far from Parisian. Being engaged in conversation one day with Talleyrand, some one asked the witty diplomatist how the duke spoke French. The answer was: "Just as he does everything — with a great deal of intrepidity." A writer upon this subject has therefore remarked, that had not Wellington been a great general, he might have been a great orator.

From the opinions of these men, and from the uniform methods of noted public speakers, it will be inferred that the logic of an orator is an energetic process of reasoning, rather than a formal statement of propositions involving intricate sentences and connecting links. The logic of the orator is a comprehensive grasp of the subject, a power of instantaneous arrangement of all the important subject-matter belonging to the subject, and the power of tracing things to their causes, and of following them to their results.

And, further, the reasoning of an orator must be cumulative and earnest. There will be in it occasional repugnant and antagonistic expressions. It will be rugged, abrupt, often hurling an ill-favored word that in the quiet moment would almost shock the hearer.

"Pithy sentences, nervous common sense, strong phrases, the *feliciter audax*, both in language and conception, well-compacted periods, sudden and strong masses of light, an apt adage in English or

Latin, a keen sarcasm, a merciless personality, a mortal thrust, — these are the beauties and deformities that now make a speaker the most interesting."

The orations of Demosthenes fully answer these conditions. They are clear, bold, massive chains of reasoning, with no over-nice distinctions and technicalities, as Brédif says: "His (Demosthenes) mode of arguing, strong and simple, is that of truth made conspicuous by lofty, sententious thoughts, by picturesque vivacity, or by a logical network of expressions." The orations of Cicero, Burke, Pitt, Erskine, and Webster, in the field of secular oratory, are likewise noted illustrations of untrammelled logical powers.

In sacred oratory, Jeremy Taylor in the British pulpit and Jonathan Edwards in the American, were also masters in the arts of strong and popular reasoning.[28]

We have not, in all this, been arguing for less logical clearness and conclusiveness; we would contend for even more of this than is at present heard, both at the bar and from the pulpit, — especially from the pulpit; but the formulas of logic and the finish of rhetoric must be such as are adapted to the vigorousness of oratoric power and impressiveness.

XI. *The ideal orator is a philosopher.*

Most of the subject-matter properly falling within the scope of this division is brought under the section treating of the orator's knowledge (see p. 103); we therefore merely remark in this connection that,

as the orator ought not to be trammelled by his logic, so, also, he must not be trammelled by his philosophy.

XII. *The ideal orator has a philosophical memory.*

The full discussion of this topic belongs to the psychology of speech. But the distinction between the technical or verbal memory and the species called philosophical, or, properly enough, oratorical memory, may here be made. The technical memory recalls, without the aid apparently of classification or association. Such is the ready memory of the child, which to the orator is of some account, but not of vital importance. The philosophical memory, however, — that, we mean, which easily recalls principles, and without apparent difficulty groups and classifies all data belonging to a subject, rejecting everything that does not essentially aid the cause (for this type of memory is just as serviceable in being able to forget as in being able to recall), — is absolutely indispensable to the orator. The practice of constantly generalizing is the surest way to come into possession of a philosophical memory.

XIII. *The ideal orator is a man of extensive learning.*

From what has been said, the inference will follow that there are three fundamental factors that constitute the orator: what he *is*, what he *knows*, and his *power* of using himself and his knowledge. As to the orator's knowledge, ancient writers seem extravagant in their demands. They insist that an orator

should know everything: but it is well to remember that the field of human knowledge, during the periods of Grecian and Roman eloquence, in comparison with what it is at present, was extremely limited. Cicero is especially emphatic and specific, requiring that the orator shall be a logician (*De Ora.* lib. i. § 6), a philosopher, and an historian (lib. ii. § 13, 14, 34), and be thoroughly acquainted with the classics (§ 16). Cicero's own accomplishments were varied. "He was apparently master of logic, ethics, astronomy, and natural philosophy, besides being well versed in geometry, music, grammar, and, in short, in every one of the fine arts. It was from no unassisted natural gifts, but from deep learning and the united confluence of the arts and sciences, that, as Tacitus affirms, the resistless torrent of that amazing eloquence of Cicero derived its strength and rapidity."

Quintilian is scarcely less exacting. "The material of oratory," he says, "is everything that may come before an orator for discussion." [29]

Fénelon, in developing Plato's view of this subject, says:

"Orators ought to know the laws and customs of their country, and how far they are agreeable to the genius and temper of the people, what are the manners of the several ranks and conditions among them, their different ways of education, the common prejudices and separate interests that prevail in the present age, and the most proper way to instruct and reform the people. This knowledge comprehends all the solid parts of philosophy and politics. So that Plato meant to show us that none but a philosopher can be a true orator. And it is in this sense we must under-

stand all he says in his *Gorgias* against the rhetoricians; I mean that set of men who made profession of talking finely and persuading others, without endeavoring to know, from solid philosophy, what one ought to teach them. In short, according to Plato, the true art of oratory consists in understanding those useful truths of which we ought to convince people, and the art of moving their passions, in order to persuasion."

Bautain, discussing the "Fund Needful to the Orator," says:

"The orator's capital is that sum of science or knowledge which is necessary to him in order to speak pertinently upon any subject whatever; and science or knowledge are not *extemporized.* Although knowledge does not give the talent for speaking, still, he who knows well what he has to say, has many chances of saying it well, especially if he has a clear and distinct conception of it.

> 'What you conceive aright you express clearly,
> And the words to say it in come easily.'"

"Our office," says Cecil, speaking of the ministry, "is the most laborious in the world. The mind must be always on the stretch, to acquire wisdom and grace, and to communicate them to all who come near."

During the era of British eloquence, education was largely confined to classical study, and noted orators were accustomed to acquaint themselves with ancient lore, that they might weave into their speeches felicitous quotations. Accordingly, we find that Curran was passionately devoted to the classics, and always had with him a pocket-edition of Virgil. His biographer tells us that, during a

storm at sea, when all others on board were in fear for their lives, Curran was found reading Virgil by himself and crying over the fate of Dido. He perfected himself in French, so "as to speak like a native," and mastered all the wealth of English and French literature.

Chatham was perfectly familiar with Demosthenes, and "turned and returned" the *Oration on the Crown* into English. He also translated every oration of Cicero, then, after an interval, re-translated his English translation into Latin. He mastered in succession, ethics, Roman civil law, international law, the feudal law, and the municipal law of England.

Pitt the younger studied with close attention the Greek, Latin, and English poets, and wove into his speeches, with telling effect, many choice passages he had memorized.

The mind of Fox, as his biographer says, was "steeped in classical literature." The pages of Homer, Euripides, Virgil, and Ovid were perused till the day of his death. Euripides, "the argumentative dramatist," Fox used to say, was, "without exception, the most useful classic for a public speaker."

The speeches of Burke are likewise studded with poetical gems from the classics; Horace, Lucan, Juvenal, and especially Virgil, being contributors. Says his biographer:

"Burke disclaimed superior talent, and always appealed to his superior industry. . . . By incessant labor, he could

at last soar at any moment to his highest elevation, as though it had been his natural level. His innate genius was wonderful, but he improved it to the uttermost. By reading and observation he fed his rich imagination; to books he owed his vast and varied knowledge; from his extensive acquaintance with literature he derived his inexhaustible command of words; through his habit of incessant thought he was enabled to draw the inferences which have won for him the renown of being the most sagacious of politicians; and by the incessant practice of composition he learned to embody his conclusions in a style more grandly beautiful than has ever been reached by any other Englishman with either the tongue or the pen."

Lord Brougham was an enthusiastic advocate of classical learning and translation, and also of classic imitation as a help to the orator. In a letter addressed, in 1823, to Macaulay's father, he says:

"I know from experience that nothing is half so successful in these times (bad though they be) as what has been formed on the Greek models. I use a very poor instance in giving my own experience; but I do assure you that, both in courts of law and Parliament, and even to mobs, I have never made so much play (to use a very modern phrase) as when I was almost translating from the Greek. I composed the peroration of my speech for the queen, in the House of Lords, after reading and repeating Demosthenes for three or four weeks, and I composed it twenty times over at least; and it certainly succeeded in a very extraordinary degree, and far above any merits of its own."

Wirt was also diligent and laborious. He seemed perfectly familiar with Bacon, Boyle, Hooker, Locke, and the other masters of English literature, and, among the ancients, with Quintilian, Seneca, and

Horace; a pocket edition of the latter, well thumbed and marked, was upon his journeys his constant companion.[30]

Choate was a tireless student and translator of the classics. It is said that in his busiest days he would find time to read his chosen author, Tacitus. Pulpit orators, too, have been faithful workers in the fields of classical lore. Chrysostom enriched his mind with the spoils of all ancient learning. The British pulpit of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries quoted Greek and Latin authors with a freedom that to us seems pedantic. Barrow was a philologist and mathematician, Greek professor at Cambridge, and predecessor of Newton in the chair of mathematics. He was as familiar with the writings of Chrysostom as with the literature of his mother tongue. Fénelon was so well acquainted with Cicero that he could almost repeat the entire *De Oratore*. The royal style of Bossuet had a classical basis. Homer, Tacitus, and Thucydides were as well known to him as the standard French authors. His passion for Homer was so great, that he is said to have talked the Iliad in his sleep.

Such, the past. We are, of course compelled to recognize the fact that the times have changed. With the exception of Gladstone, who introduces a bit of Virgil into every fresh speech, no English nor American orator, at the present day, "adorns his speeches with jewels from the ancient classics."

The age being more scientific, and more given to business enterprise than to classical literature, has

demanded a change, and the orator must govern himself accordingly. He must be scientific and enterprising; he must deal with such questions as agitate the popular mind.

Some of the ancient recommendations, however, remain in force.

For instance: the study of human nature is no less important to-day than when urged by Plato.[31] The lawyer must be able to read even the thoughts of the witnesses and jury. The statesman, if he is an orator, must know men, or he will be without influence. And no more damaging criticism can be passed upon the preacher than to say, he does not understand human nature.

The most common recommendation for acquiring knowledge in this field is, to study man in the ordinary walks of life. It was in this way that Burke, Fox, and Mirabeau gained their knowledge of men. Burke talked with men by the roadside and in woodsheds, made them understand his speech, then transferred their thoughts and speech to the halls of Parliament. "I dined with Burke and others at the Ton," says Rogers. "At dinner Burke was missed, and was found at a fishmonger's, learning the history of pickled salmon."

Likewise introspection, the study of biography, conversation with all classes, the study of the higher types of fiction, especially Shakespeare, and acquaintance with the Bible, will contribute rapidly to a man's knowledge of human nature.

The study of history, as well as of human nature,

was enjoined in every ancient treatise on oratory, and is at present no less important. History is one of the most substantial things a modern speaker can stand on; the data of history are solids. "History is human nature in relief;" it is philosophy and poetry illustrated. It is a rare thing to find a great oration or impressive sermon destitute of historic illustrations and allusions.

The great orators, with marked uniformity, have also been men well versed in the current literature of their time. Choate mentions two benefits resulting from acquaintance with literature. (1) It furnishes knowledge. "In literature," he used to say, "you find ideas. There one should daily replenish his stock. The whole range of polite literature should be vexed for thoughts." (2) It affords an antidote for what he regarded an unfortunate modern tendency: "All the discipline and customs of social life, in our time, tend to crush emotion and feeling. Literature alone is brimful of feeling."

The speech of the well-read man, other things being equal, will be the most interesting, impressive, and profitable. Compare pp. 33.

And, further, the drift of the present age is so thoroughly scientific, that the public speaker cannot afford to be ignorant of the results of the latest scientific investigations. Perhaps no class of orators need this more than preachers. "Chalmers met the infidel astronomers upon their own ground, and silenced them." Let each new generation of infidels be met and silenced in the same way.

But especially must the orator acquaint himself with all the general matters and details belonging to his special department of oratory. This is the requisition made upon the lawyer, the statesman, and the preacher, if they would attain the highest distinction in oratory. Speakers must be "eloquent by their wisdom," in mastering everything belonging to the profession. The secular orator must be an untiring and profound student of British and American eloquence. The celebrated speeches of the master-minds ought to be dwelt upon and repeated until committed to memory.[32]

The pulpit orator, for instance, must be a theologian and a teacher of theology.[33] If he is "mighty in the scriptures" he will, like Apollos, and for the same reason, be an "eloquent man." The preacher should be so well acquainted with his text-book, the Bible, that when the flush of the extemporaneous is upon him, the rich stores of revealed truth and Scriptural expression, without the aid of concordance or reference Bible, will spring to his lips. The realms of theological literature, including exegetical, historical, systematic and practical theology, in all their highways and byways, should be thoroughly known by the pulpit orator. His stock of sermonic literature must be coextensive with the writings of all the best sermonizers — those uniting deep spirituality with extensive learning, together with simplicity, clearness, and force of expression.[34]

And still further, the ideal orator makes himself thorough master of the subject-matter upon which

he speaks. Copiousness of matter will cure nearly half the defects of the orator's elocution. "All men," says Socrates, "are sufficiently eloquent in that which they understand." Cicero puts this same thought in a negative form: "No man can be eloquent upon any subject he does not understand." Mr. Webster once replied to a gentleman who pressed him to speak on a subject of great importance: "The subject interests me deeply, but I have not time. There, sir," pointing to a large number of letters on the table, "is a pile of unanswered letters, to which I must reply before the close of the session (which was then three days off). I have not time to master the subject so as to do it justice." "But, Mr. Webster, a few words from you would do so much to awaken public attention to it." "If there be so much weight in my words as you represent," Webster replied, "it is because I do not allow myself to speak on any subject till I have imbued my mind with it." Wirt, though fluent and in constant practice, would never speak, if he could help it, without the most laborious preparation. For extemporaneous after-dinner speeches "he had a mortal horror." "Which is your best sermon?" was asked of Massillon. "The one I know best," he replied. "Make yourself master of your subject," is Bishop Simpson's advice. Garrick said of Whitefield: "He is at his best when he has preached a sermon for the fortieth time." Emerson's discussion of this subject is apt: "The orator must have the fact and know how to tell it. In any knot of men conversing on

any subject, the person who knows most about it will have the ear of the company, if he wishes it, and lead the conversation, no matter what genius or distinction other men there present may have; and in any public assembly, him who has the facts, and can and will state them, people will listen to, though he is otherwise ignorant, though he is hoarse and ungraceful, though he stutters and screams. . . . . In every company, the man with the fact is like the guide you hire to lead your party up the mountain, or through a difficult country. He may not compare with any of the company in mind, or breeding, or courage, or possessions; but he is much more important to the present need than any of them. Such is the knowledge demanded of the orator who aspires to high rank."

We offer this caution: The orator must not be trammelled by his knowledge. The power of disembarrassing the speech of everything not making for the main issue cannot be overestimated. If one has not the judgment judiciously to select from his stores of knowledge, he would as well or better have less knowledge. The great orators, with scarcely an exception, have had this reserve power, or power of selection, as to the use of materials; and scarcely a writer upon the subject of oratory has failed to impress the importance of this power upon his readers. Cicero's observations are so terse and wise as to entitle them to a representative rank:

"But the orator, by his eloquence, represents all those things which in the common affairs of life are considered

evil, and troublesome, and to be avoided, as heavier and more grievous than they really are; and at the same time amplifies and embellishes, by power of language, those things which to the generality of mankind seem inviting and desirable; nor does he wish to appear so very wise among fools as that his audience should think him impertinent or a pedantic Greek, or, though they very much approve his understanding, and admire his wisdom, yet should feel uneasy that they themselves are but idiots to him; but he so effectually penetrates the minds of men, so works upon their senses and feelings, that he has no occasion for the definitions of philosophers, or to consider, in the course of his speech, 'whether the chief good lies in the mind or in the body;' 'whether it is to be defined as consisting in virtue or in pleasure;' 'whether these two can be united and coupled together;' or 'whether,' as some think, 'nothing can be known, nothing clearly perceived and understood;' questions in which I acknowledge that a vast multiplicity of learning and a great abundance of varied reasoning is involved; — but we seek something of a far different character: we want a man of superior intelligence, sagacious by nature and from experience, who can acutely divine what his fellow-citizens, and all those whom he wishes to convince on any subject by his eloquence, think, feel, imagine, or hope."[35]

CHAPTER VI.

INFERENCES (*Continued*).

XIV. *The ideal orator is a master in those arts of eloquence adjoining the fields of Elocution.*

These arts are included chiefly under gesture-culture and voice-culture, the details of which belong to another treatise. Hence only in a general way, in the present volume, can this subject be presented.

There is a noticeable agreement among all writers upon oratory as to the great importance of both the study of models and the law of constant practice.

British forensic and pulpit orators, as already noticed, have been diligent students, especially of Greek models. That was a suggestive remark in one of Lord Brougham's letters to Macaulay, already quoted. (See p. 107.)

The statement of Sydney Smith is also to the point: "After all, it is impossible to gain a just expression of voice and gesture merely from rules, without practice and imitation of the *best examples*." And Professor Shepard's recommendation to preach-

ers is, to study Demosthenes until they fall in love with his style.

The law of needful practice, too, as might be expected, applies to this subject as well as to rhetorical composition. (See Vol. I. p. 66.) Quintilian illustrates the law thus: "The art of speaking depends upon great labor, constant study, varied exercise, and repeated trials." Lord Brougham, in his instructions for young Macaulay, enforces the same idea thus: "Let him first of all learn to speak easily and fluently, as well and as sensibly as he can, no doubt, but at any rate let him learn to speak. This is to eloquence, or good public speaking, what the being able to talk in a child is to correct grammatical speech. It is the requisite foundation, and on it you must build. Moreover, it can only be acquired young, therefore let it by all means, and at any sacrifice, be gotten hold of forthwith, by a custom of talking much in company, by speaking in debating societies, with little attention to rule." When Sir Isaac Newton was asked how he had discovered the true system of the universe, he replied: "By continually thinking upon it." When Mr. Murray asked Wendell Phillips, "How shall I learn to speak?" Mr. Phillips replied, "Keep speaking." Bishop Simpson's testimony is of weight: "To attain the highest power in direct address, practice is absolutely essential. If I am asked how and when you shall begin, I answer, The first time you preach; and, if practicable, before a small audience. There is certainly some risk; but don't stand

shivering on the bank; plunge in at once." Gilbert Stuart, in answer to a question as to how young artists are to commence their subjects, is reported to have said, 'Just as puppies are taught to swim — chuck them in.'"

In this connection it may be remarked that several writers upon oratory recommend the development of the conversational powers, as an aid to oratorical success. Dr. Storrs puts the matter in a strong light:

"Conversation, too, with equal minds, is of immense and constant service in refreshing the mind, and replenishing it with active force. Indeed, conversation, if practised as it ought to be, as a commerce of thought between responsive and interchanging minds, is an invaluable aid toward gaining the art of easy and self-possessed public speech. I do not think we have as much of it as we ought, or that it holds the place which it should in our plans of life, as a real educational force. It is much the same exercise, if you analyze it, with public speaking. Of course it is not the same altogether. In public speech your utterance of thought is more prolonged; it is monologue, not dialogue. You miss the help which comes from interjected remarks or replies; and you are not so immediately conscious of the sympathy or the collision of the adjacent minds. Still conversation is much the same form of mental activity, and it always helps the public speaker. It trains the mind to think rapidly, and to formulate thought with facility and success; and each sense of such success, which is gained in conversation, will give one more confidence when he stands before an audience.

"Instead of talking to ten persons, you are there to talk to five hundred; but the one exercise has helped for the other, as singing in a parlor helps to sing in a choir, or as

shooting with an air-gun, at ten paces, helps one to shoot straight with a rifle, at a hundred. One who is silent, secluded, all the week, without contact with men, had better always read his sermons. He will be certainly timorous and self-conscious, when Sunday comes; afraid of other minds, except as they speak to him through books."

It is clear, therefore, that he who aspires to oratorical distinction must talk. Let him talk to himself, if no one is near. At the club and caucus his voice must be heard. On the cars, in the street, everywhere, in fine, he must talk. But this may make one a bore, may it not? Yes, for a time. Submit to the sacrifice. "The longer I live," says Thackeray, "the more convinced am I that oversensitiveness is a great mistake in a public man." "It is probable there never was a successful speaker," says Mathews, in *Oratory and Orators*, "who did not acquire his mastery by the constant torment of his hearers."

In addition to the study of models, and constant practice, most men who have given attention to this subject strongly recommend the importance of professional elocutionary instruction. The history of the subject is full of interest and suggestion. We have already seen how patiently, under various teachers, Demosthenes submitted himself to the details of elocutionary discipline. Cicero, likewise, was for nearly thirty years under continuous drill. Even after he had attained eminence as a pleader, his voice still being harsh, he applied to several teachers, and even went to Asia and other places, to

hear the best speakers and receive instruction. For months together, he declaimed daily in the presence of some friend, occasionally in his native language, but oftener in Greek, a language with which he was thoroughly familiar, and from which he transferred much richness to his more unadorned and meagre native speech.[36]

Curran's elocutionary discipline, also, was such as to remind one of that of Demosthenes and Cicero. Small in stature, a harsh voice, a hasty articulation, and an awkward bearing, were his inheritance. He was known at school as "stuttering Jack Curran," and in a debating society, on account of an early failure, was called "Orator Mum." But he overcame these constitutional defects. He was on constant guard against all elocutionary vices, daily read aloud slowly and distinctly, studiously observed and imitated skilful speakers, practised before a mirror, spoke in debating-clubs whenever an opportunity presented itself, and thus at last surmounted every obstacle, "turned his shrill and stumbling brogue into a flexible, sustained, and finely-modulated voice; his action became free and forcible; and he acquired perfect readiness in thinking on his legs, — in a word, he became one of the most eloquent and powerful forensic advocates that the world has seen."

Chatham, too, studied oratory with the utmost diligence, practised daily before a mirror, and often before his friend, the poet Pope. Fox belongs to this same class of diligent elocutionary workers. During five sessions of Parliament he spoke every

night but one, and always regretted that he did not speak on that night also. We are told by Lord Holland, his nephew, that in "whatever employment, or even diversion, Fox was engaged, whether dress, cards, theatricals, or dinner, he would exercise his faculties with wonderful assiduity and attention till he had reached the degree of perfection he aimed at."

Pitt commenced in childhood his elocutionary work and continued it life-long. "Probably no man of genius since the days of Cicero," says Professor Goodrich, "has ever submitted to an equal amount of drudgery." Macaulay, in his biography of Pitt, says: "He had indeed been carefully trained from infancy in the art of managing his voice, a voice naturally clear and deep-toned. His father (Lord Chatham), whose oratory owed no small part of its effect to that art, had been a most skilful and judicious instructor. The wits of Brookes's, irritated by observing night after night how powerfully Pitt's sonorous elocution fascinated the rows of country gentlemen in the House of Commons, reproached him with having been 'taught by his dad on a stool.'"

Chesterfield, whom Walpole ranked as "the first speaker of the House," says: "I succeeded in Parliament by resolving to succeed." But this, as a matter of fact, involved indefatigable labor, to perfect himself not only in public speaking but in conversation. Count Montalembert, one of the most eloquent Frenchmen of the present century, when

attending school in La Roche-Guyon, at the age of seventeen, wrote thus to a friend, concerning his oratorical exercises: "You would laugh heartily, my dear friend, if you could but see me in one of my rambles, whilst I follow one of my favorite pursuits — declamation. By times, in the depths of the woods, I begin an extempore philippic against the cabinet ministers; and all at once, thanks to my near-sightedness, I find myself face to face with some wood-cutter or peasant-girl, who stares at me in amazement, and probably looks upon me as a madman just escaped from a Bedlam. So, quite ashamed of myself, I take to my heels; and once more set to work at gesticulating and declaiming."

Henry Clay's confession and advice are confirmatory and encouraging: "I owe my success in life to one single fact, namely, at the age of twenty-seven I commenced, and continued for years, the process of daily reading and speaking upon the contents of some historical or scientific book. These off-hand efforts were made sometimes in a cornfield, at others in the forest, and not unfrequently in some distant barn, with the horse and ox for my auditors. It is to this early practice in the great art of all arts that I am indebted for the primary and leading impulses that stimulated me forward, and shaped and moulded my entire subsequent destiny. Improve, then, young gentlemen, the superior advantages you enjoy. Let not a day pass without exercising your powers of speech."

Patrick Henry must not be omitted from this list. By "his every-day trials on his lingering visitors of the power of words, his deep and enthusiastic investigations of history, and particularly by his patient and continued study of the harangues of Livy, and the elaborate translations he made of them, he became one of the most illustrious examples of persuasive eloquence that this country has ever known."

Wirt, who was himself a most laborious student, gave the following advice to a young law-student: "I would commit to memory and recite, *à la mode de Garrick*, the finest parts of Shakespeare, to tune the voice by cultivating all the varieties of its melody, to give the muscles of the face all their motion and expression, and to acquire an habitual use and gracefulness of gesture, and command of the stronger passions of the soul. I would recite my own compositions, and compose them for recitation; I would address my own recitations to trees and stones, and falling streams, if I could not get a living audience, and blush not even if I were caught at it."

Rufus Choate, whose genius in speech was "science in disguise," made forensic eloquence the study of his life, and for forty years allowed no day to pass without an effort to perfect himself in the arts of speech. Instead of disparaging, as many do, the teachings of elocutionists, he said to one of his students: "*Elocutionary training I most highly approve of;* I would go to an elocutionist myself, if I could get time. . . . I have always, even before

I first went to Congress, practised daily a sort of elocutionary culture, *combined with a culture of the emotional nature.*"

The pulpit has lacked, largely, elocutionary drill, and bears too many evidences of it: many preachers have felt, nevertheless, the importance of this kind of discipline and regretted that they have been denied its benefits. Not a few noted pulpit orators have received special elocutionary instruction, and most of those who have not and who slur it, show with marked clearness the need of it.

Whitefield was a diligent student of this subject, and was constantly practising accent and intonation. Mr. Beecher has remarkable natural pulpit power, and is the son of a pulpit orator who had rare ability on the platform as well as in the pulpit; still he has not thought himself exempt from elocutionary discipline. While in college, he placed himself under a skilful teacher, and for three years "was drilled incessantly," he says, "in posturing, gesture, and voice culture." At the theological seminary this discipline and practice were continued. There was a grove between the seminary and his father's house, and it was his habit, with his brother Charles and one or two others, "to make the night, and even the day, hideous with their voices, as they passed backward and forward through the wood, exploding all the vowels from the bottom to the very top of their voices." "The drill that I underwent," he says, "produced, not a rhetorical manner, but a flexible instrument, that accommodated itself readily

to every kind of thought and every shape of feeling, and obeyed the inward will in the outward realization of the results of rules and regulations." [37]

XVI. *The ideal orator is a master of those arts of eloquence bordering upon the department of Rhetoric.*

Orators and rhetoricians have recommended different methods of becoming acquainted with those principles of composition and construction which are of special use in eloquence. Perhaps there is no recommendation in which there is such general agreement as, the perfection of one's style through the untiring use of the pen.[38] The following is taken from *De Oratore:*

"'What can be the reason,' asked Brutus of Cicero, 'if there were so much merit in the oratory of Galba, that there is no trace of it seen in his orations?' 'The reason is,' replied Cicero, 'that some of our orators, being indolent, do not practise composition; for most of the orations we are now possessed of were written, not before delivery, but some time afterwards. Others do not choose the trouble of improving themselves, to which nothing more contributes than frequent writing.'"

Antonius, in this same treatise of Cicero, thus criticises Sulpicius:

"There is in his style at times, as farmers say of their corn when in the blade, amidst the greatest fertility, a sort of luxuriance which ought to be, as it were, eaten down by the use of the pen." [39]

Plutarch says that Demosthenes repeatedly told his friends that "he neither wrote the whole of his

orations, nor spoke without committing a part to writing." Lord Brougham, in his *Inaugural Discourse*, uses this language:

"This leads me to remark that, though speaking without writing beforehand is very well, until the habit of easy speech is acquired, yet after that no one can ever write too much. This is quite clear; it is laborious, no doubt, and it is more difficult beyond comparison than speaking offhand; but it is necessary to perfect oratory, and at any rate it is necessary to acquire the habit of correct diction."

Elsewhere he lays it down, as a rule admitting of no exception, that a man "will speak well in proportion as he has written much." Robert Hall, Summerfield, and Dr. Olin, though remarkable extemporaneous preachers, carefully wrote their sermons either before or after their delivery. Dr. Channing, too, practised and recommended the use of the pen:

"We doubt whether a man ever brings his faculties to bear with their whole force on a subject until he writes upon it. . . . By attempting to seize his thoughts, and fix them in an enduring form, he finds them vague and unsatisfactory, to a degree which he did not suspect, and toils for a precision and harmony of views, of which he never before felt the need."

In an address to the students of the Union Theological Seminary, Dr. John Hall thus speaks of the advantage of writing sermons:

"I think it is settled that all men who mean to be good preachers, *should write*. There are good reasons for that. It often enough happens that a man thinks he has got a

thought while it is floating like a cloud through his mind; but when he is asked to put that same thought into black and white, oh, how it shrinks and shrivels into the smallest proportions!" [40]

The careful revision of literary productions, either by the mental or the pen method, though not practised nor advised by all who have discussed these subjects, is nevertheless quite generally recommended. There is scarcely an exception among ancient classical authors. The familiar lines of Horace embody the prevailing Grecian and Latin sentiment:

> "Never the verse approve and hold as good,
> Till many a day and many a blot has wrought
> The polished work, and chastened every thought,
> By tenfold labor to perfection brought."
>
> *Ars Poetica.*

Pericles, Demosthenes, and Cicero revised their orations with the greatest care. Burke had all his principal works printed two or three times at a private press before submitting them to his publisher. Charles Sumner was indefatigable in the work of revision.

Nearly all great preachers have worked for years upon the same subjects, and, in many instances, upon the same sermons. "I wish," said the king to Dr. South, complimenting him on a sermon, "that you had had time to make it longer." He replied, "May it please your majesty, I wish I had had time to make it shorter."

Henry Melville, one of the most finished and popular preachers in London during the present

century, attempted but one sermon a week, which he rewrote always twice, often three times. Massillon rewrote some of his sermons fifteen and even twenty times. Bossuet also belongs to this class of laborious revisers. In a word, young preachers would be astonished if they knew the amount of time that many preachers of note, in our own day and country, spend upon the sermons that are thought to be easily and quickly prepared.

Another means of rhetorical and oratorical improvement, which has been well-nigh universally recommended and practised by orators is, translation from one tongue to another. This kind of work was a sort of pastime with Cicero. Lord Stanhope tells us that Pitt, when asked to what he ascribed the two chief characteristics of his eloquence, namely, the lucid order of his reasoning and the ready choice of his words, replied, that "he believed he owed the former to an early study of the Aristotelian logic, and the latter to his father's practice of making him every day, after reading over to himself some passage in the classics, translate it aloud and continuously into English prose." Rufus Choate was a diligent translator, Tacitus being his favorite author. Says Bishop Simpson:

"Command of language may be best gained in two ways: First, by the practice of translating aloud, especially of reading in company a work written in some foreign language. This was recommended strongly by the elder Pitt, and has in some form been practised by eminent writers and speakers. Dr. Franklin was accustomed when a young man, to read one of Addison's essays, and, holding the

ideas in his mind, to write them out in his own language, and then compare them with those of Addison: this was a species of translation. Without any design of its influence on my future life, I acquired the habit, when a youth, of reading aloud to my friends from books in any language I studied, whatever I found to be either very beautiful or very interesting. Especially was this the case with the writings of Xenophon, and the orations of Demosthenes, Virgil's Æneid, and Fénelon's Telemachus. It was also my practice for a number of years to read in family worship from the original languages, thus accustoming myself to instantaneous choice of words to express the ideas of the writers."

Still another method recommended for acquiring ease and correctness in oratorical speech is, the constant study of the best literature in the mother-tongue of the orator. Bautain has so well stated this thought that we cannot forbear quoting:

"There is another practice which strikingly conduces towards facilitating expression and towards perfecting its form; we mean the learning by heart of the finest passages in great writers, and especially in the most musical poets, so as to be able to recite them at a single effort, at moments of leisure, during a solitary walk, for instance, when the mind so readily wanders. This practice, adopted in all schools, is particularly advantageous in rhetoric, and during the bright years of youth. At that age it is easy and agreeable, and he who aspires to the art of speaking ought never to neglect it. Besides furnishing the mind with all manner of fine thoughts, well expressed and well linked together, and thus nourishing, developing, and enriching it, it has the additional advantage of filling the understanding with graceful images, of forming the ear to the rhythm and number of the period, and of obtaining a sense of the harmony of speech, which is not without its own kind of music; for ideas, and even such as are the most abstract, enter the

mind more readily, and sink into it more deeply, when presented in a pleasing fashion. By dint of reading the most beautiful lines of Corneille and Racine, Bossuet's majestic and pregnant sentences, the harmonious and cadenced compositions of Fénelon and Massillon, one gradually and without effort acquires a language approaching theirs, and imitates them instinctively through the natural attraction of the beautiful, and the propensity to reproduce whatever pleases; and at last, by repeating this exercise daily for years, one attains a refined taste for the delicacies of language and the shades of style, just as a palate accustomed to the flavors of the most exquisite viands can no longer endure the coarser."

Demosthenes was a diligent student of Grecian literature. He transcribed the history of Thucydides eight times, and studied it until committed, word for word. Chatham memorized several of the sermons of Barrow, and a number of Spenser's poems. His son, Pitt, did the same, also committing to memory much of Shakespeare. Sheridan, in like manner, could repeat nearly all the published writings of several of the English poets and dramatists. Fox was an ardent lover of English literature, and thus remarks upon this subject;

"I am of opinion that the study of good authors, and especially of poets, ought never to be intermitted by any man who is to speak or write for the public, or, indeed, who has any occasion to tax his imagination, whether it be for argument, for illustration, for ornament, for sentiment, or for any other purpose."

Burke chose for special study the prose of Dryden and the poetry of Milton. His speeches show how

these authors had pervaded his mind. Erskine, "who spoke probably the finest and richest English ever uttered by an advocate," devoted himself to the study of literature for two years, before his call to the bar. He committed much of Milton to memory, and was so familiar with Shakespeare, that it is said he could almost have held conversations on all subjects for days together, in the phrases of the great English dramatist. "It was in the study of Milton," as Mathews remarks, "that he acquired, not only his rich fund of ideas, but the fine choice of words, the vivid and varied imagery, that distinguished his style." Pinkney was likewise a master in English literature. His rule was to commit to memory every idea which struck him forcibly. Webster's favorites were Milton and Shakespeare. Choate had few equals in his acquaintance with English literature, whether in the departments of science, history, philosophy, or belles-lettres.

Again, the patient study of words so as to master the synonyms of the language, and so as, in the vital parts of a speech, to use words that express volumes, is a method of improving the oratorical style which has strong recommendations. Chatham studied Bailey's large folio dictionary, going through it twice, "examining each word attentively, dwelling on its various shades of meaning and modes of construction, thus endeavoring to bring the whole range of our noble and affluent tongue completely under his control." Webster, Choate, and Pinkney, were also diligent students of the dictionary, a fact which

easily explains the perfection of their diction, and that remarkable force found in many of their sentences.[41]

In view of these facts, the young orator presumes far too much if he expects success short of the constant and laborious industry which was practised by these men, who are rightly regarded as geniuses in the field of eloquence and oratory.

XVII. *Hence the ideal orator, by the study of models and constant practice, must become thoroughly familiar with the forms of expression known as Figures of Oratory, or Figures of Emphasis.*

Some of the more important of these figures are the following:

1. *Antithesis.* This figure is a comparison of things that are very different. Throughout the history of literature, in both poetry and prose, it has been in high favor. It is a figure that greatly contributes to mental activity, and, by enabling one to see a thing upon two sides and in detail, it aids in the power of quick comprehension. It abounds in Hebrew poetry, in classical literature, and was used almost to excess by Thucydides and Tacitus. All strong and popular writers in modern times, likewise, resort for emphasis to this form of speech; in proverbs, dialogues, biographic sketch, and eulogistic discourse, it is especially serviceable.

Examples of antithesis already quoted from Demosthenes need not be here repeated. See page 43.

The following are additional standard examples of this figure:

"Reading maketh a full man, conference a ready man, and writing an exact man; and therefore if a man write little, he had need have a great memory; if he confer little, he had need have a present wit; and if he read little, he had need have much cunning to seem to know that he doth not. Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural philosophy deep; moral, grave; logic and rhetoric, able to contend." — *Bacon.*

"My hold on the colonies is the close affection which grows from common names, from kindred blood, from similar privileges, and equal protection. These are ties which, though light as air, yet are strong as links of iron."

Burke.

"But yesterday, and Britain might have stood against the world; now, none so poor to do her reverence."

Chatham.

"He can bribe, but he cannot seduce. He can buy, but he cannot gain. He can lie, but he cannot deceive. It is the very struggle of the noble Othello. His heart relents, but his hand is firm. He does naught in hate, but all in honor. He kisses the beautiful deceiver before he destroys her." — *Macaulay.*

"The one led me to see a system in every star; the other leads me to see a world in every atom. The one taught me that this mighty globe, with the whole burden of its people and of its countries, is but a grain of sand in the high field of immensity; the other teaches me that every grain of sand may number within it the tribes and the families of a busy population. The one told me of the insignificance of the world I tread on; the other redeems it from all its insignificance, for it tells me that in the leaves of every forest, and in the flowers of every garden, and in the waves of

every rivulet, there are worlds teeming with life, and numberless as the glories of the firmament.

Chalmers' Astronomical Discourses.

"God hath written a law and a gospel; the law to humble us, and the gospel to comfort us; the law to cast us down, and the gospel to raise us up; the law to convince us of our misery, and the gospel to convince us of His mercy; the law to discover sin, and the gospel to discover grace and Christ."— *John M. Mason.*

See also Prov. iii. 33–35; x. 19–29; xxv. 2: Is. i. 18; ix. 2; lxi. 3: Matt. x. 39; xxv. 46: Mark ii. 27: Luke x. 41, 42; xii. 6, 7: Ro. vi. 18; viii. 5, 6: 1 Cor. xv. 40–43; 2 Cor. iv. 8, 9; vi. 10: 1 Tim. v. 6.

2. *Rhetorical Repetition.* This figure is the frequent recurrence of the vital points of an address, for the purpose of increasing their significance, without interfering with rhetorical or dramatic progress and climax. By this means the auditor has his attention called to the main points until they are clearly apprehended, or until their relative importance is made apparent. The principle underlying rhetorical repetition has been suggested in various maxims. Says the Indian adage: "If a man talk long enough, he can wear a hole in a rock." "You can pierce any head or heart, if the blows are long enough repeated upon the same spot." We hear of "ploughing a furrow in the soul." Compare Luke xviii. 1–8.

The tenacity and persistency with which the most eminent lawyers adhere to the main point in the case —holding to it until the dullest of the twelve can see

it — and the skill with which, in different ways, they repeat themselves without seeming to do so, and without weariness to the hearer, sufficiently account for their success before jurors.

Boswell had occasion to speak before the House of Commons, and the following is Johnson's advice to him: "You must say the same thing over and over again, in different words. If you say it but once, they miss it in a moment of inattention."

An old French writer, more remarkable for originality of thought than for grace of style, was once reproached by a friend with the frequent repetitions to be found in his works. "Name them to me," said the author. The critic, with obliging precision, mentioned all the ideas which had most frequently recurred in the book. "I am satisfied," replied the honest author. "You remember my ideas. I repeated them so often on purpose to prevent you from forgetting them. Without my repetitions, I should never have succeeded."

The following advice of Dr. John Hall should be heeded:

"I would almost venture to put among the elements of preparation for preaching some little experience in teaching. A superficial person is apt to suppose that to tell a thing once is sufficient for all purposes. A thoughtful person knows the contrary, knows that in the common affairs of life we often repeat and reiterate the instructions we wish to be remembered and acted upon. So a thoughtful teacher soon finds; and one of the main objects of the preacher is to teach. The teacher varies his phraseology, puts his points variously, asks questions, illustrates, suggests, employs

shifts and expedients to insinuate definite ideas into the mind. A brilliant and successful advocate once told me that it was idle to suppose that one simple didactic statement would reach the understanding of the men on a jury. 'I never assume anything of the sort,' said he; 'I go over the same ground again and again, not always in appearance, varying the language and mode of presenting the idea, until no more can be said about it.' And we must remember that twelve jurymen, on oath to decide justly, may be supposed to have their faculties on a tenser strain, and their intelligence higher than the average of an ordinary mixed congregation. Men find this out practically in teaching; and so, not only because a minister is all the better for having some practical knowledge of teaching, — for Sabbath-school and other purposes, — but because teaching is so essential an element in good preaching, a little experience in practical instruction is to a candidate for the ministry a substantial advantage."

After the battle of Austerlitz, Alexander paid a high tribute to the genius of his conqueror, but insisted that the French army was double his own. "Your Majesty is misinformed," replied Savary; "our force was inferior to yours by at least twenty-five thousand men. But we manœuvred much; and the same division combatted at many different points." Thus Lord Stanhope, in complimenting the style of Fox, says: "By the multitude, one argument stated in five different forms, is, in general, held equal to five different arguments."

De Quincey, criticising the style of Lord Bacon, and showing that it was impossible for him to have been a great popular orator, says: "The popular orator must have the gift of *tautology*. Can he

say the same thing three times over in direct sequence? for, without this talent of iteration, — of repeating the same thought in diversified forms, — a man may utter good heads of an oration, but not an oration."

We have already seen to what extent this figure was employed by Demosthenes. Cicero, too, understood and recommended its use. Dr. Chalmers, likewise, used this form of emphasis, with great skill. In all his master-pieces one can easily discern that he seizes upon the chief idea involved, and then revolves it, and revolves all he says about it until the dullest hearer sees and feels its force. He was once criticised for this characteristic, but Bethune thus replied to the critics: "The one idea of Chalmers is worth a month's preaching from the critics who cavil at him."

Vinet thinks that Bossuet excels not only Chalmers, but, indeed, all other preachers, in the skilful and apparently artless use of repetition.

A moment's thought will show any one that the correct employment of this figure requires excellent judgment; judgment first in the selection of the ideas to be repeated. They must be vital. And, then, judgment as to the amount of repetition required or allowed. To continue the repetition after the intended impression has been made, would show that the speaker is not an artist, but a blundering bore; his cause thereby would be damaged.

Thus, also, repetition, to be unobjectionable, cannot be used to kill time, but must come to the lips

without effort, and because the speaker is profoundly impressed with the vital importance of the thought repeated.

In British secular oratory, no one, as noted above, has been more successful in rhetorical repetition than Charles James Fox. Erskine regarded this ability of Fox to pass and repass the same points "in the most unforeseen and fascinating review," as one of his chief merits. Fox advised Romilly, in an important trial, not to fear, when summing up the evidence, to repeat the material matters. "It is better," he says, "that some in the audience should observe it, than that any should not understand."

Lord Brougham also, highly prized this figure, and often employed it. Too much space would be required to introduce examples at length; we therefore give the student the following references: Quotations already used, see pp. 48–56; Clodius' hatred of Milo, see Cicero's *Oration for Milo;* Seneca, *Nat. quæst.*, lib. vi. cap. xxiii.; Matthew Arnold's play upon "*Cogitavi vias meas*" in *God and the Bible*, pp. 137–8. See also, Ps. ciii. 1, 2; cl.: Eccl. xi. 1–6; xii. 1–6: Is. ii. 11–17: Amos iv. 6–12: Matt. v. 3–11; vi. 19, 20: Luke xi. 42–44: John xv. 4, 5: Acts xiii. 30–33: Gal. i. 8, 9.

3. *Recapitulation.* The same general principles are involved in recapitulation as in rhetorical repetition. The repetition of the vital points in this figure is near the close of the address. Cicero's rule was to so manage the recapitulation as to revive

the thoughts of the discourse in a clear, concise, and rapid style, without repeating the phraseology.

4. *Climax.* This figure seeks, by the skilful arrangement of thoughts and sentences, to increase the emphasis, and heighten the impression. It contributes largely to the dignity and grandeur of style. It is, as the Greek word implies, the climbing a ladder, or the building of a pyramid. Ancient rhetoricians taught that in pure climax each successive clause of a sentence is in some way contingent upon what precedes. Quintilian states the principle thus: "Climax recurs to what has been said, and takes a rest, as it were, on something that precedes, before it passes on to anything else. The following from Cicero illustrates this ancient idea of climax:

"What hope is there for liberty, if what these men wish to do, the law permits them to do; if what the law permits them to do, they are able to do; if what they are able to do, they dare do; and if what they dare do gives you no offence."

See also 2 Peter i. 5–7.

But in modern times, climax is not restricted to the form of a sentence, but includes gradation in thought, the most important thought being reserved for the last. The following are examples:

"I not only did not say this, but did not even write it; I not only did not write it, but took no part in the embassy; I not only took no part in the embassy, but used no persuasion with the Thebans." — *Demosthenes.*

See also pp. 41, 45.

"It is coming fast upon you; already it is near at hand — yet in a few short weeks, and we may be in the midst of

those unspeakable miseries the recollection of which now rends your souls asunder."—*Brougham.*

"We have petitioned, we have remonstrated, we have supplicated, we have prostrated ourselves at the foot of the throne."—*Patrick Henry.*

"If we rise yet higher, and consider the fixed stars as so many oceans of flame, that are each of them attended with a different set of planets, and still discover new firmaments and new lights that are sunk farther in these unfathomable depths of ether, we are lost in such a labyrinth of suns and worlds, and confounded by the magnificence and immensity of nature."—*Chalmers.*

See, also, Ps. ix. 1: Hosea ii. 21, 22: Joel i. 34; Habak. iii. 17, 18: Matt. x. 40, 41: Rom. iv. 11–13; v. 3–5; viii. 38; xiii. 4–8: 1 Cor. ii. 21–23; iii. 21–23; xv. 54, 55: Eph. iii. 20: 2 Tim. iv. 6–8: 2 Peter i. 5–7: Rev. xxii. 17.

4. *Accumulation.* This form of speech belongs to the family of climax, so far as the object in view is concerned, but consists in amplifying the subject by a specification of details belonging to it. The following examples will illustrate the different varieties of this figure:

"Do not entertain so weak an imagination as that your registers and your bonds, your affidavits and your sufferances, your cockets and your clearances, form the great securities of your commerce."—*Burke.*

"Observing the wide and general devastation, and all the horrors of the scene—of plains unclothed and brown; of vegetables burned up and extinguished; of villages depopulated and in ruins; of temples unroofed and perishing; of reservoirs broken down and dry—he would

naturally inquire, what war has thus laid waste the fertile fields of this once beautiful and opulent country?"

Sheridan.

"I stigmatize it as a revolutionary tribunal. What in the name of heaven is it, if it is not a revolutionary tribunal? It annihilates the trial by jury; it drives the judge from his bench — the man who from experience could weigh the nice and delicate points of a case, who could discriminate between the straightforward testimony and the suborned evidence; who could see plainly and readily the justice or the injustice of the accusation. It turns out this man, who is free, instructed, unprejudiced, who has no previous opinions to control the free exercise of duty."

O'Connell.

"It is not enough to say that he must be an engineer, a geographer, learned in human nature, adroit in managing mankind; that he must be able to perform the highest duties of a minister of state, and sink to the humblest offices of a commissary or clerk; but he has also to display all this knowledge, and he must do all these things at the same time, and under extraordinary circumstances."

Disraeli.

"A fall of ten per cent. in the funds is nearly eighty millions sterling of value; and railway stock having gone down twenty per cent., makes a difference of sixty millions in the value of the railway property of this country. Add the two — one hundred and forty millions — and take the diminished prosperity and value of manufactures of all kinds during the last few months, and you will understate the actual loss to the country now if you put it down at two hundred millions sterling." — *John Bright.*

6. *Interrogation.* A question introduced for the purpose of emphasis, ordinarily without the expectation of an oral answer, is classed among the figures

of oratory, and is called interrogation. The force of the figure is not destroyed if the orator, with emphasis answers his own question. The formulas, "Can any one doubt," "Will it be believed," "Can any intelligent person suppose," &c., often introduce this figure. Oratorical interrogation frequently involves strong affirmation, appeal, sometimes challenge, also defiance, and even a triumphal indignation. The orator should avoid using this figure so frequently as to make it monotonous and consequently forceless. Writers upon this subject recommend that the speaker pause long enough after the question is asked for the hearer to collect his thoughts and mentally answer it. The danger in the use of this figure is that by introducing several questions, the speaker will institute an inquiry differing essentially from the point at issue.

The following quotations will serve for illustrations:

"But when, O my countrymen, will you begin to exert your vigor? Do you wait till roused by some dire event, till forced by necessity? What, then, are we to think of our present condition? . . . Or say, is it your sole ambition to wander through the public places each inquiring of the other, What news? Can anything be more new than that a man of Macedon should conquer the Athenians and give laws to Greece? Is Philip dead? No, but he is sick. Pray, what is it to you whether Philip is sick or not?"

Demosthenes.

See also pp. 44, 45.

Cicero in his defence of Ligarius used this figure with great effect:

"But I ask, who says that it was a crime in Ligarius that he was in Africa? It is a man who himself wished to be there: a man who complains that Ligarius prevented him from going, and one who has assuredly borne arms against Cæsar. For, Tubarus, wherefore that naked sword of yours in the lines of Pharsalia? Whose breast was its point seeking? What was the meaning of those arms of yours? Whither looked your purpose? your eyes? your hand? your fiery courage? What were you craving? what wishing?"

Cæsar, who was listening to these interrogative threats, became so agitated that he let fall the paper containing the condemnation of Ligarius. See also opening sentences of Cicero against Catiline.

"I put it to your oaths: do you think that a blessing of that kind — that a victory obtained by justice over bigotry and oppression — should have a stigma cast upon it by an ignominious sentence?" — *Curran.*

"What is it we want here to a great act of national justice? Do we want a cause, my lords? . . . Do you want a criminal, my lords? Where was there so much iniquity ever laid to the charge of any one?" —*Burke.*

"But, sir, the high-sheriff was threatened — and how? Was it by threats of assaulting him? No. Was it by holding up the fear of danger to him by mobs or riots? No."
Fox.

See, also, Barnes' *Lecture on the Evidences of Christianity*, beginning with the sentence, "On what points outside of the small circle," &c.

And see Gen. xii. 18; Nnmb. xxxiii. 19: Judges v. 28: 1 Kings xviii. 21; xix. 13: Job x. 3–6; xxvi. 2–4; xxxviii.: Ps. lxii. 3; lxxvii. 7: Prov. xxiii.

29: Isa. lviii. 3–7; lxiii. 1: Matt. xi. 79; xii. 3, 4: Mark ii. 9, 19, 25; iii. 4, 23, 33: Luke vii. 24–26: John vii. 48; viii. 46: Acts xxvi. 26: Ro. vii. 24; viii. 32: 2 Cor. xi. 22, 23: Heb. ii. 3.

7. *Exclamation.* When in the course of the address there is a sudden and emphatic interruption of the narrative or argument, for the purpose of arresting attention, the speech employed is called the figure of exclamation. It is in its nature emotional, and is used for the purpose of extreme emphasis. It often takes the form of personification and apostrophe. It is frequently introduced by the words, "oh," "alas," "I affirm," "I assure you," &c. There is scarcely any masterpiece in the field of oratory which is without this figure. For examples of its use by Demosthenes, see pp. 44–5. See, also, Webster's Bunker Hill speech, beginning at "Venerable men! you have come down to us," &c. See Whitefield's sermon preached before the sailors of New York, beginning at "Well, my boys, we have a clear sky," &c. And see Job xxix. 2: Ps. cvii. 15: Is. xlvi. 12; lxiv. 1; Jer. ix. i.: Ezek. xviii. 29: Joel i. 11: Zech. ix. 9: Matt. xxiii. 37; xxvi. 42: Rom. vii. 27; xi. 33: 1 John iii. 1.

8. *Command.* When the speaker's mind is impassioned, and he has risen to a conscious superiority over his audience, he frequently heightens the emphasis by using the figure called command. The person or thing commanded is often imaginary. This figure sometimes involves apostrophe and personation, together with warning, reproach, reproof,

and invitation. The following examples are illustrative: Demosthenes, see p. 47.

"Tell me not of rights, talk not of the property of the planter in his slaves." . . . "You are standing on the brink of a precipice; beware! . . . Now, then, let the planters beware — let their assemblies beware — let the government at home beware — let Parliament beware." — *Brougham.*

"Listen! for if you are not totally callous, if your consciences are not seared, I will speak daggers to your souls, and awake you to all the horrors of guilty recollection. I will follow you with whips and stings through every maze of your unexampled turpitude, and plant thorns under the rose of ministerial approbation." — *Burke.*

"Go home if you dare; go home, if you can, to your constituents, and tell them that you voted it down." — *Clay.*

"Is it that insidious smile with which our petition has been lately received? Trust it not, sir; it will prove a snare to your feet. Suffer not yourselves to be betrayed with a kiss." — *Patrick Henry.*

See also, 2 Sam. xvi. 7: Ezek. xviii. 31: Matt. v. 38–49; vi. 25, 33; vii. 1–6: Mark xvi. 15: Acts ii. 38: Eph, v. 14; vi. 10–17: 1 Tim. vi. 13: Rev. ii. 5.

9. *Denunciation.* This figure in secular oratory is an emphatic and impassioned disapproval of such men, things, or sentiments, as are supposed to be pernicious to the public good. In pulpit oratory, denunciation is indispensable when branding outbreaking sins and hypocrisy. It often involves scorn, menace, and anathema; there is peril, therefore, in using it against persons except those who cannot be gained over to the right, or to the orator's cause.

Demosthenes abounds in this figure. See pp. 47, 51. Cicero's first oration against Catiline is denunciative almost throughout. Note also the following from his oration against M. Antonius:

"Is, then, Lucius Antonius the patron of the Roman people? Plague take him! For I fully assent to your outcry. I won't speak of this bandit whom no one would choose to have for a client."

"These abominable principles, and this more abominable avowal of them, demand the most decisive indignation."

Chatham against Lord Suffolk.

See King Lear's denunciation of his daughter Goneril, beginning with, "Blasts and fogs upon thee," &c.

See also, Ex. xxxiii. 3: Is. v. 18–22; xiv. 12–15; xxxi. 1: Jer. xlviii. 35–47: Hab. ii. 15: Amos vi. 1: Mic. ii. 1: Matt. iii. 7; viii. 32; xii. 34; xvi. 23; xxiii. 13–30: John viii. 44: Acts vii. 51, 52; xiii. 9, 10; xxiii. 2, 3.[42]

10. *Appeal to Deity.* This figure is in form a prayer, but, strictly speaking, is mere emphasis without devotion. It is employed, perhaps, more often in secular than in sacred oratory. It befits, like the oath, none but the grandest altitudes of oratoric passion. Demosthenes furnishes many illustrations; see pp. 32–57: "I,—let the gods be my witness," &c. See also, pp. 46, 47. See Cicero against Verres, sentence beginning, "You, you Alban mounds," &c. Also Brougham's peroration of Speech for Queen Caroline, sentence beginning,

"She wants no prayers of mine; but I do here pour forth," &c.

"What are the processions of the learned counsel himself, circuit after circuit? Merciful God! what is the state of Ireland, and where shall you find the wretched inhabitant of this land?" — *Curran.*

See also 2 Sam. ii. 27: 1 Kings xvii. 1: Ps. xl. 9: Rom. ix. 1: 1 Cor. i. 10: Gal. i. 20: 1 Thess. ii. 5.

11. *Oath.* This mode of speech is often, in form, the same as profanity, but is felt to be entirely free from irreverence; it is employed, however, only when the emphasis is extreme. Modern eloquence rarely uses this figure. The following examples are illustrative:

"I say, by God! that man is a ruffian who shall after this presume to build upon such honest, artless conduct as an evidence of guilt."

Erskine, plea for Lord George Gordon.

See also oath of Demosthenes by those who fought at Marathon, and oaths uttered by Curran in plea for Rowan.

And see Gen. xlii. 15: 1 Sam. xvii. 45: 2 Sam. xix. 7: 1 Kings xviii. 15: 2 Cor. xi. 31.

12. *Vision.* In ordinary speech vision is the presentation of past, future, or distant scenes as though actually present. It is appropriately used in animated narration, and is found constantly enlivening the pages of the best historians. In oratory its use presupposes that the mind of the speaker is greatly moved. Vision, therefore appears ridiculous or like bombast to the hearer, unless he is in full accord with

the animated condition of the speaker. It more frequently than otherwise involves personification, apostrophe, and, in dealing with past events, employs "the historic present." The following examples illustrate the appropriate use of this figure:

"I seem to myself to behold this city, the ornament of the earth, the capital of all nations, suddenly involved in one conflagration. I see before me the slaughtered heaps of citizens, lying unburied in the midst of their ruined country. The furious countenance of Cethegus rises to my view, while, with a savage joy, he is triumphing in your miseries."— *Cicero.*

"Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that in my day at least that curtain may not rise. God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind. When my eyes shall be turned for the last time to behold the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood. Let their last feeble and lingering gleam rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored through the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, nor a single star obscured; bearing for its motto no such miserable interrogatory as 'What is all this worth?' nor those other words of delusion and folly, 'Liberty first, and the Union afterwards;' but everywhere spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, and as they float over the sea, and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every American heart — 'Liberty and Union, now and forever, one and inseparable.'"— *Webster.*

"Do you think that whoso could by adequate description bring before you that winter of the Pilgrims — its brief sunshine, the nights of storm slow waning; the damp and icy breath felt to the pillow of the dying; its destitutions; its contrast with all their former experiences in life; its utter isolation and loneliness; its deathbeds and burials; its memories, its apprehensions, its hopes; the consolations of the prudent, the prayers of the pious; the occasional cheerful hymn in which the strong heart threw off its burden, and, asserting its unvanquished nature, went up like a bird of dawn to the skies: do you think that whoso could describe them waiting in that defile, lonelier and darker than Thermopylæ, for a morning that might never dawn; or might show them when it did a mightier army than the Persian, raised as in act to strike, — would he not sketch a scene of more difficult and rarer heroism?"

Rufus Choate.

"Methinks I see it now — that one solitary, adventurous vessel, the Mayflower of a forlorn hope, freighted with the prospects of a future state, and bound across the unknown sea. I behold it pursuing, with a thousand misgivings," &c. — *Edward Everett.*

The following is one of the most touching examples of vision in English literature:

"The past rises before me like a dream. Again we are in the great struggle for national life. We hear the sounds of preparation — the music of the boisterous drums, the silver voices of heroic bugles. We see thousands of assemblages, and hear the appeals of orators; we see the pale cheeks of women and the flushed faces of men; and in those assemblages we see all the dead whose dust we have covered with flowers. We lose sight of them no more. We are with them when they enlist in the great army of freedom. We see them part from those they love. Some are walking for the last time in quiet woody places with the maidens

they adore. We hear the wnisperings and the sweet vows of eternal love as they lingeringly part forever. Others are bending over cradles, kissing babies that are asleep. Some are receiving the blessings of old men. Some are parting who hold them and press them to their hearts again and again, and say nothing; and some are talking with wives, and endeavoring with brave words spoken in the old tones to drive from their hearts the awful fear. We see them part. We see the wife standing in the door, with the babe in her arms — standing in the sunlight sobbing; at the turn of the road a hand waves — she answers by holding high in her loving hands the child. He is gone — and forever."—*Robert Ingersoll, to the Soldiers of Indianapolis.*

See also, Is. liii. 2, 3: Ezek. i. 1; x. 1; xxxvii. 10: 1 Cor. xv. 55: Rev. v. 6; vii. 9; x. 1; xiv. 1.

13. *Prediction.* This figure comes naturally to the lips of an orator when the mind is excited and swayed by a confident faith in certain results. In uninspired composition it may be called the statement of consequences believed to be certain. The array of facts justifying this form of speech must be overwhelming, the principles involved must be fundamental, and the consequences clearly inevitable, or the secular prophet will be laughed at. The following are a few of the many examples that could be cited:

"They must be repealed. You will repeal them. I pledge myself for it that you will in the end repeal them: I stake my reputation on it. I will consent to be taken for an idiot if they are not finally repealed." — *Chatham.*

"He may be naked; he shall not be in irons. And I do see the time at hand — the spirit is gone forth — the Declar-

ation of Rights is planted; and though great men shall fall off, yet the cause shall live." — *Grattan.*

"But the heathen shall not reproach us. It shall be known in heaven that we could pity our brethren. We will send them all the relief in our power, and will enjoy the luxury of reflecting what happiness we may entail on generations yet unborn, if we can only effect the conversion of a single tribe." — *Dr. Griffin.*

14. *Egoism.* This figure is the presentation of the speaker's own opinions or experiences. It is free from the offensive air of egotism, and is often very serviceable in emphatic discourse. The following examples illustrate this figure:

"Would you bind Lucius Crassus to silence? For that purpose you must cut out this tongue; and even if it be torn out, the freedom in my very breath will confound your audacity." — *Crassus against Philippus.*

"I found Ireland on her knees. I watched over her with an eternal solicitude, and have traced her progress from injuries to arms, and from arms to liberty. Spirit of Swift! spirit of Molyneux! your genius has prevailed. Ireland is now awaking: in that new character I hail her, and, bowing to her august presence, I say, *Esto perpetua!*" — *Grattan.*

"I have read with astonishment, and I repel with scorn, the insinuation that I had acted the part of an advocate, and that some of my statements were colored to serve a cause. . . . I come forward in my own person. I make the charge in the face of day. I drag the criminal to trial. I openly call down justice upon his head. I defy his attacks. I defy his defenders. I challenge investigation." — *Brougham.*

Everett puts the following language in the mouth of an imaginary Indian chief:

"Thou shalt plant in terror, and I will reap in blood; thou shalt sow the earth with corn, and I will strew it with ashes; thou shalt go forth with the sickle, and I will follow after with the scalping-knife; thou shalt build, and I will burn, till the white man or the Indian shall cease from the land. Go thy way for this time in safety; but remember, stranger, there is eternal war between me and thee!"

See also, quotations from Demosthenes, in this volume, pp. 40, 41, 42, 43, 53. See John M. Mason's sermon, *The Gospel for the Poor*, sentence beginning "He who pretends to be my comforter," &c.

And see Ps. xviii. 20–23; lxvi. 13–20: John ix. 25: Acts xxvi. 29: Ro. xi. 1: 1 Cor. xv. 8–10: 2 Cor. xi. 21–33; xii. 2–11: Gal. i. 10; ii. 20: the book of Job.

15. *Isolation, or Singling out.* This figure seeks to isolate each hearer, making the warning or appeal direct, emphatic, and personal. Note the following examples:

"I confine myself to you who are now here assembled. I include not the rest of men, but consider you as alone existing on the earth. The idea which fills and terrifies me is this: I figure to myself the present as your last hour," &c.

Massillon.

See also, quotation from Demosthenes, pp. 44, 46, 47. And see 2 Sam. xii. 7: Ps. cv. 6; cxiv. 5: Acts xxvi. 27: Ro. ii. 1: 1 Cor. xv. 36.

Such are some of the figures of oratory and emphasis. The knowledge of their classification is comparatively unimportant, but the ability wisely to

employ them is essential in the highest types of oratory.

At the bar, we are forced to say, that there appears to be no one, in the skilful use of finished and poetic oratory, to take the place of Choate, Wirt, and Pinkney. The modern lawyer is technical, and is technically successful, but true oratory is with him a lost art.[43]

And if the modern pulpit orator would escape the charge of insipidity, let him become familiar with the poetry of eloquence. But it must be borne in mind that the history of oratory establishes nothing more clearly than the fact that distinction in this field is not purchased save by prolonged, intense, and even painful application.

XVIII. *Hence also the ideal orator must become familiar with all the tactics and artifices of oratory.*

Some of these tactics, like those in military science, can be named, and the place for their use assigned, but others so much depend upon circumstances of time, place, and occasion, and are so variously involved, that they have not been classified, and, therefore, the circumstances under which they can be legitimately used must be left to the instincts and intuitions of the orator. Some of the more important of these forms of speech are the following:

1. *Counselling with the hearer and asking an opinion.* This figure is technically called "anacœnosis." The examples under it are numerous. Note the following:

"I put it to your oaths; do you think that a blessing of that kind — that a victory obtained by justice over bigotry and oppression — should have a stigma cast upon it by an ignominious sentence of men bold enough and honest enough to propose that measure?" — *Curran.*

"Shall we try argument? Sir, we have been trying that for the last ten years. Have we anything new to offer upon this subject? Nothing." — *Patrick Henry.*

"Tell me, then, if it do not add as much to the perfection as to the benevolence of God that, while it is expatiating over the vast field of created things, there is not one portion of the field overlooked by it?" — *Dr. Chalmers.*

"Well, if you go to war now, you will have more banners to decorate your cathedrals and your churches. You may raise up great generals; you may have another Wellington and another Nelson, too, for this country can grow men capable for every enterprise. Then there may be titles and pensions, and marble monuments to eternize the men who have thus become great; but what becomes of you, and your country, and your children?" — *John Bright.*

See also, "Figure of Interrogation," p. 44.

And see Is. v. 3, 4: Jer. xxiii. 23: Mal. i. 6; iii. 8: Matt. xxii. 42; xxvii. 22, 23: Mark xii. 9: Luke ix. 18; xxii. 27: Acts iv. 19: 1 Cor. iv. 21; x. 15: Gal. iv. 21.[44]

2. *Presuming upon the agreement and knowledge of the hearer.* This form of speech involves a compliment to the hearer, and is often resorted to in order to gain his good-will. Sometimes it is used to make the case appear extremely plausible. Note the following examples:

"You cannot think so. You remember! You are well aware." — *Demosthenes.*

"Yes, my good lord, I see you do not forget them. I see their sacred forms passing in sad review before your memory." — *Curran.*

"Gentlemen of the jury, I observe plainly, and with infinite satisfaction, that you are shocked and offended at my even supposing it possible you should pronounce such a detestable judgment." — *Erskine.*

The preacher in his appeals to conscience wisely employs this form of speech.

See also, Jer. ii. 19: Matt. xviii. 12: Acts xx. 2, 3, 26, 27; xxvi. 7, 8: Ro. iii. 9: 1 Cor. vi. 19: 1 John ii. 21, 29.

3. *Admission of difficulty.*

"They tell us, sir, that we are weak — but when shall we be stronger?" — *Patrick Henry.*

"I am aware of the difficulties I have to encounter in bringing forward this business; I am aware how ungracious it would be for this House to show that they are not the real representatives of the people; I am aware that the question has been formerly agitated on different occasions by great and able characters, who have deserted the cause from despair of success; and I am aware that I must necessarily go into what may, perhaps, be supposed trite and worn-out arguments." — *Lord Grey.*

4. *Compliment to the hearer.*

"But be that as it may, gentlemen, he now comes before you perfectly satisfied that an English jury is the most refreshing prospect that the eye of accused innocence ever met in a human tribunal." — *Mackintosh for Peltier.*

See also, Acts xxiv. 3.

5. *Self-Correction.* When a speaker discovers that either a stronger or more guarded expression

can take the place of the one already commenced, and therefore changes it, the speech is termed self-correction. The self-correction may be deliberately planned beforehand, for the purpose of increasing, through contrast or climax, the emphasis; then the speech is clearly a device of oratory. As: "What did I say?" "Oh, I correct myself."

"Rejoice, my friends; the tyrant dies this day! This day, do I say? The very moment in which I kept silence he suffered for his crimes — he dies!"

Apollonius of Tyana.

"If you can say this — that he is guilty — upon the evidence, it is your duty to say so, and you may with a tranquil conscience return to your families, though by your judgment the unhappy object of it must return no more to his. Alas, gentlemen! what do I say? He has no family to return to. The affectionate partner of his life has already fallen a victim to the surprise and horror which attended the scene now transacting." — *Erskine for Hardy.*

"Rats, did I say? Mice! mice!" — *Randolph.*

"That it should come to this!
But two months dead! Nay, not so much — not two."

Shakespeare.

See also, Prov. viii. 19; John xvi. 32: Ro. viii. 34; ix. 1, 2: 1 Cor. ix. 7, 8; xvi. 5, 8: 2 Cor. xii. 5: Gal. i. 6; ii. 20; iii. 4; iv. 9: 1 John ii. 2; v. 16, 17.

6. *Self-Interruption.* In oratory this form of expression should be accompanied by much animation. It implies either that the speaker has been hurried on until he has reached the limits of the endurance of his hearers and would, therefore, check

himself, or that he cannot do the subject ample justice; or else that there is no need of further argument. Thus: "Nay! but I cannot proceed with this thought." Nay, but hush my speech." Demosthenes, with great force employed this figure. See pp. 42, 44, 46.

"All study is not reading, any more than all reading is study. By study I mean— But let one of the noblest geniuses and hardest students of any age define it for me: 'Study,' says Cicero, 'is the persistent and intense occupation of the mind, directed with a strong effort of the will to any subject.'" — *Everett.*

"They are not uncivil to him, but they are peremptory to the extent of— Rotch may shudder to think what."

. . . . . .

"Richter says, in the island of Sumatra there is a kind of "light-chafers,' large fireflies, which people stick upon spits, and illuminate the ways with at night. Persons of condition can thus travel with a pleasant radiance which they much admire. Great honor to the fireflies! But!"

Carlyle.

"If you should transfer the amount of your reading day by day from the newspaper to the standard authors— But who dare speak of such a thing?"

"If you go to church, and a panic occurs—but perhaps you don't go to church."

See also, Mackintosh for Peltier, sentence beginning, "When Carrier ordered five hundred children," &c.

And see 2 Cor. v. 6; xii. 2: Gal. iii. 4: Eph. iii. 3.

It may be observed at this point that the purposes of interruption may be gained by a rhetorical pause, and may be represented by a dash. A distinguished literary man says that one of the most impressive things he ever heard was a sentence of Emerson's spoken in the course of a half extemporaneous lecture on Italy in a New England town. He was describing the Venus de Medici, and simply said, "I walked — round — and round — the Marble — Lady"; but such was the depth and dignity of his tones, the distinct and lingering quality of his enunciation, that the little sentence drew a wondrous picture for his audience, and made an immense impression upon them. In this case the pause was a silent parenthesis. The following is a similar example:

"The blood and spirit of Le Fevre, which were waxing cold and slow within him, and were retreating to their last citadel — the heart — rallied back; the film forsook his eyes for a moment; he looked up wistfully in my Uncle Toby's face, then cast a look upon his boy; and that ligament, fine as it was, was never broken. Nature instantly ebbed again; the film returned to its place; the pulse fluttered — stopped — went on — throbbed — stopped again — moved — stopped — Shall I go on? No." — *Sterne.*

7. *Interpolation.* The impassioned moods of eloquence generate spontaneity of thought; hence thoughts crowd the mind, and interpolation results. This form of speech is, therefore, suited to earnest delivery, and is very effective when the minds of both speaker and hearers are so aroused that conti-

nuity of thought is not disturbed by the interpolation. Sometimes the speaker, by interpolation, introduces a thought which without this oratorical setting would be extremely offensive, or at least objectionable to the audience. Hence "side thrusts" belong to this class of speech. Exclamation and apostrophe usually fall under interpolation. Examples are numerous; the following are representative:

"First, I say that the infantry — but how to prevent you from doing that which has often injured you! Your thinking that the occasion demands far less than it does demand — your selecting the grandest plans in your decrees, while in execution you make not the paltriest exertion."

Demosthenes. First Philippic.

See also, quotations, pp. 52, 54.

"Would my learned friend have had the boldness to say to this hero that he must hide his tears (the tears shed by a hero)," &c. — *Mackintosh.*

"An honorable gentleman whom I see in his place, but who, I believe, neither hears nor sees me at this moment [Mr. Jenkinson, who was fast asleep on the Treasury Bench], knows full well that all I am saying is strictly true. . . . . That honorable gentleman can attest the veracity of this recital; but it were vain flattery, I fear, to hope that he will rise up to-night and vindicate by his voice and his vote the principles of the cause he then supported." — *Fox.*

It has been often observed that the Romish preachers use this figure in calling attention to the Virgin Mary. Fénelon gives an example from one of the greatest French orators, M. L'Esprit Fléchier, Bishop of Nismes. In his panegyric on St. Joseph

he introduces his Ave Maria thus: "Everything seems to concur to the glory of my subject; the Holy Spirit, Jesus Christ, and Mary, are concerned in it; why may I not hope for the assistance of one of them, the grace of the other, and the intercession of the Virgin? to whom we will address ourselves in those words that the angel said to her, and which St. Joseph no doubt often repeated; Hail! Mary."

See also, Ro. iv. 16, 17: 1 Cor. v. 6–8; ix. 21: 2 Cor. vi. 13; xi. 23; xii. 2, 3.

8. *Self-Depreciation.* This is a species of subtle flattery, implying the superiority of the audience, and is natural to every orator who has refinement of taste. Though Demosthenes was fearless and daring in any cause he advocated, still he constantly and artfully introduced, directly and indirectly, self-depreciation.

"Whenever he touches upon his own praise," says Plutarch, "he does it with an inoffensive delicacy. Indeed, he never yields to it at all except when he has some great point in view. On all other occasions he is extremely modest." See pages 38, 39.

Cicero begins his oration for the poet Archias with the remark: "If I have any ability, — and I feel how little that is," &c.; and his oration for Quintius by saying that he endeavors to make amends for his want of talent by application.

A masterly example of this figure is the address of Mark Antony:

"I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts:
I am no orator, as Brutus is,
But, as you know me all, a plain, blunt man,
That love my friend; and that they know full well
That gave me public leave to speak of him.
For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
To stir men's blood: I only speak right on;
I tell you that which you yourselves do know,
Show you sweet Cæsar's wounds, poor, poor dumb mouths,
And bid them speak for me: but were I Brutus,
And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony
Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue
In every wound of Cæsar that should move
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny."

Shakespeare.

"When he brought it forward first in a time of war and calamity, I gave to the proposition my feeble support."

Fox.

"Gentlemen, I feel entitled to expect both from you and the court the greatest indulgence and attention. I am indeed a greater object of your compassion than even my noble friend whom I am defending. He rests secure in conscious innocence and in well-placed confidence that it can suffer no stain at your hands. Not so with me. I stand before you a troubled and, I am afraid, a guilty man, in having presumed to accept the awful task which I am now called upon to perform — a task which my learned friend who spoke before me, though he has justly risen by extraordinary capacity and experience to the highest rank in his profession, has spoken of with that distrust and diffidence which becomes every Christian in a cause of blood. If Mr. Kenyon had such feelings, what must mine be? Alas, gentlemen, who am I? A young man of little experience, unused to the bar of criminal courts, and sinking under the dreadful consciousness of my defects. I have, however,

this consolation, that no ignorance nor inattention on my part can possibly prevent you from seeing, under the direction of the judges, that the crown has established no case of treason." — *Erskine.*[43]

9. *Pretended Omission.* This mode of expression pretends to be passing in silence a certain matter while at the same time stating it in the strongest manner possible Thus, after fully recounting the deeds of the early Greeks, Demosthenes says:

"Thereafter they did such deeds as all men through all ages are eager to recount, but which no one is able eloquently enough to tell; wherefore I too shall pass them by. Justly so."

"For greater the deeds of these your forefathers than any one can utter them in any words." — *Second Philippic.*

"I speak not now of the public proclamation of informers, with a promise of secrecy and of extravagant reward. I speak not of the fate of those horrid wretches who have been so often transferred from the table to the dock, and from the dock to the pillory. I speak of what your own eyes have seen day after day." — *Curran.*

"I pass over all considerations of the written treasures of antiquity which have survived the wreck of empires and of dynasties, of monumental trophies, of triumphal arches, of palaces of princes and temples of gods. I pass over all considerations of those admired compositions in which wisdom speaks as with a voice from heaven; of those sublime efforts of political genius which still freshen as they pass from age to age in undying vigor; of those finished histories which still enlighten and instruct governments in their duty and their destiny; of those matchless orations which roused nations to arms, and chained senates to the chariot-wheels of all-conquering eloquence." — *Joseph Story.*

See also, Heb. xi. 32: Eph. ii. 8: Philemon 18, 19.

10. *Diminution.* This figure is employed when the speaker desires to lower the tone or importance of a thought. It is usually sought for by unfavorable association, comparison and anti-climax.

What, then have you made of Ireland? Look at her again. This fine country is laden with a population the most miserable in Europe, and of whose wretchedness, if you are the authors, you are beginning to be the victims; the poisoned chalice is returning in its just circulation to your own lips. Your domestic swine are better housed than the people." — *Daniel O'Connell.*

"An Aristotle was but the rubbish of an Adam, and Athens but the rudiments of Paradise." — *Dr. R. South.*

"And what is this world in the immensity which teems with them, and what are they who occupy it? The universe at large would suffer as little in its splendor and variety by the destruction of our planet, as the verdure and sublime magnitude of a forest would suffer by the fall of a single leaf." — *Chalmers.*

11. *Oratorical Inaccuracies.* The misuse of words, and especially of figurative language, to which one is liable when completely carried away with his subject, is, if intentional, a device of oratory called "catachresis." The orator seems to be in a state of noble forgetfulness of all small matters and of verbal technicalities and niceties. He fearlessly introduces colloquial expressions, or inelegant illustrations, to set off the truth more clearly, or to render it more emphatic, and still he gives, thereby, no offence. This mode of speech, therefore, befits the speaker when a crowd of thoughts, in an instant, burst upon the mind.

Figures mix. Rules of grammar and rhetoric are put to flight. The speaker, for the moment, becomes a genius; genius heeds not rules, but in breaking, makes them. See Hamlet, Act I., Hamlet's fourteenth speech, in Scene II. Also, Act I. Scene IV. lines 30–36. Lev. xxvi. 30: Deut. xxxii. 14: Ps. lxxx. 5: Hos. xiv. 2: Matt. xi. 31, 32: 1 Cor. i. 25.

12. *Confession.* As:

"I come forward on the present occasion, actuated solely by a sense of duty, to make a serious and important motion, which I am ready fairly to admit involves no less a consideration than a fundamental change in government."

13. *Concession.* As:

"But, sir, let us admit the fact and the whole force of the argument. I ask, whose is the fault? Who has been a member for many years past, and seen the defenceless state of his country even near him, under his own eyes, without a single endeavor to remedy so serious an evil?"

John C. Calhoun.

We enumerate a few other types of oratorical device, leaving the student to supply examples.

14. *Holding the hearer in suspense.*

15. *Special adornment of repulsive or uninteresting subjects.*

16. *Pretended recollection.*

17. *Exaggeration and extenuation by the enumeration of details.*

18. *The excitement of interest by the introduction of something irrelevant.*

19. *Pretended impossibilities.*

20. *Pretended doubts.*

21. *Pretended surprise.*

The student should observe that these and all other figures of speech, to be adapted to oratory, must be expressed with simplicity, conciseness, and precision, otherwise they are devoid of that energy and directness which ought to characterize the ideal orator.

XIX. *The ideal orator must regain the lost art of naturalness.*

The reason for calling naturalness in speech a lost art is, that almost every young man, through a failure to develop his faculties of speech, and by reason of imitating speakers who are full of elocutionary vices, at length becomes cramped by mannerism, and false to nearly all the graces of oratory. The ability, therefore, to conform to the elocutionary law of naturalness depends first of all upon one's strength of character. Is the speaker enthusiastic enough to submit to elocutionary drill; is he heroic enough to appeal less and less to some external authority, and more and more to his inmost convictions; is he man enough to shake off his teacher and his model, after having received all the benefit they can render? if so, he has that self-reliance and independence which make obedience to the law of naturalness comparatively easy.

If it is not natural for a given speaker to be like a continuous roar of thunder, as was Demosthenes; or if it is not natural for him to be like a conflagration gathering fuel in its progress, as was Cicero;

or if it is not natural for him to be like Everett, the florid word-painter of the English tongue; or if it is not natural for him to be perfectly easy, elegant, and graceful, then, let him dare to be what he *is*, and he will be successful, if success, in his case, is possible.

There is, perhaps, more unnaturalness in modern pulpit than in any other department of oratory. Ostervald's advice is needed no less to-day than when first given:

"There is a false eloquence in being ambitious to say everything with spirit, and turn all things with delicacy. If you would attain to true eloquence, you must first lay aside the passion for appearing eloquent. So long as you have vain, ambitious views, you will never preach well, and you will never become truly eloquent."

Dr. Lyman Beecher's rule is rough-hewn, but wise:

"Fill your mind and heart with your subject, then mount the pulpit and let nature caper."

Women are now appearing, with marked success, upon the platform and in the pulpit. But their right to be heard and their popularity as speakers, will ultimately depend upon their naturalness. Women can be as eloquent as men; it is doubtful if they can be as oratoric. In attitude, gesture, and enunciation, they must be women full of persuasion, but should not display much oratoric passion.

All speakers, of whatever class and of both sexes, will do well to heed Dr. Franklin's admonition:

"The eyes of other people are the eyes that ruin us."

What has just been said does not, however, preclude the necessity of studying models. The highest art is studious; it is able, however, to conceal art and become natural. Be artists and artless, is sound elocutionary advice. While the youthful speaker is to keep in the great oratorical highway, he is, nevertheless, not to tread slavishly in the footsteps of others.

XX. *The ideal orator has the instincts and graces of popularity.*

By popularity is meant something more than notoriety, or sensationalism. It is a something that almost defies perfect analysis, though when possessed it is easily recognized. Emerson thus describes the popular orator:

"A crowd of men go up to Faneuil Hall; they are all pretty well acquainted with the object of the meeting; they have all read the facts in the same newspapers. The orator possesses no information which his hearers have not; yet he teaches them to see the thing with his eyes. By the new placing, the circumstances acquire new solidity and worth. Every fact gains consequence by his naming it, and trifles become important. His expressions fix themselves in men's memories, and fly from mouth to mouth. His mind has some new principle of order. Where he looks all things fly into their places. What will he say next? Let this man speak, and this man only."

The primary meaning given to the word popularity conveys a tolerably accurate idea:

"The state of being suitable to or beloved by the people." — *Webster.*

Vinet makes the word popularity synonymous with familiarity. Vauvenargues, adopting the same idea, says; "There is not a better or more necessary school for the speaker than familiarity." The highest type of popularity is in reality based upon all the oratorical qualities heretofore enumerated. A high moral tone, courage, earnestness, poetic skill, and elocutionary tact, are especially indispensable. So likewise a prevailing under-tone arising from cheerfulness, charitableness, generosity, tenderness, and affection; and in case of the pulpit orator, an intense love for souls, will go far towards gaining the popular ear and heart; while on the other hand gloom, harshness, and selfishness are sure to doom the speaker.

Common sense, too, that deep sagacity and ready perception which instantly explores the whole community of thought and judgment respecting any matter under consideration, will be found underlying genuine popularity.

Now, it is a combination of these, and other oratorical excellencies already enumerated, which will give the speaker that inexplicable moral might which magnetizes and then entrances the audience and leads it captive, there being no strength left to withhold applause.

The orator's rhetorical style, likewise, has much to do with his popularity. Language, according to Vinet, that has in it nothing rare or exceptional, but

is common and customary, is what engages and delights the popular ear. Thus also the qualities of naturalness, clearness, simplicity, conciseness, force, and poetic representation cannot be sought for too diligently by the orator.[46] See also, Vol. I. pp. 125–142, inclusive, and present Vol. pp. 96, 97.

Subject-matter having to do with the *humanities* rather than the *individualities* of the race, and that comprehensive range which disdains mere hair-splitting discussion and sand-hill building, are thoroughly refreshing to the popular heart, and receive its praise. "Peace or war, vengeance for public wrongs, or mercy to prostrate submission, national honor and national gratitude,—topics appealing to the primal sensibilities of man,—were, as De Quincey has observed, the themes of Greek and Roman oratory."[47]

No one who has listened to Joseph Cook has failed to notice that he has mastery over his audience in proportion as he deals with the grand foundations upon which rest natural and revealed religion.

And further, it is vitally important that the orator, if he desires popularity, should make common cause with the people. He should aim to make his hearers care for all he cares for; this is done more effectually than otherwise by caring for what they care for. He should, therefore, be on guard lest the culture of the schools which he, nevertheless, cannot dispense with, shall separate him from the people whom he is to influence. The orator must learn to shake off the oppressive air of the school-

room, and take off the glove of all sorts of distinction and extend his naked hand, especially if the people are ungloved. He is to talk not *before*, nor *at*, but *with* his audience.

> "Men must be taught as if you taught them not,
> And things unknown proposed as things forgot."

"In honor preferring one another," is a charming art in oratory, as well as the gem of Christian politeness. This sympathetic interest in others and respect for them, Starr King denominates a sixth sense. This same oratorical art was referred to by the Duke of Wellington when speaking thus of the elder Scarlett: "When Scarlett is addressing a jury there are thirteen jurymen." "This is both characteristic of the influence my father exercised when addressing juries," says the younger Scarlett, "and of the duke's terse manner of expressing himself." A thirteenth juryman would not necessarily bring over the other twelve. What the duke probably meant was, that Scarlett, suppressing the advocate, talked to them as one of themselves, and as having at heart the same object — the discovery of the truth. He did this so completely that the sense of his superiority was lost, and no suspicion broke upon them that they were under a spell woven by a master of his art.[48] Anything, therefore, like a haughty bearing, a needless show of learning, or an undue deference to some particular personage or class in the audience, each of which oratorical vices tends to separate the speaker from the mass of his hearers, is fatal to genuine popularity.

Hence, too, the smile of the orator, often a successful artifice, is, when genuine, a remarkable aid in winning the popular heart to the cause advocated. Such a smile upon the face is what cheerfulness, generosity, and tenderness are in rhetorical style. It has characterized the great leaders of men — Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon. "The smiles that played about Bonaparte's mouth when he spoke," says Fox, "were delightful." "His smile," said a correspondent from India, alluding to the Prince of Wales, "is worth a kingdom, and won all hearts." "If I value myself upon anything," says Hawthorne, "it is in having a smile that children love." There will be much risk, however, in trying to put on the smile while the spirit is really haughty. It will be like "a silver plate on a coffin." But when the smile glows upon the face because there is good will and sympathy for the audience in the heart, it will be a potent factor in the delivery of the speech.

An effort to make each hearer, even the humblest, feel that he is receiving special attention, is likewise regarded, upon the ground of popularity, a justifiable use of oratorical tactics. An anecdote related of M. Arago illustrates this thought. In order to test the clearness of his lectures, he made a rule to fix his eyes on the dullest-looking scholar he had. If he saw that he was understood by that pupil, he knew that the rest of his hearers had found him clear. One day, just after he had been alluding to this as his usual habit, a young man entered the room, and

feeling sure the lecturer knew him well, saluted him accordingly. "I regret I have not the pleasure of your acquaintance," said M. Arago. "You surprise me," replied the young student. "Not only am I most regular in my attendance at your lectures, but you never take your eyes off me from the beginning to the end." When each hearer is thus made to imagine that this special devotion is his, the orator easily wins his cause.

The presence of the modern reporter, so far as the speaker gives him any thought, no doubt interferes with a true *popular* expression. Macaulay called attention to this, which, if an evil in his day, is still more so in our time. He says:

"Our legislators, our candidates, on great occasions even our advocates, address themselves less to the audience than to the reporters. They think less of the few hearers than of the innumerable readers. At Athens the case was different; there the only object of the speaker was immediate conviction and persuasion."

Likewise, a needless show of learning is a blow at popularity. Says John Randolph, as reported by Josiah Quincy:

"It is a great blunder for a speaker to allude to books which are not familiar to his audience. A quotation from Horace or Juvenal will do in the British Parliament. The members are all graduates from Oxford and Cambridge, and they understand it. But what folly it would be to quote the classics to an average American audience. I know of only three books with which all decently educated Americans are familiar: these are the Bible, Shakespeare, and Milton. Now I want you to notice a fine passage from

Burke, which I will repeat, and you will find that he has used thought or language from these three books in its construction."

In pulpit oratory, this modesty in bearing and expression, and this community of interest, are especially demanded. The preacher who is more in sympathy with his subject than with his people, and who by learned exegesis offsets the ignorance of the people with his own skill and knowledge, violates one of the first laws of popularity, and is sure to have a dull auditory. It was said of one of John Foster's profound discourses when published, that "it should have been addressed to an audience created for the purpose." Such a preacher, however talented he may be, cannot be popular.

The preaching of the Great Teacher, on the other hand, was popular, attracting such crowds as compelled him to take to a boat or to the mountain side. His simplicity, purity, grace, cheerfulness, mercy, and earnestness; his comforting and inviting words when addressing the struggling and penitent, and his severity when addressing hypocrites, conquered the popular heart, giving him such a following as the world had hardly known. See Mark xii. 37, and compare Matt. iii. 5, 6: Acts xiii. 42.

Genuine popularity may, therefore, be legitimately striven for by the aspirant for oratorical honors. There should be a close and constant study and imitation of the character and methods of all the popular orators, pulpit and secular.

In seeking for popularity, even by legitimate

methods, the young orator will perhaps be placed under suspicion. But let him fear not. A quick-witted but generous-souled occupant of a small village pulpit,—who has ability enough to shine in a much larger field, but a heart equal to its duty anywhere,—once remarked: "There is one thing I find which a certain class of clergymen can never forgive in a brother: that he should preach to three thousand people while they preach to three hundred."

Nevertheless, seek most diligently to preach to the three thousand. When men ask for bread, it is not necessary to give them a stone, nor a scorpion for a fish.

CHAPTER VII.

INFERENCES (*Concluded*).

XXI. *The ideal orator in a given oration is expected to conform to the following requirements:*

1. *He should have a thorough knowledge of the persons addressed.* Audiences, like individuals, differ. The "business-talk" of the British Parliament appears extremely tame to the average American. "Become all things to all men," is as much a fundamental rule in eloquence as in religious intercourse.

2. *The aim from the start should be to shorten as much as possible, the distance, figurative and literal, between the speaker and hearer.* The utterance, especially in the introduction, of a single word that tends to antagonize the audience is, in oratory, a breach of common sense.

3. *The aim, when possible, should be single.* If the orator when standing before the people is possessed with "one lone idea," and that a fundamental one; if his purpose is firm and definite, and if he comes to the main issue without delay, he will be quite sure to gratify the wishes and tastes of a modern audience. He will also be equally sure of

escaping most of the common elocutionary vices. Dr. John Hall suggests that if a speaker is sure of his target and his bullet, his success is guaranteed.

But slight observation, however, discloses the fact that the inexperienced pleader is strongly tempted, for instance in a case involving "an ejectment for ten acres," to begin by discoursing at length upon the voyage of Columbus, the discovery of America, or the Revolutionary war. "May it please your honor, when the race commenced its eventful career in the Garden of Eden," began the young lawyer, "Will the counsel," interrupted the judge, "commence this time at the flood?"

The pulpit, however, is in this matter, far more faulty than either the platform or the bar. It will have to be acknowledged that one of the chief reasons why churches are deserted, is not so much the depravity of the hearers, as the want of a controlling and well-defined purpose on the part of the preacher. He aims at nothing, and in a bungling way hits it. Dr. J. H. Newman, in *Lectures upon University Subjects*, gives wise counsel.

"I would go the length of recommending a preacher to place a distinct categorical proposition before him, such as he can write down in a form of words, and to guide and limit his preparation by it, and to aim in all he says to bring it out, and nothing else. . . . Nor will a preacher's earnestness show itself in anything more unequivocally than in his rejecting, whatever be the temptation to admit it, every remark however original, every period however eloquent, which does not in some way or other tend to bring out this one distinct proposition which he has chosen.

Nothing is so fatal to the effect of a sermon as the habit of preaching on three or four subjects at once."

No preacher who has definiteness of aim, or who heeds the apostolic injunction,—"I charge thee, therefore, before God and the Lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom, go preach the word," will begin each sermon either with the creation of the world or in the Garden of Eden. This same general principle applies in all other forms of art as well as in literature and oratory. Skilful painters require that much of the canvas shall be covered with neutral colors in order that the prominent colors and the principal figures may be the better defined and the more impressive. This, too, is nature's hint. She presents over head the soft blue of the sky, and about us and beneath our feet the green verdure and the gray rocks; her pet objects will be thus the better outlined.[49]

4. *He must be able to seize upon what is passing.* This ability depends largely upon quick perceptions and perfect coolness. It is skill like that of a military genius whom no emergency or change of movement on the part of the enemy can surprise, and who can turn everything that would be a surprise to the common mind into personal advantage. See Matt. vi. 26: Acts xvii. 22, 23; xxiii. 6; xxvi. 28, 29.

5. *He must believe in the cause advocated.* "The shoemaker cannot work beyond his last," is a suggestive and widely applicable adage.

Says Emerson:

"I have heard an experienced counsellor say that he never feared the effect upon a jury of a lawyer who does not believe in his heart that his client ought to have a verdict. If he does not believe it, his unbelief will appear to the jury, despite of all his protestations, and will become their unbelief. This is that law whereby a work of art, of whatever kind, sets us in the same state of mind wherein the artist was when he made it. That which we do not believe, we cannot adequately say, though we may repeat the words never so often. It was this conviction which Swedenborg expressed, when he described a group of persons in the spiritual world, endeavoring in vain to articulate a proposition which they did not believe; but they could not, though they twisted and folded their lips even to indignation."

When the speaker advocates what he does not thoroughly believe, the audience will feel that something is out of joint, the mischiefs of hypocrisy will taint the orator's spirit, and much bad elocution will result; there will be unnaturalness, formality, self-consciousness, and a whole brood of other elocutionary vices.

6. *He must be determined to win his case.* Rufus Choate used to say, "I always go in for the verdict." "A great speech," O'Connell once said, in speaking of forensic discourses, "is a very fine thing; but, after all, the verdict is THE thing." When the orator can say, I *will* go through this speech, or I *will* hold the attention of this people, or I *will* gain the verdict, he is close upon the borders of success.

The orator must, therefore, cultivate will-power by keeping the will in constant exercise through moral and righteous determination. And he must be true to himself. He who violates his moral convictions does what the athlete would do did he cut his sinews at the wrist.

It is not difficult, at this point, to trace additional analogies between oratory and military science. Paul Jones, when half his men lay dead or wounded upon his vessel's deck, his guns having been dismounted and his flag shot away, was hailed by a British officer, who shouted, "Have you surrendered?" Jones, climbing up the rope ladder with a hammer and a nail in his hand, shouted, "No! I have just begun to fight!"

General McPherson, who acted as chief of staff to General Grant during the battle of Pittsburg Landing thus describes the disasters of the first day's fighting:

"I had been compelled from hour to hour during the whole day to be the bearer of bad news to the chief. It was a succession of reverses from morning till night. When night came on, and it was becoming too dark for the enemy to continue the fight, I rode up to Grant, who coolly said to me, 'Well, Mac, how do things look?' 'Bad enough, general. We have lost, I think, about one half our artillery and at least a third of the infantry. Our line is broken in several places, and we are pushed back, as you see, pretty near the bank of the river.' Grant made no reply, and I, becoming a little impatient, finally said to him, 'Well, general, under these circumstances, what do you intend to do?' 'Do! why, I shall reform the line, and attack them at daybreak. *Won't* they be surprised!' Grant executed

his plan to the letter, and before nine o'clock next morning the enemy was flying in every direction."

"*Possunt quia posse videntur*"—for they can conquer who believe they can.

7. *His self-assertion should be supplemented by entire self-renunciation.* "Bold in his cause, modest in himself," is the oratorical law. It is a Hindoo saying that "large rivers, great trees, wholesome plants, and the most worthy persons, are not born for themselves, but to be of service to others." The greatest and the most rapid growth in manhood is through a self-renunciation that yields to noble impulses and purposes. "What so kingly," says Cicero, "so liberal, so munificent, as to give assistance to the suppliant, to raise the afflicted, to bestow security, and to deliver from danger?"

When the secular orator, in advocating measures whose results will be either desirable or beneficial, can hide himself; when he can voice things, or become like John in the wilderness, or be a tongue of fire; and when the preacher by leaving himself out of the pulpit and by putting the Master into it, can assert the truth and surrender to it, then everything touched is exalted, and a halo is above the head of the orator.

ART OF SPEECH.

PART SECOND. — STUDIES IN LOGIC.

INTRODUCTORY.

ARGUMENTATION, viewed as an art, is the formal and skilful arrangement of ideas for the purpose of producing conviction; viewed as a science, it treats of the different varieties of reasoning and of the different modes of conducting an argument. Hence the art of argumentation lies in the field of rhetoric, the science of argumentation in the field of logic.

The basis of an argument is in the use of one or more statements in proof of some other statement.

The principal requirements are, that those statements shall be both correct and clear.

The normal development in argumentation is, therefore, the following: the thinker chooses a subject, states two propositions, deduces a third, and there results the naked outline of his argument. Then, by resorting to the arts of poetic, prose, or poetic-prose, speech, he clothes that skeleton in an appropriate dress.

Since all men argue, and delight in arguing, especially in that definite kind of argumentation which can be reduced to three judgments, expressed or implied, it follows that the man who aspires to be a public teacher or speaker should be acquainted with the science, and should certainly master the arts of argumentation.

CHAPTER I.

ARGUMENTATION.

I. *Basis.*

It is evident from the nature of argumentation that it must rest upon reliable subject-matter. For instance, that belonging to the following classes:

1. *Primary mental judgments.* The mental acts included are those of conscience, consciousness, instinct, intuition, memory, perception, and common sense, unless common sense is regarded as an harmonious blending of these and all other mental activities. It is found that no conquest, or even progress, can be made in reasoning when any of these primary judgments are opposed or ignored. Could there be a process of reasoning proving that men are machines, still, when the conclusion of the argument was reached, the one who had listened would reply, "I know better." Dogmatisms and arguments are alike regarded as forceless and worthless when running counter to these facts of mind. It is evident, therefore, that the reasoner should acquaint himself thoroughly with the ordinary thinking of humanity.

For examples of argumentation based upon primary judgments, see Gen. iv. 7: John viii. 1–11; ix. 20, 25: 1 Cor. viii. 4: 1 John ii. 29: 3 John 12.

2. *Facts.* "Facts given in evidence are premises from which a conclusion is to be drawn."

"A matter of fact is: *a*, Everything capable of being perceived by the senses; *b*, Every mental condition of which any person is conscious."

Stephen's Digest of the Law of Evidence.

They are classified thus:

(1.) Truths resting upon first principles. These harmonize with the mental constitution of humanity, and consequently with all primary mental judgments. They include the axioms of mathematics, as, "Two straight lines cannot contain a space;" "A part cannot equal the whole," &c.; also the fundamental principles of physical science, as "A body cannot be in two places at the same time;" "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time," &c.; likewise, the data of psychological science, as, "Thought implies the existence of a thinking being to whom the thought belongs;" "Quality implies a substantive existence in which it inheres;" "Whatever is perceived by the several senses exists, and substantially as perceived;" "Whatever is recalled by the memory did exist as remembered;" and "Consciousness makes a true and reliable report of our experience."

(2.) Truths of general experience. Whatever agrees with the invariable experience or observation of humanity belongs to this class, and affords a firm basis for reasoning. Their weight is in proportion to their universality, number, and mutual

agreement. When alleged facts are rare, extraordinary or supernatural, they are excluded from this classification; they must be established by testimony.

(3.) Truths of special experience. These depend upon conditions that are peculiar to certain states or surroundings. Christian experience, for instance, reports as nothing else can, respecting the facts of conversion, regeneration and justification; a sanctified consciousness, likewise, reports correctly, and is the only reliable witness respecting the peace and triumphs of holiness. This same principle is thus stated by Plato: "To many minds there must come a moral improvement before they can receive intellectual enlightenment." See Acts xxvii. 1–23.

(4.) Truths of testimony. "It is by comparison of reasons and of experiences through testimony, that we reach conclusions of practical value." At the same time it should be observed that testimony, in itself, proves nothing. At most it simply shows the condition of a person's mind concerning that of which he offers his testimony. That condition of mind is the fact to be examined and weighed as evidence. Nevertheless, the credit given to history; information respecting persons, places and things, when there is no opportunity to make personal examinations; the rights and security looked for in courts of justice, together with social, financial and political confidence, all depend upon evidence of testimony.

The *discount* placed upon testimony is referred to two causes: The want of information on the part

of the narrator, also some motive influencing him to utter falsehood.

The *force* given to testimony depends upon the inherent credibility of the narration; the consistency of the attendant or involved circumstances; and the moral character, competency and number of the witnesses.

The following are also acknowledged principles in relation to testimony: The concurrence of several independent witnesses increases the weight of the evidence given by each; the points of agreement in otherwise conflicting testimony are regarded the most weighty sort of evidence; variation in minor matters increases the general probabilities that the testimony is correct; incidental testimony is usually regarded as of greater validity than direct, since it supposes clear knowledge and a vivid impression of the facts stated, and almost precludes the possibility of deliberate intention to deceive; written testimony found in ancient manuscripts is considered of greater weight than oral tradition relating to the same events; the *eye-witness*, especially when there is a probability that his testimony will result in personal loss or injury, is the testifier most desired. See Acts iv. 20; xxvi. 26: 1 John i. 3. The student may test the foregoing principles by applying them to the records of the Resurrection of Christ. Compare Acts xxii. 1–21: 1 Cor. xv. 5–8.

(5.) Truths of experiment. Said a father to his son who was studying surveying, "You can't prove anything by book-learning." The boy replied, "I

will set two stakes in the pasture lot; you can go and measure their distance apart; I will stand where I am and give you the exact result in half the time you employ." The trial was made; the boy with the sextant was successful; the father was convinced.

The opinions of others cannot be changed by sheer force, however great that force; but the presentation of facts will accomplish complete, though silent changes. A doctrine or theory can be disputed and rejected; but a truth established by experiment is self-evident and needs no proof beyond the presentation of it. Experiment is often very important in testing supposed facts, and in eliciting new ones.

3. *Opinions.* When expressed they are the testimonies of conscience, judgment, and other mental conditions or acts; hence they fall under the general subject of testimony.

4. *Revealed or Bible truth.* Prior to building an argument upon the Bible, it must either be admitted as authoritative or proved to be such. In the Christian pulpits its authority is usually admitted. When not admitted, it becomes necessary to establish the integrity of its text, its genuineness, its credibility, and its miraculous inspiration. The credibility of Bible truth is tested by comparing it with the facts of matter, of mind, and of the history of Providence. For examples where Bible authority is admitted, see Is. viii. 20: John vii. 42: Acts xviii. 28: Rom. iv. 3; xi. 2; where believed in from evidence, see John ii. 22: Acts xvii. 28. Method

of reasoning from the Scriptures, is illustrated in Rom. iv. and ix.

II. *Method.*

In dealing with facts in argumentation, the following directions are important:

1. "The first step in dealing with facts as evidence is to acquire a strong belief of the truth of the facts."

The rule of Descartes is stated thus: "Never admit the truth of anything without thorough conviction; that is, sedulously avoid precipitation or prepossession of judgment, and accept nothing as fact which does not recommend itself so clearly and distinctly to the mind that there can be no possible occasion to doubt." "Truth and falsehood have a superficial similarity," says the Persian adage; therefore there should often be rigid, even merciless inquisition in dealing with facts.

2. In estimating the force of evidence built upon facts, bear in mind that there are four degrees: the possible, the plausible, the probable, and the certain. Observe also that an argument takes the form of climax and becomes conclusive, when the evidence presented makes a subject appear possible, plausible, probable, and lastly, certain.

3. Observe also that the mere statement of a fact is not sufficient for the purposes of eloquence; the statement must be made with the purpose of convincing and persuading.

4. Other things being equal, select facts near at hand rather than those afar off.

5. Deal with worthy and grand facts, those which represent and illustrate worthy and grand ideas.

6. A general and natural order is to inquire what are the facts; why are they thus rather than otherwise; and what are the consequences involved.

III. *Merit.*

From what has been said it is apparent that merit in argumentation rests upon:

1. The motives influencing the speaker.
2. The importance of the truths defended.
3. The selection and verification of proofs.
4. The arrangement of proofs in the argument.
5. The rhetorical and elocutionary presentation of the arguments.

CHAPTER II.

CLASSIFICATION.

In all attempts to convince the judgment of those addressed there are processes of reasoning which may be termed general and specific.

1. *General Classification.* It is found that all forms of reasoning fall under one or the other of two general types:

(1) Inductive method. When a general conclusion is drawn from particular instances, the reasoning is inductive. An induction is, therefore, proof based upon certain related particulars, or as Bautain says, it is "the drop of oil extracted from thousands of roses; the healing power of a hundred-weight of bark in a few grains of quinine." Thus, the men A, B, C, &c. die; therefore all the men will die. The inductive is a natural and an extremely easy method of reasoning; the most ordinary people practise it. Sir John Herschel, therefore, speaks of "the impulse of the human mind to generalize," and of "the inductive propensity." The importance, too, of this method cannot be overestimated. It is found necessary, as Locke remarks, for the

mind "to shorten its way to knowledge and make each perception more comprehensive by binding them in bundles."

The following principles should be observed while reasoning inductively:

a. The exclusion of important particulars and the introduction of unimportant ones will probably lead to false inductions.

b. The repetition of the same kind of particulars does not fortify the argument. *Tutor* — "What can you say of the second law of thought?" *Student* — "It cannot both be and not be. For example, the door over there must be either shut or open. It can't be both shut and open." *Tutor* — "Give another illustration." *Student* — "Well, take the case of another door."

c. Reliance upon a limited number of particulars when an ample number is at command, is unphilosophical.

d. Hasty inductions built upon limited particulars may seem to prove anything. It has thus been proved, at least to the satisfaction of many, that the earth is both a flat surface and a sphere; that ministerial education is both beneficial and injurious. If the preacher hastily forms his Biblical theology from a few isolated passages, his doctrines most likely will be worthless and erroneous. Hasty inductions have killed many a patient, and lost many a case at the bar. It is clear, therefore, that the investigator and reasoner should spare no pains in collecting the facts and data upon which he is to

make his induction. Professor Swing has thus happily expressed the importance of broadness in our observations: "As we cannot take up a drop of water from the Atlantic and find in that drop the flow of the tides, the lifting up of the billows, the power that floats all the ships of a thousand ports, and the soft and loud music of a calm and storm; as to see the ocean we must grasp in all its rocky bed bordered by continents, — so we cannot in the face of a dying infant, or the adversity of a good man, see the government of the love of God. It has boundaries wider than these. We must wait, and what the fleeting moments of man deny, ask the great years of God to bring. The tides of the mind, the deep music of human waters, cannot be seen in the drop of life."

e. The number of instances from which the induction is made must be increased in proportion both to the irregularity of the instances, and to the difficulties attending the proposition to be established.

f. Inanimate nature, owing to its greater uniformity, requires of particular cases upon which to make a correct induction, a smaller number than does animate nature, and for the same reason brute nature requires a smaller number than human nature.

g. When all the data at command are viewed, an inference will result; but the mind must hold itself in readiness to yield that inference for another upon the arrival of additional data. Some one blamed Dr. Marsh for changing his mind. "Well," he

replied, "that is the difference between a man and a jackass; the jackass can't change his mind, and the man can — it 's a human privilege."

h. In debate the burden of proof rests upon the one whose induction has the weakest support; the burden of proof is, therefore, shifted when that induction is sufficiently strengthened by additional data.

i. An absolutely unquestionable induction can be reached only when all the data belonging to a given class are taken into account; it follows, therefore, that an absolutely unquestionable induction is a demonstration or a fact. For illustration, we say, "all men are mortal," because as far as our experience goes, and from the uniformity of the laws of nature, we are confident that they will always prove to be so. But from the nature of the case, the mortality of man can never be universally established till the end of time. Hence most of our general principles, which rest upon induction, are, strictly speaking, but probable truths.

(2) The deductive method. A general conclusion having been reached, the application of it to some particular instance, is reasoning by the process of deduction. A deduction is, therefore, proof based upon some general law. Thus, all men die, therefore we shall die. Of the two processes, the inductive and deductive, Sir W. Hamilton, in *Philosophical Discussions*, thus remarks: "The former is governed by the rule, — *What belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to all the constituent parts, belongs*

(*or does not belong*) *to the constituted whole.* The latter by the rule, — *What belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to the containing whole, belongs* (*or does not belong*) *to each and all of the contained parts.*" [50]

It is evident, if the facts at command are numerous, that the inductive naturally precedes the deductive method; that is, the law must be inferred from the collected particulars before it can be applied to some given particular. This is the basis of Horne Tooke's remark: "Reasoning is only addition and subtraction."

The preacher, basing his reasoning upon the facts of Revelation, is, at the outset, in possession of a general law (the text); his method, therefore, is deductive. He announces the law, perhaps pauses for a moment, to show its reasonableness, and then makes the application. This practice is so uniform in the pulpit that it leads to the rule that a preacher should employ the inductive method only when he intends to supplement it by the deductive. It is often the same with the lawyer before the court, and the physician while administering to his patient.

It may be further remarked, that when the inductive can be supplemented by the deductive method, the conclusion becomes a moral certainty. Thus, induction based upon several scientific facts rendered it probable that the diamond and charcoal were the same chemical substance. But if so, the inference followed that the diamond would burn. Deduction, therefore, applied the law that carbon burns to the

diamond; the experiment was successful, and there was no longer any reasonable question as to the identity of the two substances.

The steps to be taken in the pursuit of knowledge for the purposes of argumentation can be, at this point, easily inferred, and are the following: When the investigator watches the curious phenomena of matter or of mind, his method is merely *observational.* When he goes into his laboratory and there tests and analyzes substances, or goes among men trying the effect of this or that motive, his method is purely *experimental.* If, after obtaining and verifying his facts, either by experiment or observation, he then infers a general conclusion concerning all other facts belonging to the same class, his method is *inductive.* When he adopts a given conclusion, the result of his own observation or experiment, or that of others, and applies it to this or that object or purpose, either to ascertain whether the object or purpose belongs to a given class, or to see what practical service may result therefrom, his method is *deductive.*

The student may illustrate these points by Newton's discovery and application of the law of gravitation; and by Franklin's electrical experiments and applications. For examples of inductive supplemented by deductive methods, see Acts v. 34–40; xi. 1–18; xv. 13–23. A pure deduction is found in Matt. xii. 25, 26.

2. *Specific Classification.* Under the two foregoing general types of reasoning are included certain

varieties which may be classified according to *quality*, *rhetorical form*, and *logical method*.

(1) Reasoning classified as to its quality.

a. Probable reasoning. It deals with facts included under observation, experiment, experience, and opinion. The quality is contingent and variable because the facts upon which it is based are variable.

From these remarks it is clear that probable reasoning is to be freely employed in the fields of theology, morality, politics, business, the arts, and in some of the sciences. Probable reasoning assumes much, and most men admit that it has this right. That there is mind, for instance, and that it is superior to matter, the reasoner assumes; and all feel that he has a right so to do. For assumption is not illogical where the evidence of the thing assumed is clearly within the range of ordinary understanding.

"We are also often obliged in probable reasoning to start from this or that admitted fact or truth (and these, perhaps not *universally* admitted), and proceed by merely probable inferences drawn from various, diverse, and often uncertain relations, till we reach the conclusion. Such reasons may be sufficient to incline the mind to a particular conclusion, as against those which tend to any other conclusion; but they are never quite sufficient to necessitate the conclusion and render any other impossible."

Pres. Champlin, *Intellectual Philosophy*.

Hence Lord Erskine claims that all proof outside of mathematics "is nothing but presumption of high order." Still, the conclusions reached may be sufficiently convincing to control human conduct.

Bishop Butler goes so far as to say that, "probability is the constant guide of human life." "That the evidence preponderates on one side is sufficient to determine the reason, and should be to determine the conduct. If it does not, it is evidence of something wrong in our character; and thus the fact that every question cannot be made demonstrably evident, becomes an important test and trial of character. Besides, as life has to do chiefly with things contingent, probable reasoning is much more used by us, and hence is much the most important to us." Examples of this kind of reasoning are the speeches of Cicero against Verres, of Burke in the impeachment of Warren Hastings, and of Webster in the trial of the Knapps.

b. Demonstrative, sometimes termed mathematical, reasoning. It deals with facts and truths which in their nature are immutable. For instance, space, time, number; in a word, necessary qualities constitute immutable truths; they are termed immutable from the fact that if they are once clearly apprehended as true, they must likewise be so apprehended at all times and by all men.

It is claimed by Reid (*Essay on Intellectual Powers*) that demonstrative reasoning may enter the field of metaphysics as well as that of mathematics; and by Professor Scott (*Elements of Intel. Phil.*) that it may also enter the realm of physics.

Further distinctions between probable and demonstrative reasoning may be stated thus: Demonstrative reasoning examines but one side of a sub-

ject; probable reasoning must look at all sides. The demonstrative admits of no degrees; but the probable, as to its force in producing assurance, depends upon the weight of evidence. The demonstrative is a chain from which, whatever its length, no link can be spared; the probable is a combination of independent arguments, to which others at pleasure can be added, and from which previously employed arguments may be either dropped or modified. Lastly, demonstrative reasoning requires one to guard especially against mistakes arising from the evidence; while probable reasoning requires one to guard especially against personal prejudice and false definitions.

A moment's reflection will make it clear to every person that there are other facts than those which form the basis of probable and demonstrative reasoning; they are facts rather which are neither contingent nor variable; nor are they generally classed among immutable truths, as are those facts which form the basis of demonstrative reasoning. Hence we make a third class, under:

c. Divine reasoning. It is that reasoning which is based upon the inspirations by the Holy Spirit. When the inspiration is established and the record verified, the truth is absolute; the conclusions reached will not be probable, but will be certain; they will not appear so much like a demonstration, as like an overwhelming and convincing announcement. This mode of reasoning is, as Stier calls it, "a spiritual logic," and as Chrysostom styles it, "inspired logic."

The study of the sacred writers, better than any other course, will illustrate the peculiarities of this kind of reasoning. It often seems foolish to the world, as did Paul's reasoning concerning the cross to the Greek philosophers (1 Cor. i. 23.) "Paul of Tarsus," says Longinus the sophist, "was the first, within my knowledge, who put forth his opinion without supporting it by argument." Still, this same Longinus adds Paul's name to the list of the eight Greek orators "who are the glory of all eloquence."

The aim of this spiritual and peerless logic is not so much to convince as to illustrate and impress; while the power of the method is found in its sweeping and fundamental deductions. It is never illogical, but frequently rises above ordinary logical methods, using them or dismissing them at pleasure. "The sacred writers often in a concealed syllogism begin with the minor proposition, and in an enthymeme leave us to supply the consequences; now they use several mediums of argument, and then suddenly break into rhetorical interrogations, exclamations, and amplifications."

The following examples taken from our Lord's reasoning will still further illustrate these statements: Matt. v. 34–36, 45, 46; vi. 7, 8, 19–21; vii. 12; ix. 12, 13; xii. 3, 6–8, 11, 12; xvi. 2–4; xix. 3–6; xxiii. 16–22: Mark ii. 19, 20, 27; iii. 4, 23–27; viii. 34–36; xii. 26, 27: Luke v. 36–39; xi. 11–13, 19, 20; xii. 15, 54–57; xiii. 15, 16: John x. 35.

(2) Reasoning classified as to its rhetorical form.

All spoken or written argument is clad in rhetorical expression; hence reasoning falls under the science of rhetoric as well as under that of logic. The rhetorical processes employed lead to the following classification:

a. Reasoning illustratively. This includes, (a) Arguments from examples. (b) Arguments from experience. (c) Arguments from experiment. (d) Arguments from analogy.

Arguments from examples, experience, and experiment are discussed elsewhere; we therefore at this point confine attention to arguments from analogy.

"By this method the reasoner argues from one object or state to another, because there exists a resemblance between those objects or states; the resemblance affords sufficient basis, provided it rests upon similarity in relations or arises out of similarity of properties, or causes and effects."

See *Buchanan*, *Locke*, *Butler*, and *Mill*.

The resemblance between an egg and a seed affords a beautiful analogy, but consists solely in the *relation* between the egg and the birdling, and between the seed and the seedling. From our Lord's parables the student may illustrate the kind of analogy resting upon similarity of properties and effects. The subject is subdivided thus:

First, Analogical reasoning is of special service in the following instances:

When the design is to neutralize objections. See Albert Barnes's *Introductory Essay to Butler's Analogy*.

To give the appearance of likelihood to what seems incredible.

Likewise to create the conviction of probability: Butler's Analogy furnishes many examples.

Also to enforce and illustrate truths already admitted by explaining ambiguities and relieving obscurities.

And to furnish upon many speculative and practical subjects the only valid evidence obtainable. "As when a lawyer is perplexed with a case that falls not fairly within the provisions of any existing statute, and for which his file affords no exact precedent, he is placed under the necessity of tracing remote analogies and correspondences between this case and others within his knowledge, and of forming his method of procedure by the equivocal evidence furnished by such illustration."

Second, The following dangers of assumption in analogical reasoning should be guarded against:

The assumption that analogy is demonstration; whereas at best it is only probability.

The assumption that because two or more objects or states are alike in certain respects, therefore, they are alike in all other respects.

The assumption that an analogy means more than the author intended. Compare Paul's direction as to marriage, in 1 Cor. vii.

Third, Perfection of art in employing this mode of reasoning depends upon the following considerations:

The selection of objects or states that are the most

remote possible in time, place, or character, from the objects or states illustrated, except as to the essential points the author designs to enforce or establish.

The use of several distinct and widely different analogies in support or illustration of some particular truth.

The use of analogies drawn from well known objects and states.

The most faultless analogies in all these respects are found among the parables of our Lord. See Reid, *Essays on Intel. Powers*, Essay I. ch. iv: Isa. i. 3; v. 1–7; xxvii. 23–29; liv. 9: Jer. iv. 3; vii. 12–15; xiii. 23; xviii. 6: Mal. i. 6–8: Matt. vi. 24–32; xviii. 21–35: Heb. iii., vii: James iii. 3–6.

b. Reasoning inferentially. Sir William Hamilton defines an inference to be the carrying into the last proposition what is contained in antecedent judgments. He also defines the conclusion to be the last proposition which is supposed to express the product of the whole process. Accordingly the inference and the conclusion are nearly synonymous; the conclusion being a little more conclusive and final than the inference. The process of reaching an inference is reasoning inferentially. In a chain of reasoning there may be several inferences; an inference from these several inferences would be the conclusion of the process. Thus: from a b c, we infer x; from d e f, we infer y; from g h i, we infer z; and from x y z, we reach the conclusion aimed at.

The use of inference in the exposition and application of the Scriptures is very clearly stated in Horne's *Introduction*, Vol. II., pt. ii., ch. xii. sec. i.

While inferential reasoning does not claim to present absolute proof, still it is often successful, as much so as demonstration, in carrying the convictions of the hearer.

c. Reasoning suppositively. It is the process of drawing conclusions, inductions, or inferences from imaginary or hypothetical cases.

In all new sciences, supposition plays an important part. It is usually based upon partial data, affording often a relief and rest to the mind in its investigations. The working hypothesis is merely an inductive supposition. Thus also in ordinary conversation there is frequently heard the phrase, "Now suppose a case," &c.

The Christian religion is positive, consequently the preacher deals not much with conjecture, but with assertion and proof. Still, if he can pass through a year without the introduction of a supposition into his sermons, it is probable there will be not a little stupidity in his preaching. For excellent examples, see *Letters of Junius;* and see 2 Sam. xiii. 32: Matt. xxii. 42: Luke x. 36; xiii. 2: 1 Cor. x. 12: 2 Cor. xi. 5: 1 Peter v. 12.

d. Reasoning interrogatively. This method is subdivided into, (*a*) The oratoric; see pp. 44, 45, 140–142. (*b*) The Socratic. In the former case the speaker answers his own questions or leaves them unanswered; in the latter, a dialogue is insti-

tuted. The following, from a London publication, is an excellent example of the Socratic method. "A Future State of Rewards and Punishments" is the subject under discussion:

Q. Did God make the world?

A. Certainly he did.

Q. Does God govern the world?

A. As he made it, 'tis reasonable to suppose he governs it.

Q. Is not God a *good* and *righteous* governor?

A. Doubtless he is.

Q. What is the true idea of a *good* and *righteous* governor?

A. That he *punishes the wicked* and *rewards the good.*

Q. But are the wicked always punished in this life?

A. No; every one's observation tells him the contrary; for the worst of men are often advanced to riches and honor, and have all the external comforts that the world affords.

Q. Are the good always rewarded in this life?

A. No, certainly; for poverty, persecution, and various kinds of affliction are often the lot of the most virtuous men.

Q. How then does it appear that God is *good* and *righteous?*

A. I confess there is but little appearance of it in the present state of things.

Q. Will there not be a time when the scene of things will be changed, and God will make his goodness and righteousness in the government of mankind appear?

A. Undoubtedly such a time will come.

Q. But if this be not done before death, how can it be done at all?

A. In no other way that I can think of, but by supposing man to have some existence after this life.

Q. Then you are convinced that there must be a state of rewards and punishments beyond the grave?

A. Yes, I am thoroughly persuaded of it; since the goodness and righteousness of God, as governor of the world, cannot be made to appear without it.

It should be borne in mind that this, like the previous method, does not, strictly speaking, claim to present proof, though it is frequently effective in gaining mental conquests. The artful orator often resorts to interrogation because he has no proof. He rapidly introduces various inquiries, stating and restating them, until he has a new question, though still seeming to adhere to the one at issue. His opponent, however, easily explodes the fallacy by simply demanding a return to *the question*, or by introducing a series of corresponding counter questions. The following, which passed between a Christian believer and an infidel physician, is illustrative: —

"The doctor said, 'There is no soul,' and asked, — 'Did you ever see a soul?' 'No,' said the Christian. 'Did you ever hear a soul?' 'No.' 'Did you ever smell a soul?' 'No.' 'Did you ever taste a soul?' 'No.' 'Did you ever feel a soul?' 'Yes,' said the man, 'I feel I have one within me.' 'Well,' said the doctor, 'there are four senses against one; you have only one on your side.' 'Very well,' said the Christian. 'Did you ever see a pain?' 'No.' 'Did you ever hear a pain?' 'No.' 'Did you ever smell a pain?' 'No.' 'Did you ever taste a pain?' 'No.' 'Did you ever feel a pain?' 'Yes.' 'Well,' continued the Christian gentleman, 'there

are four senses against one; you have only one on your side, therefore there is no such thing as pain.'"

See other examples in Xenophon's *Memorabilia of Socrates.*

e. Reasoning by conversion of terms. By this method the speaker repeats a proposition in another form for the purpose of deepening the impression and generating conviction. Thus it is said, "You must all die; for you are all mortal;" or, "Every man is an animal; for man is included in the animal kingdom." It is clear that these are rhetorical assertions, not logical proofs. "The fact asserted in the conclusion is either the very same fact, or a part of the fact asserted in the original proposition." Yet nevertheless these repeated statements are often successful in deepening the conviction. Mill thinks that there is no more important intellectual habit, nor any the cultivation of which falls more strictly within the province of the art of logic, than that of discerning rapidly and surely the identity of an assertion when disguised under diversity of language. See also sophistical reasoning, page 213.

f. Reasoning syllogistically. "In a legitimate syllogism," says Mill, "it is essential that there should be three, and no more than three, terms; namely, the subject and predicate of the conclusion, and another called the middle term, which must be found in both premises, since it is by means of it that the other two terms are to be connected together. The predicate of the conclusion is called the major term

of the syllogism; the subject of the conclusion is called the minor term. As there can be but three terms, the major and minor terms must each be found in one, and only one, of the premises, together with the middle term which is in them both. The premise which contains the middle term and the major term is called the major premise; that which contains the middle term and the minor term is called the minor premise."

This method of framing an argument was regarded anciently as the only sure mode of reasoning. It is based upon the principle that whatever is true of any genus is true of all the species included under it; and that any two things agreeing with a third must agree with each other. The syllogism is very useful in exact statements and in detecting fallacies. Strictly speaking, this form of reasoning does not concern itself with the truth or falsity of the propositions stated; it simply guards the form of statement, demanding that when the leading propositions are conceded, the conclusion will be obvious and inevitable. Berkeley, Spinoza, and Hume are faultless in their reasoning, if their premises are granted. "Their deductions," as Coleridge remarks, "constitute a chain of adamant."

Every statement accompanied with the reason why it is made will be found to contain the elements of syllogistic reasoning; therefore, most books and speeches, having as their basis statements and reasons, may be reduced first to compound and then to simple syllogisms. The student may reduce

John ix. 16, and 30-33, to three propositions, the last of which is deduced from the other two. Thus, also, treat the argument in Butler's *Analogy*.

g. Reasoning enthymematically. The enthymeme differs from the syllogism in this, that one of the premises of the argument is suppressed. Hence it is said that the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, "because it holds the same relation to rhetoric which the syllogism holds to logic. The syllogism has always its regular proposition and conclusion, and establishes by means of all its parts that which it has proposed. The enthymeme is satisfied if merely what is stated in it be understood."

The syllogism is stated thus:

Whatever thinks is a spiritual substance. The mind of man thinks. Therefore the mind of man is a spiritual substance.

The enthymeme would be stated thus:

Whatever thinks is a spiritual substance. Therefore the mind of man is a spiritual substance. Or, the mind thinks and is therefore a spiritual substance. This, it will be noticed, is the form of speech ordinarily employed.

h. Reasoning soritically. This form of argument consists of several propositions so arranged that the predicate of each proposition that precedes forms the subject of the one that follows, while the concluding proposition unites its predicate with the subject of the first. The following is an example: "The mind is a thinking substance; a thinking substance is a spirit; a spirit has no composition of

parts; that which has no composition of parts is indissoluble; that which is indissoluble is immortal: Therefore the mind is immortal."

i. Reasoning oratorically. This is the form of argumentation, which wields the truths and facts presented with a seeming independence of the rules of logic; the orator, for the time, appears none the less effective if he is entirely unacquainted with those rules. Such reasoning, ignoring the ordinary steps of exact argumentation, masses and presents the proof and the reasons, with the sole intent of carrying at the moment, the point at issue, not so much by generating a cool and clear conviction as by inspiring the intuitive and instinctive impulses to yield a favorable decision. Says Zeno, "The philosophic argument is like the human hand closed; the oratorical like the same hand unfolded." The schooled logician says: "We ought to love what renders us more perfect. Now literature renders us more perfect. Therefore we ought to love literature."

But the fervid orator would exclaim: "Who is it that loves not letters? They enrich the understanding, and refine the manners; they polish and adorn humanity. Self-love and good sense themselves endear them to us, and engage us in their cultivation."

This mode of reasoning employs with great effect the dilemma, also the accumulation of examples, and the method known as "reasoning by tests." In this latter case the orator "seizes certain determinating principles, certain limiting conditions, or depicts

some prominent features of the case in point, and makes them representative or determinative of the whole business." It is necessary often for the orator thus to infuse life by the rejection of unimportant details, upon the presumption that the audience can supply them. See pp. 113, 114.

j. Reasoning by authority or examples. The lawyer collects decisions bearing upon a given case and presents them with the announcement that these decisions suggest the established law in all similar cases. It only remains for him to show that the case in hand falls under the law announced. When the announcements are based upon the admitted opinions of wise and good men, the reasoning is technically termed *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

Gladstone in the *Nineteenth Century* thus unfolds the subject still further:

"Then there is the authority of judges. . . . These judges sometimes supply us with opinions upon facts, sometimes with facts themselves. The results, in pure science, are accepted by us as facts; but on the methods by which they are reached, the mass, even of intelligent and cultivated men, are not competently informed. Judgments on difficult questions of finance are made into compulsory laws, in parliaments where only one man in a score, possibly no more than one in a hundred, thoroughly comprehends them. All kinds of professional advice belong to this order in the classification of authorities.

"But, thirdly, as Lewis has observed with much acuteness, we are in the constant habit of following

yet another kind of authority, the authority of ourselves. In very many cases, where we have reached certain results by our own inquiries, the process and the evidence have been forgotten, and are no longer present to the mind at times when we are called upon to act; they are laid aside as no longer necessary; we are satisfied with the knowledge that we acquired at a former time. We now hold to the conclusion, not remembering accurately its warrant, but remembering only that we once decided that it had a warrant. In its essence, this is acting upon authority. From this sort of action upon authority I believe no man of active life, however tenacious be his memory, can escape. And no man who is content to act on this kind of authority is entitled to object in principle to acting on other kinds. . . . We are bound to act on the best presumption, whether that presumption happens to rest on something done by others, or on something we have done ourselves."

The preacher, as already seen under *Divine Reasoning* (page 199), often employs this method. Thus Stockton suggests that the preacher is to "Preach the gospel; preach it as Christ preached. Preach it as the spirit of Jesus shall teach you to preach it. *Preach* it — not *prove* it. You might as well attempt to prove that sunshine is from heaven as to prove that the gospel is from heaven. Only *preach* it, and it will prove *itself*, as sunshine proves itself." Compare Jonah iii. 2: Matt. x. 19, 20; xxviii. 19, 20: Mark xvi. 15. Our Lord rea-

soned more often than otherwise by announcement. See *God-Man*, pages 396, 397.

See Dr. Tyng's *Christian Pastor*, pages 23–25, 83. Shedd's *Homiletics*, page 256.

(3) Reasoning classified as to its logical method. Since argument lies at the basis of all reasoning, it would be expected that under different circumstances different logical formulas would be resorted to. The classification of these different argumentative statements has been quite definitely established. In general the divisions are:

a. Sophistical forms of argument. Sophisms usually contain a latent fallacy under a general appearance of correctness. They are distinguished thus:

(*a*) A form of argument which gives as proof in another statement, the proposition to be proved, termed *petitio principii*. "Why does opium produce sleep?" asks one of the characters in Molière's *Comedies*. "Because it possesses a soporific quality," was the reply. In other words, it induces sleep because it induces sleep. The quack perfectly satisfied the old lady, by giving as a *reason* why her child was born dumb, that it had come into the world without the faculty of speech.

(*b*) A form of argument which establishes some other proposition than the one at issue, termed *ignoratio elenchi*. Mr. Whittemore, in arguing against a future judgment, presents many passages, such as Ps. lviii. 11: John ix. 39; xii. 31, 47, which teach that there is a judgment in the present life. He

offers these as conclusive evidence that there is to be no future judgment. "There is no future punishment," is a proposition which is often discussed under another, namely, "There is no endless punishment." See the fallacy underlying Balfour's *Inquiry*. See also, Gen. iii. 4–6.

(*c*) A form of argument which consists in stating two propositions and making each the only proof to establish the other, termed, *the vicious circle*. See Fox's speech on *Parliamentary Reform*, beginning, "Gentlemen are fond of arguing in this vicious circle," &c. The preacher sometimes offers as proof of the inspiration of the Scriptures quotations from the Scriptures. This is reasoning in a circle.

(*d*) A form of argument which substitutes local, temporary or partial circumstances for what is universal or unchangeable, termed *fallacia accidentis*. Religion is thus condemned because it occasionally leads to insanity, or because it is sometimes made a cloak for iniquity. See Luke vii. 33, 34.

(*e*) A form of argument in which events are wrongly accounted for, termed *non causa pro causa*. Ignorant people have a propensity for instantly referring every event, rightly or wrongly, to a cause. It is said that the rudest North American Indians never hesitate to assign a cause for each phenomenon. With many persons, coincidence of events is ample ground for making one the cause of the other. The following is a newspaper comment: "The reverend gentlemen who declare that all the railroad trouble has been sent as a punishment for

the sinfulness of running trains on Sunday, must be right, of course; but the public would be better satisfied if the statement were accompanied by some explanation — some sort of argument, so to speak." The political haranguer declares that "trade is depressed, therefore the country is misgoverned." The method of detecting his sophistry is this: "Trade is depressed, therefore the country is misgoverned, *for every country is misgoverned where trade is depressed.*" But this is false.

See Hugh Latimer's sermon before Edward VI., in which was used the illustration of Goodwin Sands and Tenterden Steeple. Another form of this error arises from not distinguishing between the different senses in which the word *cause* is used. Aristotle classifies causes as of four kinds, namely: *material cause*, which indicates the substance from which a thing is made; *formal cause*, that agency which shapes the thing made; *efficient cause*, that which produces the thing made; *final cause*, the end for which the thing is made. In dealing with causes it is very important first to ascertain the kind of cause, and then make correct assignments. See John ix. 2, 3.

b. Correct forms of argument.

(*a*) Arguments from antecedents to consequents, technically called *a priori*. Paul, in his magnificent oration before Agrippa, adopts this form of argument. "He describes his manner of life from his youth, his training after the straitest sect of his religion, a Pharisee. The inference *a priori* must be

that such an one knew well the prophecies of the Jews and could wisely judge of their fulfilment in the Messiah. Next he recites his bitter prejudices and persecutions of the believers. The inference *a priori* must be that such a man would join himself to them only from overwhelming reasons of conviction." See Isa. lviii. 3–7: Jer. viii. 22: Ezek. xxv. 3–5; xxviii. 2–10: Matt. xix. 26: Acts xxvi. 4–8, 9–11: Heb. vi. 4–6, 18.

(*b*) Arguments from consequents to antecedents, technically styled *a posteriori*. Webster, in his reply to Hayne, reasoned that there ought to be a Union "now and forever, one and inseparable," otherwise the consequences would be "States dissevered, discordant, belligerent, a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, with fraternal blood." See, too, Robert Hall's sermon, *Modern Infidelity*, text, Eph. ii. 12. Compare the reasoning of Job's friends as to the probable antecedents of the patriarch. See also, Isa. ii. 4: Ezek. xiii. 10–15: Habak. ii. 9–16: Hag. i. 9: Matt. vii. 6–20: John viii. 39–43: Acts xvii. 29: Heb. iii. 17, 18: ix. 5, 16. The liability of falling into error while using this form of argument is seen in Luke xiii. 1–5: John ix. 2, 3.

(*c*) Arguments showing that antecedents or consequents being true progressively up to a given point, will continue to be true beyond that point. Dr. Whately terms this the argument of *progressive approach*. It is very effectively employed in oratory, especially when climax is sought. The student may

prove the omnipotence of God from the government of the world, of the planetary system, and of the stellar universe.

(*d*) Arguments showing that antecedents or consequents being of a given character in one thing or relation, will be of a corresponding character in another thing or relation. See *Analogical Reasoning*, page 201.

(*e*) Arguments showing that antecedents or consequents being true in a given case, are still more probably true in another given case, technically termed *a fortiori*. It is a very popular argument and is well adapted to oratory. See Burke's self-defence on *Catholic Emancipation*, beginning, "A great terror fell upon this kingdom," &c. Also *Julius Cæsar*, Act III., beginning with the display of Cæsar's mantle. And see 2 Sam. xii. 1–14: Isa. vii. 13: Jer. xii. 5: Ezek. xv. 5; xxiii. 24: Mal. i. 8: Matt. iv. 25–34; vii. 11, 12; x. 24, 25; xxv. 30: Luke xxiii. 31: John x. 35: Rom. viii. 32: Heb. ii. 2, 3; ix. 13, 14; xii. 25: 1 Peter iv. 17, 18: 1 Cor. vi.

(*f*) Arguments showing that since certain antecedents or consequents are accepted, they lead necessarily to the acceptance of others which have been rejected, termed *argumentum ad hominem*. Quotations from an author with whom the opponent agrees, is essentially this form of argument. See Cicero's *Defence of Ligarius*, beginning, "But I ask, who says it was a crime," &c. Butler's *Analogy* frequently uses this argument. All the parables

of the Old Testament, and most of our Lord's, involve this form of argument. See also, Jonah iv. 10, 11: Matt. vii. 3, 5; xii. 27, 28: John vii. 22, 23: Acts xvii. 28, 29: 1 Cor. xv. 29, 30.

(*g*) Arguments showing that one or more opposing antecedents or consequents must be true, and that whichever is true a certain other proposition must also be true, technically termed *Dilemma.* Pyrrho, the ancient sceptic, asserted that no one can have certain knowledge of anything. One of his friends involved him in the following dilemma: "You either know what you say to be true, or you do not know it; if you do know it to be true, that very knowledge proves your assertion to be false, and you do wrong to make it. If you do not know it to be true, you do wrong to assert it, since no one has a right to assert what he does not know to be true; therefore, in either case, you do wrong to assert that no one can have certain knowledge of anything." See page 43. Also see Patrick Henry's oration on the war, beginning, "We must resort either to submission," &c. See Matt. xii. 25–28; xxi. 25–27: Mark xii. 14, 18–23; 35–37: Luke xx. 2–8: Acts v. 38, 39.

(*h*) Arguments showing that certain antecedents and consequents are reasonable, by showing the absurdity or impossibility of their opposites, technically called *reductio ad absurdum*, or *per impossibile.* This mode of reasoning is often adopted in mathematics. It is a favorite argument with Socrates. The evangelical by this method can often

silence the anti-evangelical both as to the doctrine of endless punishment and the deity of Christ. See Erskine's *Defence of St. Asaph*, beginning, "Every sentence contained in this little book," &c. See also, Isa. x. 15; xxix. 16; xl. 12–26; xliv. 6–20; xlvi. 1–7; lv. 2: Jer. x. 3–5; xxii. 15: Mal. 1–8.

(*i*) Arguments showing the nature or results of given antecedents and consequents by showing the nature of their opposites, termed *reductio per contraria*. Like the last, it is a negative method, but is popular and often very effective. If, in trying to convince a person of the advantages of education, the disadvantages of ignorance are presented; or if the benefits of Sabbath observance are shown by stating the evils of Sabbath breaking, the reasoning falls under this class. This argument was often employed by the early apologists when showing the advantages of Christianity over Paganism. There is an approach to this form of argument in Eph. ii., where the apostle compares what the Ephesians were by nature, with what they are by grace. See also, Matt. v. 45–47.

Such are the forms into which argumentative speech shapes itself. The mastery of them is not difficult; and when fully mastered the speaker can easily decide what form of argument should be chosen in unfolding any given subject; he can also easily classify arguments when properly presented, and detect fallacies when they are offered in place of sound arguments.

CHAPTER III.

PRACTICAL OBSERVATIONS UPON ARGUMENTATIVE SPEECH.

THEY are subdivided into such as relate to : —

1. *Ordinary Discourse.*

(1) Avoid the use of weak arguments. Arguments like materials used in mechanics, are tested not at the strongest, but at the weakest points. In courts of justice, the use of a worthless witness is liable to lead to the acquittal of the prisoner, though the other evidence had been sufficient for conviction. The opponent, if skilful, will glide over the weightier arguments presented, but will dwell upon, and magnify the weaknesses of those that have but little weight. It was this art which greatly aided Demosthenes in gaining his conquest over Æschines.

(2) Avoid the use of arguments which prove too much. Often men are encumbered with their own logic. Dr. James Freeman Clarke, in his *Orthodoxy, its Truths and Errors*, in an attempt to show that hell limits the divine omnipotence, reasons thus: "Unless God's laws are obeyed, God is not obeyed; and he is not a Sovereign if not obeyed." Should the Doctor be called upon to treat of the evils and disobedience of humanity for the last six

thousand years he would discover that the foregoing reasoning has proved too much; for God is not obeyed; and he has never been obeyed by all; still he is Sovereign. A king is a king though there are rebels in his dominions.

(3) One should avoid the use of arguments which may be turned against him upon some other occasion. Though successful to-day in their use, he may meet great embarrassment to-morrow. The preacher for instance, in his zeal to inspire benevolence, or to increase the contributions of the church for a given cause insists, without qualification, that benevolent gifts on earth shall meet reward in heaven; he may afterwards find himself embarrassed while preaching upon the doctrine of "justification by faith alone."

(4) If one is strong upon the ground occupied he should avoid yielding to temptations to take other grounds respecting whose strength he is not confident. Success in oratory, as in military tactics, is achieved by simply remaining on the defensive when the enemy's success is conditioned upon dislodging the one thus entrenched.[51]

(5) One should avoid the presentation of given argumentative propositions if he doubts his ability to maintain them. It is very demoralizing to put one's self into position where an advance must be followed by a retreat. State only what can be proved; then prove it.

(6) Avoid what is sometimes termed "logical scent;" better termed, *illogical scent*. The follow-

ing is an illustration: A minister announced that he was to preach upon the "Final Judgment." But his sermon was upon the "Use of Tea and Coffee." The development was thus: "If asked to contribute to the *Missionary Cause* you reply that you are not able. And yet you are constantly indulging in luxuries." Then followed a lengthy discussion upon the use, expenses and effects of tea and coffee. In the conclusion the preacher remarked that all these things were luxuries and would most certainly be brought into the final judgment.

Dr. Campbell contributes the following respecting a lecturer who advertised that he would speak upon *Optics*. The development was thus: "Optics is the science of telescopes and spectacles; but these are useless without eyes. Now eyes are external senses of seeing, but our senses point us to our Creator, and this idea lies at the foundation of the Christian religion; our introductory lecture therefore upon *Optics* will be upon the *Evidences and Excellences of the Christian Religion.*"

The narrations of illiterate people abound in these illogical wanderings. Cousins and second cousins are constantly introduced; the question frequently recurring, What was I saying?

(7) Avoid, especially in popular address, all technical terms. They are extremely wearisome to the mass of people. Our Lord never used them; this is one reason why "the common people heard him gladly." Much upon this subject can be learned by listening to stump speakers and to those

lawyers who are eminently successful before jurors. See also pp. 97-102.

(8) Seek to present fully and fairly the more important arguments. It is an established rule in argumentation that one strong argument perfectly elaborated is worth a score of weak ones however well developed. "One whole truth is worth sixty half truths."

"Arguments should be weighed rather than numbered," said Cicero. Like Gideon, it is often well to dismiss all but the mighty handful. Judges vii. 2-8. The law of selection requires that the stronger shall displace the weaker. The success of many lawyers depends largely upon their ability to select two or three strong points in the case, dwelling upon and grouping all else about them.

(9) If it becomes necessary to introduce several comparatively weak arguments, the greatest care must be exercised in their arrangement and grouping.

Take the following example: A person was charged with murder. The advocate accused him thus: "You hoped to receive an inheritance, a rich inheritance; you were in great poverty, and actually beset by your creditors. You had offended the man whose heir you expected to be, and you knew that he contemplated changing his will." "No one of these arguments alone," says Quintilian, "has any great weight, but, taken together, if they strike not like the lightning, yet like hail they come down with repeated blows."

(10) Arguments based upon comprehensive generalizations are to the popular mind the most satisfactory. Generalization is the application of the principles of induction by which one rises from particular instances to general laws. Of this characteristic Burke and Macaulay are remarkable examples. Their fulness of knowledge enabled them to pour forth "a copious stream of examples, illustrations, and analogies, by which their arguments were enriched and enforced." A recent writer says of Macaulay: "He always seems to make us travel on a high causeway, from which the country to right and left, the prospect behind and that in front, lie visibly stretched beneath us, like a plain from a mountain ridge."

(11) Seek in popular address to present arguments in the graphic style. The free introduction of poetic-prose speech will secure this end. Dr. Guthrie is an example of the vigorous graphic, and Edward Everett of that which is more flowing. Vivid and pertinent illustrations are often more effective than the closest line of argument. "It is proverbial," says Carlyle, "that a man of logic cannot prosper." See the Bible method of proving the Omnipotence of God, Ps. cxxxix. See pp. 97–102.

(12) In proportion to the closeness of the reasoning the speaker should seek for the glow and fire of earnestness. Cold logic can melt nothing. The moment that the discourse drags in consequence of the argumentation, should the elegance of the speech

and the force of an enkindled soul come to the rescue. "Set your logic on fire," was a favorite direction of Dr. Lyman Beecher.

(13) In the formal arrangement of arguments seek such methods as harmonize with the rhetorical instincts and intuitions of humanity. "You can find," says J. Q. Adams, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory*, "hundreds of persons able to produce a crowd of good ideas upon any subject, for one that can marshal them to the best advantage. Disposition is to the orator what tactics, or the discipline of armies, is to the military art. And as the balance of victory has almost always been turned by the superiority of tactics and of discipline, so the great effects of eloquence are always produced by the excellence of disposition. There is no part of the science in which the consummate orator will be so decidedly marked out, as by the perfection of his disposition." See Vol. I., pp. 80–84.[52]

(14) Seek to argue persuasively. The *adhesive* elements in speech are vital. Unless the hearer is persuaded, the case is practically lost. To vanquish one is not enough; to lead him from a state of indecision, indifference or torpor to a settled determination should be the constant aim. If the arguments are hard let the words be proportionately gentle and kind, though violating the laws of rhetorical harmony. In the conclusion of an address, reasoning for the purpose of carrying conviction, must, therefore, always yield to the arts of rhetorical persuasion. The words of Dr. John Hall are worthy of note:

"A remorseless logic, clear and irresistible by a logician, will be set at defiance by many a human heart that would be influenced by a tone of tenderness in the voicé, or a tear in the eye. Not that the tears are to supersede the argument, but to accompany it, and carry its force from the head to the heart. You may hear men preach when they seem to pierce, crush, and trample upon their opponents; and they make every hearer an opponent. Indignation, scorn, sarcasm, ridicule, all come into play; and the preacher, having it all his own way, treats himself to a triumph at the close. This is not persuasive. It lacks the first elements of true preaching."

(15) All arguments should cease when the hearers are convincèd; reasoning must then give place to persuasive oratory.

2. *Debate.* There are two general varieties of debate which are based, in the one case upon the absence, and in the other upon the presence of an opponent.

(1) The opponent being absent or silent, is represented by the speaker. The views of the absent or silent party are first presented and then refuted, either by direct attack or indirectly by the presentation and defence of opposite views. In this variety of debate the speech often takes the form of rhetorical dialogue.

This method is adopted, in a certain measure, whenever the speaker states an objection of any kind and then refutes it. As to the extent to which such

refutation may be profitably carried, there is great variety of opinion. The Jesuits never refute objections; they announce and command compliance. It has been complained of Jonathan Edwards that he was not sufficiently considerate of the objections which his opponents could have presented. The present age and our democratic institutions, will not, of course, brook very much dogmatic intolerance. On the other hand there are eminent divines, for instance Bourdaloue, Massillon, and Dr. Chalmers, who have devoted entire sermons to their opponents' objections. When the discourse takes this form of debate the following directions should be observed:

a. Guard against a too elaborate refutation of unimportant objections. Disproportionate attention to such objections will tend unduly to magnify their importance.

b. Guard against vehemence while refuting objections. One is thereby in danger of rousing strong opposition to himself and his views.

c. The correct placing of objections requires the exercise of great skill and judgment. If the objection is deeply rooted in the minds of the hearers, it should be fairly met near the introduction, because direct argument will accomplish but little when the hearers reflect that there are still remaining weighty but unanswered and unnoticed objections. On the other hand there should not be an attempt at complete refutation until the main argument has been shown to be reasonable, because prejudices cannot be broken down by merely combating them.

While there may be instances in which refutation would be better distributed through the discourse, or reserved until the conclusion is reached, yet the well-nigh universal rule is to state and refute objections either in the middle of the argument or near the introduction.

A recent writer upon this subject states the matter thus:

"Generally speaking, then, the *refutation of objections* should be near the middle of the argument, so that the arguments refuted may not make either the first or the last impression. The beginning and the end of an argumentative, as of a dramatic, composition are the most important parts."

d. As a rule, it is wise to adduce what is sufficient, but not much more than is sufficient fairly to meet the objection. Dr. Boyd illustrates the point by laborers who are careful while driving wedges into blocks of wood to use blows of no greater force than are just sufficient for the purpose, lest the elasticity of the wood shall throw the wedge out completely.

It is known that in courts of law the prisoner may escape if too much is laid to his charge. Some writers upon the subject of debate, consequently, warn against such an overthrow of objections as shall provoke the opposition of strongly prejudiced hearers, lest their self-esteem shall be affronted. Men greatly dislike to have it appear that they have been consummate fools.

(2) The opponent being present, states and defends his own views. The fundamental principle underlying the following directions as to this variety of debate, is, that the object for which men come together in discussion is to discover the truth of the subjects presented. The excellent observations of Holyoke in *Rudiments of Public Speaking and Debate*, are in point, and worthy of note.

"The object of discussion is not the vexatious chase of an opponent, but the contrastive and current statement of opinion. Therefore, endeavor to select leading opinions, to state them strongly and clearly, and when your opponent replies, be content to leave his argument side by side with your own, for the judgment of the auditors. In no case disparage an opponent, mistake his views, or torture his words, and thus for the sake of a triumph, produce lasting ill-feelings. Your sole business is with *what* he says, not *how* he says it, nor *why* he says it. Your aim should be that the audience should lose sight of the speaker and be possessed with the subject, and that those who come the partisans of persons, shall depart the partisans of principles. The victory in a debate lies not in lowering an opponent, but in raising the subject in public estimation. Controversial wisdom lies not in destroying an opponent, but in destroying his error; not in making him ridiculous, so much as in making the audience wise."

Directions as to this variety of debate are enumerated thus:

a. Accusations of insincerity should not be indulged. The business is to present and answer arguments, not to investigate motives.

b. Reflections against the character or standing of the opponent, violate the rules of honorable

debate. The character of the debater may be questionable; he may lack wisdom; his social position may be below that of his hearers, but these matters are not under investigation. What the man has said demands attention, nothing else. See Pitt's reply to Walpole, when charged with being a young man.

c. The misrepresentation of an opponent, attributing to him views which he has not expressed, is not honorable.

d. The treatment of an opponent's views contemptuously, or an opponent abusively, is ungentlemanly and fundamentally wrong.

e. Resort to sophistry, either in presenting one's own views or in replying to an opponent, betrays a species of dishonesty.

f. Debaters should guard against mistaking violence or rashness for either chivalry or courage. See James i. 19, 20.

g. It is usually unwise to attack an opponent who has much greater or much less ability than your own. For, gaining a conquest over an insignificant foe is felt to be of but small account. And upon very able antagonists, on the other hand, hesitate to make an attack. While there may be times when a stripling may be called to confront a Goliah, still, ordinarily, the New Testament directions would better be heeded. Luke xiii. 28, 32.

h. It is far wiser either to pass in silence the really strong arguments of an opponent, or even frankly to acknowledge their weight, than attempt what will prove but a feeble attack. "If you wish to cut

the flesh do not strike against a coat of mail," was a common saying in the times of chivalry. If unanswerable arguments have been presented and have left a strong impression upon the minds of the hearers it is often wise to admit their full force, and then build up an unanswerable argument on the other side of the question. It is not honorable after admitting the force of a strong argument to say, "we will waive this point at present," if there is really no intention of returning to it.

i. Presume that the audience is against you unless you have the first word.

j. The leading step in debate is clearly and accurately to define all terms to be employed.

k. Next, the speakers should ascertain what common ground there is lying between them, which each can occupy.

l. Then let them agree upon the inevitable conclusions which are deducible from those common grounds. In this way the debate may end before it begins, and everything be gained that could have resulted had the discussion continued.

m. Unimportant points may wisely be conceded for the sake of the argument. It may be the part of wisdom for the debater to say, I concede this or that point. President Lincoln's legal method has been thus represented by a member of the Chicago bar: "He was wise in knowing what to attempt and what to let alone. He was fair to the court, the jury, and his adversary; candor compels me to say, however, that he, by practice learned there was

power in this. As he entered the trial, where most lawyers object, he would say he 'reckoned' it would be fair to admit this or that; and sometimes when his adversary could not prove what Mr. Lincoln knew to be the truth, he would say he 'reckoned' it would be fair to admit the truth to be so and so. When he did object to the court, after he heard his objection answered, he would often say, 'Well, I reckon I must be wrong.' Now, about the time he had practised this three-quarters through the case, if his adversary did not understand him he would wake up finding that he had feared the Greeks too late. When the whole thing was unravelled the adversary began to see that what he was so blandly giving away was simply what he could not get and keep. By giving away six points and carrying the seventh he carried his case; the whole case hanging on the seventh, he traded everything off which would not aid him in carrying that vital point." See Eccl. xi. 9: Joshua xxiv. 14, 15: Matt. xv. 23–28: Luke xii. 49–53: James ii. 19.

n. It is a stroke of good policy to concede ability, and when it can be truthfully done, a thorough understanding of the case, to the opponent.

o. It is a fundamental requisition, in debate, to deal fairly with an opponent's arguments. If the arguments of one of the parties are weighty, let the fact be frankly conceded by the second party; if the second party, during the discussion, restates the arguments of the first party, the restatement should not be such as to diminish their weight, provided

they were at first fairly stated. It is a universally recognized rule that any attempt to lessen the force of an opponent's valid reasoning "by wit, cavilling, or ridicule," is a grave violation of honorable controversy. See Dr. Hey; Kirwan's *Logic;* Hedge's *Logic.* The candor with which Darwin has presented the objections lying against his theory is much in his favor, placing him in an enviable position as compared with many of his opponents. If, however, an opponent's arguments are fallacious, the fallacies should be detected and exposed. But it should be borne in mind that when unfairness in reasoning results from ignorance, the exposure should be far gentler than if the sophistry has been intentional. Furthermore, if a given debater has presented arguments which seem of weight to the audience, and yet are not sound, the fallacy at the time being unanswerable, then his opponent may dispose of such arguments as Demosthenes did the charges made against himself by his adversary, "reduce them to the smallest possible size and lay them away very quietly in the middle of the speech."

p. If arguments are presupposed, the intention being to refute them and thus silence the opponent before he can present his case, they should have the fairest if not the strongest conceivable presentation, especially if they can be refuted. Josh. xxiv. 14, 15: Eccl. xi. 9: Isa. xlix. 14: Luke xii. 49–53: Rom. ix. 19; 1 Cor. xv. 35–39: James ii. 19.

q. If compelled to grapple with an ugly and abusive opponent, it is wise to condense; give

rapid blows; hurl them with dignity and might, and make as short work of the debate as the case will allow. To prolong such conflicts is not profitable.

r. It is important in ordinary debate to maintain good-temper. Unless one is on guard, the discussion will become excited, ending in either didactic harshness or dogmatic abusiveness.

s. The oratoric method is best adapted for the purposes of popular debate. See pages 201–212.

There is a prevailing sentiment that the modern legislative, platform, and especially pulpit speech, has no very high merit for logical exactness. There is but one effectual answer to such a charge, namely, *logical exactness*. The public has already decided, that he who *dares not* reason is a slave; he who *will not* is a bigot; and he who *cannot* is a fool.

SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES.

Note *. (Page 24.)

For a full account of the constitutional defects which Demosthenes overcame, see *De Oratore*, lxi.

Note I. (Page 25.)

Says Plutarch in his biography of Cicero (*Plutarch's Lives*):

"Upon the whole it appears that Demosthenes did not take Pericles entirely for his model. He only adopted his action and delivery, and his prudent resolution not to make a practice of speaking from a sudden impulse, or on any occasion that might present itself; being persuaded that it was to that conduct he owed his greatness. Yet, while he chose not often to trust the success of his powers to fortune, he did not absolutely neglect the reputation which may be acquired by speaking on a sudden occasion. And, if we believe Eratosthenes, Demetrius the Phalerean, and the comic poets, there was a greater spirit and boldness in his unpremeditated orations than in those he had committed to writing. Eratosthenes says that, in his extemporaneous harangues he often spoke as from a supernatural impulse; and Demetrius tells us that, in an address to the people, like a man inspired, he once uttered this oath in verse:

"'By earth, by all her fountains, streams, and floods.'"

Note II. (Page 26.)

See *Plutarch's Lives.*

Note III. (Page 27.)

Macaulay, in his essay on *Athenian Orators*, speaks highly of the critical character of an Athenian audience. We have quoted from him in *Fate of Republics*, pp. 168, 169.

There must have been far more freedom and inspiration in an Athenian and Roman Audience than in the modern, especially when the speaker now feels that several *reporters* are present. Says Mathews, *Orators and Oratory:*

"The practice of addressing the reporter, a practice unknown in the days of Bolingbroke, Chesterfield, and Chatham, has in another way, still further revolutionized the style of public speech-making. As the best reporters fall short of perfect accuracy, many speakers prefer to be their own reporters; in other words, prepare their speeches in manuscript; and now the custom of writing out speeches and committing them to memory, is leading to that of reading them."

NOTE IV. (Page 29.)

The confession has to be made that when Demosthenes saw that his country was doomed and that his own prestige had gone, he was corrupted by the gold of Susa and Ecbatana.

NOTE V. (Page 36.)

An outline of these two celebrated speeches may be of interest to the student.

THE ORATION OF ÆSCHINES.

I. Introduction.
   There are factions in the state; these lead to illegal proceedings; they must be stopped.

II. The proceedings of Ctesiphon as to Demosthenes were illegal.
   1. Because the law forbade a magistrate to be crowned before the accounts of his office had been accepted.
   2. The fact that Demosthenes had expended his own money in the public service did not clear him from the law.
   3. Demosthenes held two offices at the time Ctesiphon proposed to crown him.
   4. And further, Ctesiphon had proposed the coronation in an illegal place.

III. Demosthenes did not deserve this honor.
   1. On account of his private character.
   2. On account of his public character.
      (1) Demosthenes acted against the interests of his country in making peace with Philip in the first period of his career, and in exhibiting a servile spirit towards him.

(2) After Philip had passed Thermopylæ, Demosthenes suddenly changed his policy, blamed his fellow-ambassadors for the peace, instigated war against Philip, made disadvantageous alliances, and was guilty of the grossest corruption.

(3) He then brought disgrace on himself and ruin on his country by upholding the Amphissians in their sacrilege, and by the alliance with Thebes.

(4) After the battle of Chæronea, Demosthenes fled from Athens, and upon his return took no part in public affairs until the death of Philip, when he suddenly assumed courage, procured the passage of decrees honoring Philip's murderer, ridiculed Alexander at a distance, but quailed when he was near, and finally sold himself to him.

(5) Demosthenes was not a friend to true liberty.

IV. There was a necessity of greater strictness in conferring public honors, and in confining speakers to their subject.

V. He compared himself with Demosthenes.

VI. Reiterated the illegality of the decree, and the unworthiness of Demosthenes.

VII. And warned the judges to be on their guard against the eloquence of Demosthenes, or the influence of personal friendship for him.

VIII. Conclusion.

THE ORATION OF DEMOSTHENES.

I. Introduction.

1. Appeal to the gods.

2. Claim of right to his own order of thought. (For Æschines had been anxious that the judges should confine Demosthenes to the same order of thought which he himself had used, or otherwise restrict him, and Demosthenes protested against this at the outset.)

3. He had a greater stake in this trial.

II. Refutation of charges foreign to the indictment.

1. He would not refute the charges against his private life, but he would leave the judges to decide from their knowledge of him.

2. As to the charges against his public life, they were obviously dictated by malice, and were therefore false, as could be shown in one instance, namely, the peace with Philip. For this peace had been proposed, not by himself, but by Æschines, who with his friends had been bribed by Philip, after which Philip gained other traitors like Æschines everywhere.

III. Refutation of charges in the indictment.

1. Review of his public life and measures.

(1) Philip had been taking advantage of the corrupt and divided state of Greece to gain dominion over her.

(2) Athens could not, consistently with her honor, take any other course than resistance.
(3) Philip had violated the peace by seizing certain allied cities of Athens.
(4) And by seizing certain vessels.
(5) Philip had acquitted him of any blame in a letter to the Athenians.
(6) His first measures of hostility to Philip had been in resisting his unjust encroachments.
(7) The succor sent to Byzantium and the Perinthians had been of the same nature.
(8) It was no objection to the policy of assistance that these states had formerly been hostile.
(9) In addition to this, he had introduced valuable reforms into the navy.

2. The legality of the proposal of Ctesiphon to crown him.
(1) He was not responsible for his accounts.
(2) This had been acknowledged by Æschines.
(3) The place named was in accordance with the law.

IV. Strictures upon the character and policy of Æschines as compared with his own.

1. The character and course of Æschines:
(1) His low origin and early life in low pursuits.
(2) His late appearance in public life.
(3) Numerous proofs of his treasonable connection with Philip.
(4) He continued to act in the interest of Philip after the designs of the latter were known, especially in the Amphictyonic war.
(5) Æschines had assisted Philip, and was therefore the guilty cause of all the evils which had befallen his country.

2. His own policy.
(1) The Theban alliance, to which Æschines had not objected at the time when it was his duty to do so.
(2) Athens could not have taken any other course consistent with honor.
(3) Further remarks on the Theban alliance, and events immediately subsequent.
(4) Through all these measures he had enjoyed the confidence of the people.

3. Further comparisons between himself and Æschines.
4. His answer to the warning of Æschines as to his oratory.
5. Final reasons for being crowned.
(1) Because he had never taken bribes.
(2) Because of his policy.
(3) Because of his patriotism.

V. Conclusion. See De Mill's *Elements of Rhetoric*, page 331, &c.

NOTE VI. (Page 36.)

"His (Demosthenes') style is rapid harmony exactly adjusted to the sense; it is vehement reasoning, without any appearance of art; it is disdain, anger, boldness, freedom, involved in a continuous argument; and of all human productions the orations of Demosthenes present to us the models which approach the nearest to perfection."—*David Hume.*

NOTE VII. (Page 40.)

Compare Paul in Rom. viii. 37–39.

"Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors, through him that loved us.

"For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come.

"Nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

NOTE VIII. (Page 41.)

This excellent climax is cited by both Lord Brougham and Quintilian, and is imitated by Cicero, *pro Milone:*

"Neque vero se populo solum sed etiam Senatui commisit; neque Senatui modo, sed etiam publicis præsidiis et armis; neque iis tantum, verum etiam ejus potestati cui Senatus totam rempublicam, omnem Italiæ pacem, cuncta populi Romani arma commiserat."

NOTE IX. (Page 41.)

Lord Brougham, speaking of this passage, says:

"The beauty of this passage is very striking. Not merely the exquisite diction, the majesty of the rhythm, the skilful collocation, the picturesque description of Æschines' dismay and skulking from the public rejoicings, but the argument is to be observed and admired. It is a dilemma, and one which would be quite sufficient for the momentary victory at which alone an orator often aims. It is not closely reasoned, it is not a complete dilemma; a retort is obvious (to use the language of the logicians), and this is always fatal, being the test before which no bad dilemma can stand."

NOTE X. (Page 48.)

Compare Luke iii. 7–10: Matt. xxiii. 13–39.

Note XI. (Page 59.)

There is strong confirmation on this point. Says Bautain:

"The orator should have a strong constitution; he should have a sound head, a good digestion, and, above all, a robust chest; for nothing is so fatiguing or so exhausting as declamation when long continued. I speak of oratorical declamation, which brings simultaneously into action the whole person, moral and physical, — the head, all the economy of which is strained to the uttermost by extemporization; the lungs, which inhale and respire with violence, frequently with a shock and a gulp, according to the discourse; the larynx, which is expanded and contracted precipitately; the nervous system, which is wound up to the highest degree of sensibility; the muscular system, which is keenly agitated by the oratorical stage-play, from the sole of the foot to the tips of the fingers; and, finally, the blood, which warms, boils, makes heart and arteries beat with quick strokes, and shoots fire through the whole organization, till the humors of the body evaporate and stream in drops of perspiration along the surface of the skin. Judge from this whether, in order to bear such fatigue, health and vigor be required."

Says Dr. Storrs:

"The general and harmonious intellectual vigor, whereby one conceives subjects clearly and fully, analyzes them rapidly, sets them forth with exactness in an orderly presentation, and urges them powerfully on those who listen — this requires opulence of health; a sustained and abounding physical vigor. In the absence of this, the power will decline. If the mind still works energetically at all, it will do so only by jerks and in spasms, not continuously; will do it with particular faculties, not with the consentaneous and co-operating energy of all its powers, working together for a noble result. It may surprise men still, but it hardly by possibility will sway and inspire them.

"The intellectual man is always in the best condition for effective, vigorous, sustained mental effort when his physical vigor is most nearly at its height. It is not necessary to go into any argument to show this, or carefully to develop the subtle relations between physiology and psychology. Experience proves it.

"Every student knows, for example, how easy and swift mental processes are on some days, which on others are tardy and difficult; because in the one case the mind takes vigor from the body, and the thoughts go forth refreshed by its health, while in the other case there seems to be a mist on the brain, from some perturbed state of the physical system, or the invisible spiritual muscle which holds the mind to a strict and searching investigation of subjects has been silently relaxed."

"Health is the bed-plate, on which the whole mental machinery must rest and work. If this be cracked, or displaced, all the mechanism that stands on it will be jarred and disturbed, and made ineffective."

Thomas Carlyle, in his *Inaugural Address*, enforces this same thought thus:

"Finally, gentlemen, I have one advice to give you, which is practically of very great importance, though a very humble one. In the midst of your zeal and ardor — for such, I foresee, will rise high enough, in spite of all the counsels to moderate it that I can give you — remember the care of health. I have no doubt you have among you young souls ardently bent to consider life cheap, for the purpose of getting forward in what they are aiming at of high; but you are to consider throughout, much more than is done at present, and what it would have been a very great thing for me if I had been able to consider, that health is a thing to be attended to continually; that you are to regard that as the very highest of all temporal things for you. There is no kind of achievement you could make in the world that is equal to perfect health. What to it are nuggets and millions? The French financier said, 'Why, is there no sleep to be sold!' Sleep was not in the market at any quotation."

NOTE XII. (Page 65.)

The importance of the point before us leads us to dwell upon it for a moment. Says Leighton:

"The most approved teachers of wisdom in a human way have required of their scholars that, to the end their minds might be capable of it, they should be purified from vice and wickedness. And it was Socrates' custom when any one asked him a question, seeking to be informed of him, before he would answer he asked him concerning his own qualities and course of life."

Ruskin insists that no false person can paint. See *Modern Painters*, Vol. V., page 203.

Says Dr. Punshon:

"Depend upon it, the heroism which the pulpit needs — which it never needed in this world's history half so much as it needs to-day, which the ministry must have — will not be wrought in the soul unless this thought is there: 'commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God.'"

Dr. Franklin regarded the reputation for honesty as more important to a speaker than even the "action" which De-

mosthenes so earnestly emphasized. In his Diary, under date of July 27, 1784, he states that Lord Fitzmaurice, having come to him for advice, he "mentioned the old story of Demosthenes' answer to one who demanded what was the first point of oratory. *Action.* The second? *Action.* The third? *Action.* Which, I said, had been generally understood to mean the action of an orator with his hands, &c., in speaking: but that I thought another kind of action of more importance to an orator who would persuade people to follow his advice, namely, such a course of action in the conduct of life as would impress them with an opinion of his integrity as well as of his understanding; that, this opinion once established, all the difficulties, delays, and oppositions, usually caused by doubts and suspicions, were prevented; and such a man, though a very imperfect speaker, would almost carry his points against the most flourishing orator who had not the character of sincerity."

Says Cowper:

> "Faults in the life breed errors in the brain,
> And these, reciprocally, those again,
> The mind and conduct mutually imprint,
> And stamp their image in each other's mint."

Emerson exclaims:

"What care I what you say, when what you do stands over my head, and thunders in my ear so loud that I cannot hear what you say?"

Again, says this same philosopher:

"It is observable that, as soon as one acts for large masses, the moral element will and must be allowed for, will and must work; and the men least accustomed to appeal to these sentiments invariably recall them when they address nations. Napoleon, even, must accept and use it as he can."

Theodore Parker, in reply to a gentleman who, in 1851, asked by letter how he could acquire an impressive delivery, replied:

"No man can ever be *permanently* an impressive speaker, without being first a man of superior sentiments or superior ideas. Sometimes mere emotion (feeling) impresses, but it soon wearies. Superiority of ideas always commands attention and respect."

M. Droz, in his *Essai sur l'Art Oratoire*, affirms that there is no people sunk so low in immorality as not to regard the reputation of him who addresses them.

"There is no deeper law in human nature than that which compels men to withhold their respect and confidence from one who violates or disregards the primary principles of morality."

NOTE XIII. (Page 69.)

See Ps. cxxvi. 5: Acts xx. 31: 2 Cor. ii. 4. Æschines accuses Demosthenes of trying upon his audience the arts of pathos and tears.

NOTE XIV. (Page 75.)

Dr. Anthon, commenting upon Demosthenes' reply, that "action" is the first, second, and third requisite in an orator, says:

"His idea was this: a lifeless manner on the part of a public speaker shows that his own feelings are not enlisted in the cause which he is advocating, and it is idle for him, therefore, to seek to make converts of others, when he has failed in making one of himself. On the other hand, when the tone of voice, the gesture, the look, the whole manner of the orator, display the powerful feelings that agitate him, his emotion is communicated to his hearers, and success is inevitable. It was not, therefore, mere 'action,' that Demosthenes required in an orator,—an error into which some have fallen from a mistranslation of the Latin rhetorical term 'actio,' as employed by Cicero (Bmb. 37) in mentioning this incident,—but it was an attention to the whole manner of delivery, the look, the tone, the every movement, as so many unerring indications of internal emotion, and of the honesty and sincerity of the speaker."

NOTE XV. (Page 78.)

There is something in physical unction that commends it to the favor of even the most intellectual. Says Emerson:

"Perhaps it is the lowest of the qualities of an orator, but it is on so many occasions, of chief importance,—a certain robust and radiant physical health; or,—shall I say?—great volumes of animal heat. When each auditor feels himself to make too large a part of the assembly, and shudders with cold at the thinness of the morning audience, and with fear lest all will heavily fail through one bad speech, more energy and mellow-

ness are then inestimable. Wisdom and learning would be harsh and unwelcome, compared with a substantial, cordial man, made of milk, as we say, who is a house-warmer, with his obvious honesty and good meaning, and a hue-and-cry style of harangue, which inundates the assembly with a flood of animal spirits, and makes all safe and secure, so that any and every sort of good speaking becomes at once practicable. I do not rate this animal eloquence very highly; and yet, as we must be fed and warmed before we can do any work well, — even the best, — so is this semi-animal exuberance, like a good stove, of the first necessity in a cold house."

NOTE XVI. (Page 79.)

Says Bishop Simpson, speaking of unction:

"It is difficult for me to tell what that power is; but it is something that comes from the Lord, preparing the minister and the member of the Church for the great work. It is getting so near to God that divine power permeates and enlivens the soul. One element of this is 'holy boldness.' . . . . Another element is the conviction of the intimate presence and inflowing strength of the Lord Jesus Christ into our hearts."

Phillips Brooks, speaking of this same power, says:

"It is that by which a man loses himself, and becomes but the sympathetic atmosphere between the truth on the one side of him, and the man on the other side of him. It is the possession — what I have heard called the 'demon' of preaching."

The biographies of John Livingston, Richard Baxter, and George Whitefield will still further illustrate this subject.

NOTE XVII. (Page 81.)

Says Dr. Newman, in *Lectures on University Subjects*.

"I do not mean that a preacher must aim at *earnestness*, but that he must aim at his *object*, which is to do some spiritual good to his hearers, and which will at once *make* him earnest. It is said that, when a man has to cross an abyss by a narrow plank thrown over it, it is his wisdom not to look at the plank along which lies his path, but to fix his eyes steadily on the point in the opposite precipice at which the plank ends. It is by gazing at the object which he must reach, and ruling himself by it, that he secures to himself the power of walking to it straight and steadily. The case is the same in moral matters; no one will become really earnest by aiming directly at earnestness; any one may become earnest by meditating on the motives, and by drinking at the sources, of earnestness.

We may of course work ourselves up into a pretence, nay, into a paroxysm, of earnestness; as we may chafe our cold hands till they are warm. But when we cease chafing, we lose the warmth again; on the contrary, let the sun come out and strike us with his beams, and we need no artificial chafing to be warm. The hot words, then, and energetic gestures of a preacher, taken by themselves, are just as much signs of earnestness as rubbing the hands or flapping the arms together are signs of warmth; though they are natural where earnestness already exists, and pleasing as being its spontaneous concomitants. To sit down to compose for the pulpit with a resolution to be eloquent, is one impediment to persuasion; but to be determined to be earnest is absolutely fatal to it."

Except for this element of passion, actors like Garrick, the elder Kean, the elder Booth, and Macready, would not have risen above a multitude of others belonging to their profession. Says Edwin P. Whipple:

"The teacher who succeeds best is he who puts his whole soul into his speech, and thus imparts his soul to others in the very process of conveying information to their understandings."

NOTE XVIII. (Page 81.)

"Self-possession can best be gained by having the mind filled with the thoughts of the wonderful message about to be delivered, and the responsibility connected with it. If one feels that God is present, and the words are spoken for him, the timidity arising from the presence of the audience will vanish. — *Simpson.*

See Prov. xxviii. 1: Isa. lvii. 21.

NOTE XIX. (Page 83.)

Dr. Nélaton, the brilliant French surgeon, laid great stress upon the advantages of self-possession. Once he gave voice to a clever paradox, which deserves to be remembered not only by all surgeons but also by all orators. "You are going too quick," he said to an assistant; "we have no time to lose."

NOTE XX. (Page 85.)

Plutarch dwells at length upon this reserve power of Pericles. It is what saves, according to Bautain, from paralysis of expression and intellectual apoplexy. See Homer's description of Ulysses, *Iliad*, III., beginning line 191.

NOTE XXI. (Page 87.)

The answer to this charge of cowardice against Demosthenes and Cicero has been well made by De Mill:

"If these men were not courageous, they certainly were able to simulate courage in a way that is unintelligible to the ordinary mind. Demosthenes showed his courage in having led a great party in times of the utmost peril, and in having over and over again risked his life. Cicero may have had his moments of weakness, but in general he exhibits the utmost boldness, daring, and defiance. His character may be summed up in the words, 'Contempsi Catilinæ gladios, non pertimescam tuos;" and yet his death came from the very swords which he defied. Like Demosthenes, he perished because he had braved the fury of the victorious party. Both of these men, if they had been really timid, would have chosen a safe obscurity, and would have contrived somehow to make their peace with the triumphant party."

"With fear and much trembling," has been the experience of a multitude of orators. Said St. Cyran: "I would rather say a hundred masses than preach one sermon."

Gregory Nazianzen speaks of the "tempest of spirit" which a minister experiences. Luther said; "Although I am old and experienced in speaking, I tremble whenever I ascend the pulpit."

Robert Hall's first three efforts at preaching were distressing failures. Dr. Chalmers was so bashful that he would not venture into the pulpit without his manuscript. The missionary, Dr. Livingstone, in his first sermon, having taken his text, became bewildered and could not utter a word. Then, without apology or remark, he snatched his hat, leaving the congregation to think or say what they pleased. This was the man who afterwards was not afraid of men or lions.

Says Bishop Simpson:

"I have known many a minister who trembled so greatly that with difficulty he ascended the pulpit steps; while, in other cases, the paleness of countenance and drops of cold perspiration have shown the intensity of the mental struggle."

In forensic eloquence the record is much the same. Erskine was "so embarrassed in one of his maiden efforts that he would have abandoned the attempt to harangue juries, had he not felt, as he tells us, "his children tugging at his gown, and urging him on, in spite of his boggling and stammering." Canning often rose to speak in "great fright;" but at such times was sure to do his best.

The early efforts of Curran, Cobden, and Disraeli were failures. The late Earl Derby always seemed cool in his speech, but says: —

"My throat and lips, when I am going to speak, are as dry as those of a man who is going to be hanged."

Daniel Webster, when at the academy in Exeter, was afflicted with such extreme shyness that he took no part in the declamations.

"Many pieces were committed to memory and rehearsed again and again by him in his room; but when his name was called in the school-room, and all eyes were fastened upon him, he was glued to his seat."

Rufus Choate, when beginning a plea, was often extremely nervous. Frequently Patrick Henry, for several minutes after beginning to speak, stammered and hesitated. Gough is still tormented with "stage-fright."

NOTE XXII. (Page 87.)

The heroism of oratory is a subject whose materials would fill a volume. See Arnold's *God and the Bible*, Introduction, p. 43; Tyng's *Christian Pastor*, pp. 128, 129.

"You may assassinate me, but you shall not intimidate me," exclaimed Curran in his *Defence of Bond*.

When Patrick Henry uttered the celebrated passage: "Cæsar had his Brutus, — Charles the First his Cromwell,

—and George the Third"—the cry of "Treason!" was heard from the speaker, and "Treason, Treason!" was echoed from every part of the House. "It was one of those trying moments," says Mr. Wirt, Henry's biographer, "which are decisive of character. Henry faltered not for an instant; but rising to a loftier attitude, and fixing on the speaker an eye of the most determined fire, he finished his sentence with the firmest emphasis,—'*may profit by their example.* If this be treason, make the most of it.'"

Much like oratorical heroism is the heroism of the soldier. The old Greek, whose army was surrounded and attacked on all sides, and whose troops were crying out: "We are fallen among the enemy and are lost!" coolly replied, "How are we fallen among the enemy any more than the enemy is fallen among us?"

Said Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley to an officer who had exclaimed, "We are whipped!" "You are whipped, but I am not whipped."

When General Grant in the "Wilderness" was told by the alarmed scouts and terrified men: "General Lee is in our rear!" he restored courage by responding: "Then I am in his rear."

NOTE XXIII. (Page 88.)

For examples of royal boldness in sacred and pulpit oratory, see *Sword and Garment*, pp. 146, 147.

Says Dr. Punshon:

"Depend upon it, it requires no common boldness to stand single-handed before the pride of birth, the pride of rank, the pride of office, the pride of intellect, and the pride of money, and to rebuke their transgressions, strip off their false confidence, and tear away their refuge of lies."

It was long ago said by Fénelon that "an orator should have nothing either to hope or fear from his hearers with regard to his own interest."

See 2 Chron. xix. 11: Acts iv. 13, 29, 31; xiii. 46: Eph. vi. 20.

NOTE XXIV. (Page 89.)

Says Dr. Storrs:

"The prime element of its attractiveness to such minds is, I think, that it seems to offer them a present living authoritative teacher, which has the mind of God immanent in it, which is the witness and interpreter of Revelation, and in itself the living medium of such Revelation, which has thus authority to decide on all questions of religious doctrine and duty, and whose decisions are infallibly correct and unspeakably important. This is its first claim, and very persuasive. * * * And every mind must admit, I think, that there is a certain grandeur and beauty in this conception of the Church; that our questioning, timid, limited human nature, which is surrounded by so many puzzles and such tremendous problems, may well at times admit the wish that such a conception had been permitted by God to be realized, and not been left as we assuredly hold it to have been, — a delusive dream."

NOTE XXV. (Page 97.)

The nature of the foregoing figures has been discussed in Vol. I. pp. 166–174; 186–205.

NOTE XXVI. (Page 98.)

We are aware, however, that a few writers take an opposite view. Sir W. Hamilton, in an article marvellous for its scope and ability, reaches the conclusion, that mathematical studies exercise the reasoning powers but feebly, being chiefly "conducive to the *one sole intellectual virtue of continuous attention.*"

NOTE XXVII. (Page 100.)

John Foster, speaking of Lord Chatham, says:

"In his speeches he did not reason; he struck, as by intuition, directly on the results of reasoning; as a cannon-shot strikes the mark without your seeing its course through the air as it moves towards its object."

Says David Hume:

"Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room for reason and reflection, but addresses itself entirely to the fancy or the affections, captivates the willing hearers, and subdues their understanding. Happily this pitch it seldom attains."

NOTE XXVIII. (Page 102.)

John Foster, speaking of Taylor, says:

"There is a most manly and graceful ease and freedom in his composition, while a strong intellect is working logically through every paragraph, while all manner of beautiful images continually fall in as by felicitous accident."

NOTE XXIX. (Page 104.)

Quintus, brother of Cicero, differed from Cicero thus: Quintus claimed that eloquence was independent of elegant learning, and attributable to a certain kind of talent and practice. Cicero claimed that it was the offspring of the accomplishments of the most learned men.

Tully, however, as represented by Fénelon, insisted that, because of the pressing necessities and shortness of life, only those parts of knowledge should be demanded which are the most necessary for an orator.

"He would have him at least well instructed in all that part of philosophy which relates to the conduct and affairs of social life. But above all things, he would have an orator know the nature of man, both with regard to his soul and body, and the natural tendency and force of his passions; because the great end of eloquence is to move the secret springs of them. He reckons the knowledge of the laws and constitution to be the foundation of all public discourses; but he does not think a thorough insight into all the particular cases and questions in law to be necessary, because upon occasion one may have recourse to experienced lawyers, whose peculiar profession it is to understand and disentangle such intricate points."

NOTE XXX. (Page 108.)

Wirt was accustomed to remark:

"In the company of men of letters, there is no higher accomplishment than that of readily making an apt quotation from the classics; and before such a body as the Supreme Court these quotations are not only appropriate, but constitute a beautiful aid to argument. They mark the scholar,—which is always agreeable to a bench that is composed of scholars."

NOTE XXXI. (Page 109.)

Fénelon interprets Plato thus:

"He would have orators begin with the study of mankind in general; and then apply themselves to the knowledge of the particular genius and manners of those whom they may have occasion to instruct and persuade. So that they ought first of all to know the nature of man, his chief end and his true interest, the parts of which he is composed, his mind and his body, and the true way to make him happy. They ought likewise to understand his passions, the disorders they are subject to, and the art of governing them; how they may be usefully raised and employed on what is truly good: and, in fine, the proper rules to make him live in peace and discharge his duties in society. After this general study, comes that which is particular."

NOTE XXXII. (Page 111.)

Says Cicero (*De Oratore* ii. 31):

"Abundance of matter begets abundance of words, and if the things spoken of possess nobleness, there will be derived from that nobleness a certain splendor of diction. Only let the man who is to speak or write, be liberally trained by the education and instruction of his boyish days; let him burn with desire of proficiency; let him have natural advantages, and be exercised in innumerable discussions of every kind, and let him be familiar with the finest writers and speakers, so as to comprehend and imitate them; and (nae ille haud sane) you need give yourself no trouble about such a one's needing masters to tell him how he shall arrange or beautify his words."

NOTE XXXIII. (Page 111.)

This is apostolic. See Matt. iv. 23; xxviii. 20: Acts v. 42: Rom. xii. 7: Heb. v. 12: 1 Tim. iii. 2: Titus i. 11.

NOTE XXXIV. (Page 111.)

Surely the preacher should not be less diligent in this field than are men of other professions. The discourses of such preachers as Chillingworth and Butler have been kept by eminent lawyers and statesmen on the same shelf with Kent and Blackstone. Patrick Henry was wont to confess

great indebtedness to the sermons of Samuel Davies. Warren, in his *Law Studies*, recommends the careful perusal of Chillingworth, Butler, Paley and Tillotson as tending to the cultivation of the reasoning faculties. Dryden and Addison confessed their obligations to Tillotson, and William Pitt to Barrow. "There is a living writer," said Dugald Stewart, "who combines the beauties of Johnson, Addison and Burke without their imperfections. It is a dissenting minister of Cambridge, the Rev. Robert Hall. Whoever wishes to see the English in its perfection must read his writings." Jeremy Taylor, more than any other man in England, gave tone to the style of several of the leading British Essayists. Fisher Ames was more diligent in Bible study than many clergymen. Daniel Webster was called the walking concordance by the United States Senate.

NOTE XXXV. (Page 114.)

Says Mathews, in his excellent treatise on *Oratory and Orators:*

"That degree of investigation, of accuracy, of thoroughness, of fastidiousness in the use of terms, which would qualify a person for science and literary composition, would prove fatal to his harangue. Of the political orator, this is especially true. The larger his views, the more abundant his stores of knowledge, the more difficult will it often be to adapt himself to the nimble movements of that guerilla warfare in which debaters chiefly shine. Though his troops may be far more numerous than those of another combatant, and more heavily armed, yet, because he is too fastidious, — because he must pause to effect the best disposition of his battalions, — because his front and his rear must alike be cared for, before he will move, — he may be eclipsed by a person of far inferior powers, who yet can brilliantly manœuvre his more manageable forces on a more limited field. Superior activity and command of weapons may often compensate for inferiority in strength."

Lord Lytton, in his essays on *Life, Literature, and Manners*, calls attention to the fact that Charles James Fox in different places seemed to have been a dual personage:

"In the Fox of St. Stephen's, the nervous reasoner from premises the broadest and most popular, there is no trace of the Fox of St. Ann's, the

refining verbal critic, with an almost feminine delight in the filigree and trinkets of literature. At rural leisure, under his apple-blossoms, his predilection in scholarship is for its daintiest subtleties; his happiest remarks are on writers very little read. But place the great critic on the floor of the House of Commons, and not a vestige of the fine verbal critic is visible. His classical allusions are then taken from passages the most popularly known. And, indeed, it was a saying of Fox's, that 'no young member should hazard in Parliament a Latin quotation not found in the Eton Grammar.'"

NOTE XXXVI. (Page 119.)

We quote from Plutarch:

"His (Cicero's) action was naturally as defective as that of Demosthenes; and therefore he took all the advantage he could from the instruction of Roscius, who excelled in comedy, and of Æsop, whose talents lay in tragedy. This Æsop, we are told, when he was one day acting Atreus, in the part where he considers in what manner he should punish Thyestes, being worked up by his passion to a degree of insanity, with his sceptre struck a servant who happened suddenly to pass by, and laid him dead at his feet. In consequence of these helps Cicero found his powers of persuasion not a little assisted by action and just pronunciation."

NOTE XXXVII. (Page 124.)

What in this respect is true of oratory is true of stage acting and public singing. Says Talma:

"Acting is a complete paradox. The skilful actor calculates his effects beforehand. He never improvises a burst of passion, or an explosion of grief. The agony which appears instantaneous,—the joy that seems to gush forth involuntarily—the tone of the voice, the gesture, the look, which pass for sudden inspiration,—have been rehearsed a hundred times. No, believe me, we are *not* nature, but *art*, and in the excellence of our imitation lies the consummation of our skill."

Says Kean:

"People think because my style is new, and appears natural, that I don't study, and talk about the sudden impulse of genius. There is no such thing as impulsive acting; all is studied beforehand."

The stories that are told of the laboriousness of Charlotte Cushman seem almost incredible. Macready would some-

times frighten the whole neighborhood while practising upon the cry, "murder."

Says Salvini to the pupils of his art:

"Above all, study, — *study*, — STUDY. All the genius in the world will not help you along with any art, unless you become a hard student. It has taken me *years* to master a single part."

The famous vocalist, Madame Malibran, in singing one day the rondo in the opera of La Somnambula, ended with a very high trill upon the *ré*, after having begun with the low *ré*. She had embraced three octaves in her vocalism. After the concert, a friend expressed his admiration of the trill: "Oh," was the reply, "I have sought for it long enough. For three months I have been running after it. I have pursued it everywhere — while arranging my hair; while dressing; and I found it one morning in the bottom of my shoes, as I was putting them on."

All this reminds one of what Sir Thomas Browne says of "natural logic."

"Where natural logic prevails not, artificial too often faileth; but when industry builds upon nature, we may expect pyramids."

NOTE XXXVIII. (Page 124.)

There is, doubtless, danger that a man may be trammelled by his pen if he ventures to speak only that which he has written. Write upon one theme and speak upon another, is a rule recommended by several teachers of this subject.

NOTE XXXIX. (Page 124.)

See *De Oratore*, Section xxxiii.

NOTE XL. (Page 126.)

See John Hall's *God's Word Through Preaching*, pp. 124–126, 141, 144.

NOTE XLI. (Page 131.)

See *Diction and Idiom*, Vol. I, pp. 68–77.

Macaulay, in his essay entitled, *Criticisms on Italian Writers*, says:

"I have heard the most eloquent statesmen of the age remark that, next to Demosthenes, Dante is the writer who ought to be most attentively studied by every man who desires to attain oratorical eminence."

NOTE XLII. (Page 145.)

The words of Robert Hall *On the Discouragements and Supports of the Christian Ministry* are well chosen:

"In the most awful denunciations of the divine displeasure, an air of unaffected tenderness should be preserved, that while with unsparing fidelity we declare the whole counsel of God, it may appear we are actuated by a genuine spirit of compassion. A hard and unfeeling manner of denouncing the threatenings of the word of God, is not only barbarous and inhuman, but calculated, by inspiring disgust, to rob them of all their efficacy. If the awful part of our message, which may be styled the burden of the Lord, ever fall with due weight on our hearers, it will be when it is delivered with a trembling hand and faltering lips; and we may then expect them to realize its solemn import, when they perceive that we ourselves are ready to sink under it. 'Of whom I have told you before,' said St. Paul, 'and now tell you weeping, that they are enemies of the cross of Christ.' What force does that affecting declaration derive from these tears! An affectionate manner insinuates itself into the heart, renders it soft and pliable, and disposes it to imbibe the sentiments and follow the impulse of the speaker. Whoever has attended to the effect of addresses from the pulpit, must have perceived how much of their impression depends upon this quality, which gives to sentiments comparatively trite a power over the mind beyond what the most striking and original conceptions possess without it."

NOTE XLIII. (Page 152.)

In the October (1880) number of the *Southern Law Journal and Reporter* we read:

"We open the catalogue of our profession and find it barren of a single name which even claims a distinction for force of jury pleadings."

Says a late issue of the *London Law Times:*

"Another observation made by the same writer is that the late judge (Lord Thesiger) laid no claim to the gift of eloquence. No barrister making a large income in the present day does, or would wish to do so. The occasions for its display rarely occur, and in ordinary business to be eloquent is a fatal disqualification, unless counteracted by a large development of prosaic common sense. Fortunes are now being made by barristers to whom oratory is an unknown art."

The *Albany Law Journal* does not regret this loss of forensic eloquence. It says:

"But if eloquence has declined there is some consolation in the fact. Reason is a safer guide for courts of justice than eloquence. The carrying of a bad cause by sheer force of appeals to the sympathies, the prejudices, or the passions, is a degradation of a noble art."

But we may suggest to the *Albany Law Journal* that, perhaps, in the cause of justice and humanity, "the sheer force of appeal" might be of service.

NOTE XLIV. (Page 153.)

Smith, in his *Longinus*, thus speaks of this figure, as used by Paul and in the Book of Job: "'The king knoweth of these things, before whom I also speak freely.' Then in the following he turns short upon him: 'King Agrippa, believest thou the prophets?' and immediately answers his own question: 'I know that thou believest.' Acts xxvi. 26, 27. The smoothest eloquence, the most insinuating complaisance, could never have made such impression on Agrippa as this unexpected and pathetic address.

"To these instances may be added the whole thirty-eighth chapter of Job; where we behold the Almighty Creator expostulating with his creature in terms which express at once the majesty and perfection of the one, the meanness and frailty of the other. There we see how vastly useful the figure of *interrogation* is, in giving us a lofty idea of the Deity, while every *question* awes us into silence, and inspires a sense of our own insufficiency."

Note XLV. (Page 161.)

John B. Gough relates that he was once introduced to a London audience as the greatest orator who had ever lived, the introducer ending a long and fulsome eulogy by telling the people to prepare themselves for such a burst of eloquence as they had never before listened to. Gough, knowing that the best effort he had ever made would, under such circumstances, fall far short of anticipation, determined to practise a trick of oratory — that being, to affect stupidity. He opened by stammering and hesitating, by beginning his sentences and leaving them unfinished, until, as he said, the poorest speaker in England could not have done worse. He soon overheard those on the platform whispering their disapprobation and censure, one man saying, "Oh, this will never do here, you know. It may be all very well in America, you know; but in England, you know, it is quite a different thing." He still continued in his dull, disconnected way until he saw that he had a background for his verbal pictures. Then he gradually adopted his natural manner; and, as sentence after sentence rolled out vivid and resonant from his lips, his audience grew enthusiastic, and fairly roared with applause. He had never been more rapturously greeted than he was then and there. Those who heard him declared that they had never known a man to change so after he had once warmed up.

Note XLVI. (Page 168.)

The following quotations are confirmatory:

"Sentences or apophthegms lend much aid to eloquence. One reason of this is, that they flatter the pride of the hearers, who are delighted when the speaker, making use of general language, touches upon opinions which they had before known to be true in part. Thus, a person who had the misfortune to live in a bad neighborhood, or to have worthless children, would easily assent to the speaker who should affirm that *nothing* is more vexatious than to have any neighbors; nothing more irrational than to bring children into the world." — *Aristotle, Rhet. Lib.* II. c. xxi.

"It's a great mistake to think anything too profound or rich for a popular audience. No train of thought is too deep, or subtle, or grand, — but the manner of presenting it to their untutored minds should be peculiar. It should be presented in anecdote, or sparkling truism, or telling illustration, or stinging epithet; always in some concrete form, never in a logical, abstract syllogistic shape." — *Choate.*

"I have known a great many most admirable preachers who lost almost all real sympathetic hold upon their congregations because they were too literary, too periphrastic, and too scholastic in their diction. They always preferred to use large language rather than good Saxon-English. But let me tell you, there is a subtle charm in the use of plain language, that pleases people, they scarcely know why. It gives bell-notes which ring out suggestions to the popular heart. There are words which men have heard when boys at home, around the hearth and the table; words that are full of father and of mother, and full of common and domestic life. These are the words that afterward, when brought into your discourse, will produce a strong influence on your auditors, giving an element of success; words which will have an effect that your hearers themselves cannot understand. For, after all, simple language is loaded down and stained through with the best testimonies and memories of life." — *Beecher.*

Note XLVII. (Page 168.)

See Tyng's *Christian Pastor*, pp. 41, 58.

Note XLVIII. (Page 169.)

After the breaking up of the court on the last day of a long Yorkshire Assize, Wightman, then at the bar, found himself walking in the crowd cheek-by-jowl with a countryman whom he had seen serving day after day on the jury. Liking the look of the man, he got into conversation with him, and finding that this was his first attendance at the assizes, asked him what he thought of the leading counsel. "Well," was the reply, "that Lawyer Brougham be a wonderful man; he can talk, he can; but I don't think nowt of Lawyer Scarlett." Indeed!" exclaimed Wightman; "you surprise me. Why, you have been giving him all the verdicts." "Oh, there's nothing in that," said the juror; "he be so lucky, you see, he be always on the right side."

"He the best player!" exclaimed a self-constituted critic, after seeing Garrick in Hamlet; "why, I could act as well as he myself. I am sure, if I had seen a ghost, I should have looked in the same manner and done just as he did. The king for my money; he speaks all his words distinctly, half as loud again as the others; anybody may see he is an actor."

NOTE XLIX. (Page 176.)

The purpose of the preacher, in every sermon, should be twofold — *subordinately*, to convince the people of some specific religious truth, by the presentation of reasons, and, *primarily*, to persuade the people to accept the truth presented by the presentation of motives. Says President Finney:

"There were two young ministers who had entered the ministry at the same time. One of them had great success in converting sinners, the other none. The latter inquired of the other, one day, what was the reason of this difference. 'Why,' replied the other, 'the reason is, that I *aim* at a different end from you, in preaching. My object is to convert sinners, but you aim at no such thing.' And then you go and lay it to the sovereignty of God, that you do not produce the same effect, when you never aim at it. Here, take one of my sermons and preach it to your people, and see what the effect will be.' The man did so, and preached the sermon, and it did produce effect. He was frightened when sinners began to weep; and when one came to him after meeting to inquire what he should do, the minister apologized to him, and said, 'I did not aim to wound you, I am sorry if I have hurt your feelings.'"

John Smith, the Wesleyan preacher, used to say:

"God has given me such a sight of the value of precious souls, that I cannot live if souls are not saved."

Matthew Henry said:

"I would think it greater happiness to gain one soul to Christ than mountains of gold and silver to myself."

Doddridge, writing to a friend, remarked:

"I long for the conversion of souls more than for anything beside. Methinks I could not only labor, but die for it with pleasure."

Brainard said he cared not what hardships he went through, so that he might win souls. When he was asleep, he dreamed of these things, and when he awoke his first thought was of this great work. A friend asked Dr. Lyman Beecher, when upon his deathbed, "What is the greatest of all things?" and he replied:

"It is to save souls. It is not theology; it is not controversy; *it is to save souls.*"

NOTE L. (Page 195.)

Professor Huxley, in *Lay Sermons*, thus speaks upon these two methods of reasoning:

"The vast results obtained by science are won by no mystical faculties, by no mental processes, other than those which are practised by every one of us in the humblest and meanest affairs of life. A detective policeman discovers a burglar from the marks made by his shoe, by a mental process identical with that by which Cuvier restored the extinct animals of Montmartre from fragments of their bones. Nor does that process of induction and deduction by which a lady, finding a stain of a particular kind upon her dress, concludes that somebody has upset the inkstand thereon, differ in any way from that by which Adams and Leverrier discovered a new planet. The man of science, in fact, simply uses with scrupulous exactness the methods which we all habitually, and at every moment, use carelessly."

NOTE LI. (Page 221.)

Says Whately:

"A moderate portion of common sense will enable any one to perceive, and to show, on which side the presumption lies, when once his attention is called to this question; though, for want of attention, it is often overlooked; and on the determination of this question the whole character of a discussion will often very much depend. A body of troops may be perfectly adequate to the defence of a fortress against any attack that may be made on it; and yet, if, ignorant of the advantage they possess, they sally forth into the open field to encounter the enemy, they may suffer a repulse. At any rate, even if strong enough to act on the offensive, they ought still to keep possession of their fortress. In like manner, if you have the presumption on your side, and can but *refute* all the arguments brought against you, you have, for the present at least, gained a victory; but if you abandon this position, by suffering this presumption to be forgotten, — which is, in fact, *leaving out one of, perhaps, your strongest*

arguments, — you may appear to be making a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defence."

Every orator would do well to study Colonel Chesney's article on battles, in the *New Encyclopædia Britannica*. Between the lines there is an excellent treatise upon oratory.

NOTE LII. (Page 225.)

An illustration of correct arrangement and transition is found in Burke's speech upon *American Taxation:*

"The repeal of the tax on tea would not necessarily lead to a demand for further concessions.

The repeal of the other taxes has paved the way for the repeal of this.

The exigencies of the East India Company make the repeal necessary.

The tax, though small, is none the less unjust; and is foolish from the very fact of being small.

Its repeal is not inconsistent with the dignity of the government, since a repeal of other taxes has taken place under the same circumstances.

Another example is found in the famous speech of Lord Erskine, in behalf of Lord George Gordon:

After the exordium, he begins by reflecting upon the attorney-general for his obscure introduction.

But agrees with him in his estimate of the greatness of the crime of high-treason.

On account of this, the definition of high-treason is most rigidly and explicitly made by the law.

But if this definition be overstrained, the liberty of the subject would be endangered.

From which he proceeds to give a definition of high-treason, and lays down a criterion by which it may be tested, showing that all departures from this have been prudently checked.

The definition is then applied to the present case, and the argument is brought to bear more directly upon the charge, exhibiting the same characteristic of close connection and outgrowth of one argument from another. This is the chief feature of Lord Erskine's style, and distinguishes him beyond others.

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
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